Georgia Bone & Joint Surgeons, P.C. v. Keel

A medical practice, Georgia Bone & Joint Surgeons, was sued for malpractice and lost at the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which found that even if the trial court erred in refusing a requested jury instruction, the error was harmless. The practice asked the Supreme Court of Georgia to review the case, arguing that the Court's 2009 decision in Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group required trial judges to give a specific instruction telling juries that a mere difference of opinion between doctors does not by itself prove malpractice, whenever a doctor testifies about his own personal practices. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied the petition, meaning it will not review the case further. Justice Bethel wrote separately, joined by two other Justices, to explain that Condra never actually held that such an instruction was required. He also encouraged trial courts not to be afraid to depart from standard pattern jury instructions when the facts of a case call for it.

The Supreme Court of Georgia denied review, and Justice Bethel's concurrence explained that Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group only held that personal-practices testimony is admissible; it did not hold that trial courts must give a specific jury instruction about such testimony.

The concurrence clarifies for Georgia trial judges and malpractice litigants that Condra does not mandate a specific jury instruction on doctors' personal practices, while encouraging judges statewide to tailor jury instructions to the facts rather than sticking rigidly to pattern instructions.

Petition for certiorari denied

1. The concurrence explains that a court's holding, the binding part of a decision, is limited to the reasoning necessary to reach the result, not every comment made along the way.
2. Because Condra addressed only the narrow question of whether an expert's testimony about personal practices is admissible, its passing comment that jury instructions could reduce confusion was not part of its holding.
3. The concurrence notes that Georgia law requires only that a jury charge be adjusted to the evidence and be a correct, complete statement of law, regardless of whether it matches the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions.
4. Because pattern jury instructions are not written or approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia or the legislature, whether a proposed charge follows the pattern instructions says nothing about whether the charge is legally correct.
5. The concurrence concludes that trial courts have discretion to give a tailored personal-practices instruction where the facts of a case warrant it, but nothing in Condra or elsewhere requires them to do so.

• medical malpractice
• jury instructions
• expert witness testimony
• standard of care
• certiorari denial