Williams v. State

================================================================================ Opinion Type: 010combined ================================================================================ NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0998 Jaiden Williams v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County No. 23B011061 Decided: August 18, 2026 COLVIN, Justice. Appellant Jaiden Williams appeals his convictions for mur- der and other crimes related to the shooting death of Orbit Pough. 1 On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence was insuf- ficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his 1 The crimes occurred on July 26, 2021. On March 29, 2023, a Gwinnett County grand jury issued an indictment charging Williams with two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 4), aggravated assault (Count 2), possession of firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3), and criminal attempt to commit possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (Count 5). At the con- clusion of a jury trial in August 2024, the jury found Williams guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Williams to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 1) and five years on probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3), to be served consecu- tively. The trial court merged Williams’s aggravated assault charge (Count 2) into his conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 1) and vacated by operation of law his second felony murder charge (Count 4), which was predicated on his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3). But the trial court also purported to merge Williams’s charge for criminal attempt to commit possession of a Schedule I convictions; that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to in- vestigate Williams’s phone records, which Williams contends con- tain exculpatory evidence; that the trial court abused its discre- tion by admitting a text message conversation retrieved from Pough’s phone; and that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and his trial counsel’s deficient performance denied him a fair trial, even if no single error did so. We disagree and accord- ingly affirm Williams’s convictions. 1. The evidence showed the following. At about 9:20 p.m. on July 26, 2021, witness Darrell Steele was exiting the parking lot of a shopping plaza with his son, Daniel, and an employee. It was “pouring” rain and “extremely dark outside.” As they were driving out of the lot, Daniel noticed a person “hanging out” of another vehicle and got his father’s attention. Steele got out of his truck and ran over to the other vehicle, where he encountered a young man, later identified as Williams, sprawled out of the front controlled substance (Count 5) into Count 4, even though the trial court had vacated Count 4. Though it may have been proper for the trial court to sentence Williams on Count 5, as that count does not appear to merge into his other convictions as a matter of fact or law, this issue has not been raised, and we decline, as an exercise of our discretion, to address any sentencing error with respect to Count 5 because doing so would penalize the defendant. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696–98 (2017) (declining, as an exercise of the Court’s discretion, to address a merger error sua sponte that benefited the defendant because correcting the error would “effectively penalize[ the] defendant[ ] for exercising [his] right to seek appellate review”). Williams filed a timely motion for new trial through new counsel on August 22, 2024, and a brief in support of his motion on June 23, 2025. On August 12, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Williams’s motion, and on October 29, 2025, Williams filed a supplemental brief. On October 30, 2025, the trial court denied Williams’s motion by written order, and Williams filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Williams’s appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term of court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 passenger side of the vehicle and lying on the pavement in the rain. Steele also observed another young man in the driver’s seat, who was later identified as Pough, and went to check his pulse. Apparently finding none, 2 Steele returned to Williams, who had been shot and was pleading with Steele not to “let [him] die.” Steele instructed his son to call 911 and retrieved a rag from his truck, which Steele used to apply pressure to Williams’s neck wound. While Steele was aiding Williams, Williams told Steele that Pough “thought I was trying to rob him, and he shot me, I shot him.” According to Steele, Williams was “very open” about what had happened and explained that “it was a deal that went bad.” Officer Garrett Craig of the Gwinnett County Police De- partment was dispatched at 9:24 p.m. in response to a “person shot call.” When he located Steele, he immediately got out of his patrol car to render aid to Williams. In the process, Officer Craig saw Pough, who “was slumped over” the steering wheel and “looked to be deceased.” While Officer Craig was attending to Wil- liams under the cover of Steele’s umbrella, Officer Craig asked Williams what had happened, and his body-worn camera cap- tured their conversation. The recording of their encounter, which was admitted into evidence at trial and published for the jury, included the following conversation: WILLIAMS: [Pough and I] were talking about some- thing, and he started looking at his phone and started looking suspicious. OFFICER CRAIG: Say again? WILLIAMS: He started looking suspicious because 2 Steele did not testify about the results of his pulse-check, but context and the testimony of other witnesses strongly suggest that Pough was deceased when Steele checked on him. 3 he was on his phone typing about something. And that’s when I had reached — because he had — ’cause his gun was on his side of him and he reached for it — I had a reason why, and I got there before him, but he still shot me. I think he tried to set me up. OFFICER CRAIG: [...] What were you guys doing here? WILLIAMS: We was waiting here because he had a play to make. .... WILLIAMS: ’Cause we were sitting here because ... he sell carts, and he was trying to sell some — OFFICER CRAIG: He sells carts? .... WILLIAMS: — like weed carts. They’re like weed carts. OFFICER CRAIG: Weed, like marijuana? WILLIAMS: Yes. In response to further questions, Williams stated, “I upped it before him, and I hit him before, but he shot me after.... I shot him before he shot me.... because he reached for his gun.” After a few minutes, EMS providers arrived and transported Williams to the hospital, but Pough was confirmed dead at the scene. Detective C.J. Lymber interviewed Williams at the hospi- tal shortly after Williams’s arrival, while medical personnel were attending to him in the triage area of the emergency room. Ac- cording to Detective Lymber, Williams stated that Pough picked him up from his house at about 6:00 p.m. that evening and took him to the plaza’s parking lot for the purpose of selling THC prod- ucts. Williams told Detective Lymber that immediately prior to 4 the shooting, Pough was “acting suspicious,” “texting,” and “look- ing around,” which made Williams “nervous.” Williams recounted to Detective Lymber that Pough “was reaching ... with his left hand” when Williams retrieved his own firearm and shot Pough. Detective Lymber later contacted Williams’s family and ob- tained video footage from the family’s doorbell camera. That foot- age, which was admitted at trial and played for the jury, showed that Williams exited his front door at 6:53 p.m. on the night of the shooting and walked towards a black sedan parked parallel to the sidewalk. A man in a purple tee shirt (who was not Pough) exited the rear passenger side of the vehicle to let Williams in, and then the man got in back in the vehicle after Williams, and the vehicle drove off. During their investigation, officers also searched the white Chevrolet Traverse in which Pough and Williams were found. As described further below, that search revealed two firearms, four shell casings, narcotics, two iPhones, and vehicle registration in- formation indicating that the Traverse belonged to Pough’s mother. The firearms retrieved from the Traverse included a .357 Glock pistol, which was found in Pough’s lap at the scene, and a 9 mm SCCY pistol, which was located either in the front passen- ger seat, where Williams had been sitting, or on the ground nearby. Subsequent investigation yielded three .357 shell casings and one 9 mm shell casing. A crime scene investigator identified one bullet hole in the “headliner” above the front passenger seat and other defects indicating that a second bullet had passed through the front passenger seat headrest and then through the rear window on the passenger side. Based on the shell casings, bullet defects, and Pough and Williams’s wounds, the crime scene investigator opined that at least three shots were fired from the 5 .357 Glock found in Pough’s lap and that one shot had been fired from the 9 mm SCCY pistol found near Williams. Officers’ search of the vehicle also revealed an “electronic cigarette” (sometimes called a “vape pen”) in the driver’s seat that was loaded with a cartridge containing a “viscous liquid,” as well as other cartridges in various flavors packaged for sale that were strewn about the vehicle, including in the front center console. The liquid in the cartridge in the vape pen and at least one of the cartridges packaged for sale was tested by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and the parties stipulated that the results of these tests showed that the liquid contained tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), which Detective Lymber described as the “oils that come from marijuana” and a Schedule I controlled substance. 3 Additionally, investigators found a black iPhone 11 that be- longed to Pough and a red iPhone 12 that belonged to Williams.4 Law enforcement officers performed a full data extraction from Pough’s phone, but only a limited extraction from Williams’s phone. 5 3 See OCGA § 16-13-25(3)(P) (providing that, except under certain cir- cumstances not present here, “[t]etrahydrocannabinol, tetrahydrocannabinolic acid, [and] a combination of tetrahydrocannabinol and tetrahydrocannabinolic acid which does not contain plant material exhibiting the external morpholog- ical features of the plant of the genus Cannabis” are controlled substances in- cluded in Schedule I). 4 Detective Lymber testified that the device name of the iPhone 12 was “Jaiden’s iPhone,” and Williams later testified that the red iPhone 12 was his. 5 Detective Norman Howard of the Gwinnett County Police Depart- ment explained at trial that after Williams’s phone was placed in evidence, its battery died. Though officers were able to recharge the phone, Williams’s passcode was required to unlock it after it was restarted. Detective Howard was therefore only able to extract the limited information that was available “before first unlock,” that is, the information that was available without enter- ing the owner’s passcode. 6 GPS data obtained from Pough’s phone showed that it was at Pough’s residence at 6:52 p.m. on the night of the shooting — the time when Williams was picked up from his home by a black sedan — and that Pough’s phone remained there until about 8:30 p.m., when it began to move towards the shopping plaza, arriving there at about 8:40 p.m. The extraction from Pough’s phone also included a log of an Instagram conversation that took place between 8:49 p.m. and 9:15 p.m. — just minutes before Officer Craig was dispatched to the scene. In this conversation, Pough’s Instagram handle, “solid.kp,” communicated with an account identified in the log as “10327187745 1396” (hereinafter, “1396”). Solid.kp and 1396 be- gan by discussing different flavors of THC vape cartridges match- ing those later found in Pough’s vehicle. At 8:51 p.m., 1396 indi- cated that he was “otw,” an acronym for “on the way,” and at 8:53 p.m., solid.kp asked 1396 to let him know “wen u turn in.” At 9:08 p.m., 1396 wrote that he “jus stopped to get some gas” but that he was “close tho,” and at 9:15 p.m., 1396 stated, “I’m here[.] I just pulled beside you.” Solid.kp then told 1396 to “[h]op in [his] pas- senger side.” There were no further messages between them after 9:15 p.m. At trial, Detective Lymber testified that other data re- trieved from Pough’s phone showed that account 1396 corre- sponded to the Instagram account “hallowixk.” And he further testified that information retrieved from Williams’s iPhone showed that Williams’s Apple user ID was “Hallow2700@ya- hoo.com.” Pough’s autopsy revealed that he had been shot once in the right side with a type of bullet known as a “rapidly invasive pro- jectile.” The State’s medical examiner explained that these “RIP bullets” have a “round base with seven prongs” resembling 7 “curved petals” called “trocars” and that these trocars “break off when they go through the body.” In Pough’s case, the trocars dam- aged both of his lungs, his heart, and his liver, causing “signifi- cant” internal bleeding, which, in the view of the medical exam- iner, caused Pough’s death within “seconds to minutes.” The med- ical examiner also testified that Pough’s “entrance wound ... had searing or burning of the skin ... and a muzzle impression ... from the end of the gun being against the body,” from which she opined that Pough had sustained a “contact range wound.” Williams testified in his own defense. At trial, Williams ex- plained that he and Pough met at school and that they played games together occasionally online. Williams testified that on the evening of the shooting, his friends picked him up from his house, and they went to their neighborhood pool, which was within “walking distance” about a “quarter mile away.” Williams ex- plained that he didn’t bring a towel or a swimsuit because their intention was to “chill by the water” rather than to swim. Accord- ing to Williams, Pough picked him up from the pool between 7:45 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., rather than at 6:00 p.m., as Williams had in- itially told Detective Lymber at the hospital. Williams explained that his misstatement to Detective Lymber was the result of “los- ing a significant amount of blood.” Williams testified that after leaving the pool with Pough, they drove for about 30 minutes before stopping at Pough’s house, where Pough picked up the THC cartridges. 6 While Williams waited in the car, he noticed two guns — one on the driver’s side and one on his side. Neither gun was his, he explained, as he did 6 In his initial testimony on direct examination, Williams testified that he did not know whose house it was, but on cross-examination he responded affirmatively when asked if he and Pough had gone to Pough’s house to pick up the cartridges. 8 not own a gun. After Pough returned to the car, Pough drove them to the shopping plaza, which was only about 5 minutes away, to “make the play.” Williams testified that he was not participating in the deal and that he had asked Pough to take him home, but that Pough said he would take Williams home afterward. According to Williams, he and Pough sat in the parking lot for about ten to 20 minutes. Though things were “friendly at first,” Pough’s attitude changed and became “cold[er] than be- fore.” Williams testified that Pough was texting throughout this time, but that no one ever came by their vehicle. Then, when Wil- liams looked up from his own phone, he saw that Pough “had reached for his gun” and pointed it at Williams’s face. Williams thought it was a “joke” at first, and asked Pough to “please get the gun out of [his] face,” but Pough declined and asked Williams if Williams had any money on him. According to Williams, he then knocked Pough’s gun away with his left arm, used his right hand to pull the gun from the passenger-side door, lunged toward Pough, and shot him in the chest before Pough returned fire. Wil- liams testified that he fired first but explained that when Pough had pointed the gun at him, Pough’s finger had been on the trig- ger, that he “was in fear [for his] life” and that he “thought [he] was gonna die.” Williams also recounted how, after being shot, he tried to leave the vehicle to call for help, but “ended up falling face-first on the ground” and was unable to feel his left arm or his legs. 7 When asked by his trial counsel to account for the difference be- tween his statement at the scene to Officer Craig that “[Pough] reached and [Williams] reached” and his current testimony that Pough had pointed a gun at his face, Williams stated that when 7 Williams testified from a wheelchair. He explained that his legs were permanently paralyzed and that he had nerve damage in his left arm. 9 he spoke to Officer Craig, he was losing a lot of blood, thought he “was going to die,” and “couldn’t get [his] story straight.” Williams also denied that he had participated in the Insta- gram conversation found on Pough’s phone, claiming that he was not “hallowixk” and did not know who “hallowixk” was. 2. On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence was insuf- ficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions because the State failed to present evidence sufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense. We disagree. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evi- dence to support his convictions as a matter of federal due process on appeal, we review the evidence to determine whether a ra- tional trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the challenged convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). In doing so, we view the evi- dence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, which “re- quir[es] us to defer to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence,” and to avoid “weighing the evidence on appeal or resolving conflicts in the trial testimony ourselves.” Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 279 (2026) (cleaned up). Where, as here, “a defendant raises a justification defense at trial, the State has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Frison v. State, 323 Ga. 156, 160 (2025). But the defense of justification is not available when a person uses lethal force while “attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(2). See Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 810 (2015), overruling Heard v. State, 261 Ga. 262 (1991). And on appeal, the burden is on the appellant to show that the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support the challenged convictions. Charles v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 653 10 (2023). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evi- dence showed that Williams and Pough conversed over Instagram and arranged to meet in the shopping plaza for the purpose of selling THC products and that Williams shot and killed Pough during this interaction. The trial court instructed the jury that THC is a Schedule I controlled substance, that criminal attempt to commit possession of a Schedule I controlled substance is a fel- ony, and that a “defendant is not justified in threatening or using force if he ... is attempting to commit a felony[ ] or is committing a felony.” A rational juror could therefore conclude that Williams shot and killed Pough while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and that, as a result, the legal defense of justification was unavailable to him. See Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 520 (2018) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the defend- ant’s conviction for aggravated assault where the defendant claimed he had acted in self-defense because that defense was un- available as a result of the defendant’s concession that the shoot- ing had occurred during the commission of a separate felony). Wil- liams’s claim that the State failed to disprove his claim of self- defense therefore lacks merit. 3. Williams next argues that his trial counsel rendered con- stitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to secure an expert to review Williams’s phone records, which Williams contends would have revealed exculpatory evidence. Because Williams has not established on appeal that his phone records contained any exculpatory evidence, his claim fails. At Williams’s motion-for-new-trial hearing, his trial coun- sel testified that he met with Williams “probably four times” prior to trial and that he discussed trial strategy with Williams “exten- sively.” When asked about the limited data retrieval performed 11 on Williams’s phone, trial counsel testified that he “suppose[d] that, with the defendant’s consent, they could have accessed more,” and he acknowledged that he was “aware” that he could have applied to the State for funds to hire an expert to examine Williams’s phone and that he “probably didn’t think of it at the time.” But Williams’s trial counsel also testified that he did not “recall [Williams] saying, [‘]hey, you’ve got to look at my phone. I believe this could be like our smoking gun.[’]” And he further stated that “if my client had told me, [‘]hey, I got my phone, this could help,[’] [he] would have certainly pursued that.” No evi- dence from Williams’s phone was tendered at the hearing, nor was any proffer made regarding specific exculpatory evidence al- leged to be found there. In its order denying Williams’s motion for new trial, the trial court concluded without analysis that “trial counsel’s performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial.” “To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show deficient performance by trial counsel and resulting prejudice.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (2024) (cit- ing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984)). Establish- ing deficient performance requires a defendant to “demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasona- ble way considering all the circumstances and in the light of pre- vailing professional norms.” Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307 (2025). Establishing prejudice requires a defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Cooper v. State, 321 Ga. 349, 351 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 634 (2025) (quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694). Because an appellant must establish both his counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice 12 resulting therefrom, “[i]f a defendant fails to establish either de- ficient performance or prejudice, we need not address the other part of the Strickland test.” Cooper, 321 Ga. at 351–52. Even assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wil- liams’s counsel was deficient for failing to secure an expert to per- form a full data extraction of his client’s phone Williams has failed to establish that this assumed deficiency prejudiced him at trial. Williams produced no evidence at the motion-for-new-trial hear- ing from his phone, and so his contention that his counsel’s per- formance prejudiced him at trial is entirely speculative. And in absence of such evidence, Williams cannot establish a reasonable probability that securing an expert to perform a full data extrac- tion of his phone would have altered the outcome of his trial. Ac- cordingly, even assuming his counsel’s performance was deficient, Williams has not established the prejudice necessary to support an ineffective-assistance claim. See Suggs v. State, 310 Ga. 762, 768 (2021) (“Appellant has not suggested, much less shown, what further investigation would have revealed or how it would have helped his defense. Thus, even if counsel had conducted an inad- equate investigation, Appellant has failed to prove the required prejudice.”); Lane v. State, 299 Ga. 791, 795–96 (2016) (“[The ap- pellant] presents no evidence, or even assertion, as to what fur- ther investigation or preparation might have produced that would have made a difference in the outcome of his trial. Consequently, [the appellant] fails to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel on this ground.”). 4. Williams next argues that the trial court erred by admit- ting a log of the Instagram conversation between solid.kp and 1396/hallowixk over his objections. Specifically, Williams con- tends that the log was inadmissible because the State failed to 13 authenticate it by conclusively establishing that he was the au- thor of the messages sent by 1396. And because the State failed to establish that he was the author, Williams argues, the evidence was also inadmissible hearsay, rather than admissible as an ad- mission by a party-opponent. See OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a “party’s own statement” “shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule”). On appeal, Williams further argues that the State’s failure to sufficiently authenticate the messages ren- dered them confusing and unfairly prejudicial, such that the trial court erred by failing to exclude them under Code section § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). See OCGA § 24-4-403(a) (“Relevant evi- dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[ or] confusion of the issues[.]”). We disagree. (a) Because Williams objected to the admission of the evi- dence at trial on authenticity and hearsay grounds, we review the trial court’s rulings as to those objections under an abuse-of-dis- cretion standard. See Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 729 (2019) (re- viewing the appellant’s preserved claims of error regarding the admission of evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard). Code section 24-4-901 sets forth both the fundamental “require- ment of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to the admissibility” of evidence and makes clear that such condi- tion “shall be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” OCGA § 24-4-901(a). The statute further specifies that evidence may be authenticated by, among other means, its “[a]ppearance, con- tents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive character- istics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” OCGA § 24-4-901(b)(4). We have explained that “[o]nce the party seeking to authenticate evidence presents a prima facie case that the evi- dence is what it purports to be, the evidence is properly admitted, 14 leaving the ultimate question of authenticity to be decided by the jury.” Nicholas v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 475 (2019). At trial, the State claimed that Williams had written the messages sent by 1396. In support of this claim, the State linked the 1396 account with the Instagram handle “hallowixk” via fo- rensic evidence from Pough’s phone and then argued that “hal- lowixk” was highly similar to Williams’s Apple ID, hal- low2700@gmail.com. The State also pointed to the contents of the conversation itself as evidence of 1396’s identity. As stated above, Pough (as “solid.kp”) told 1396 to hop in the passenger side of his vehicle at 9:15 p.m., and Williams was found there only minutes later. This evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Williams was 1396. See Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475–76 (hold- ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting phone records containing text messages the State contended were sent by the defendant where the State established by circumstan- tial evidence that the defendant had authored the messages). Ac- cordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Williams’s authenticity objection. See id. And because Williams’s hearsay objection was predicated on his doubts about the mes- sage’s authenticity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling that objection as well: insofar as the State authenti- cated that the messages were Williams’s “own statement[s],” they were not “excluded by the hearsay rule.” OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(2)(A). (b) Williams further argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the Instagram conversation at issue under Rule 403. Specifically, Williams contends he was not hallowixk/1396, and so the admission of a conversation containing messages sent by that user was “confusing” and unfairly prejudicial, insofar as 15 it encouraged jurors to wrongly attribute hallowixk’s messages to him. As explained below, this argument fails. Because Williams did not raise an objection under Rule 403 at trial, we review his claim for plain error only. See Varner, 306 Ga. at 730 (reviewing the appellant’s unpreserved claim of error regarding the admission of evidence under the plain-error stand- ard). “To establish plain error, a defendant must show that an error occurred, was not affirmatively waived, was clear and not subject to reasonable dispute, and affected his substantial rights.” Profet v. State, 322 Ga. 731, 739 (2025). As relevant here, Rule 403 provides that “[r]elevant evi- dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues[.]” OCGA § 24-4-403. “Generally speaking, the greater the tendency [of evidence] to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, the greater the probative value.” Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803, 817 (2024). Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial for purposes of Rule 403 simply because it inculpates the defend- ant, as all evidence that inculpates the defendant is “inherently prejudicial.” Wilson v. State, 325 Ga. 728, 738 (2023). As relevant to Williams’s argument, evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172, 180 (1997) (citation omit- ted). The evidence at issue was undoubtedly probative. If Wil- liams authored the messages sent by hallowixk/1396, they reveal the time of Williams’s arrival at the shopping plaza, shed light on his interest in the THC products later found in the vehicle, and cast the veracity of his trial testimony in serious doubt. Alterna- tively, if Williams did not author the messages at issue, they show 16 that Pough was arranging to meet with someone other than Wil- liams, and they supported Williams’s contention that Pough was texting while they were parked in Pough’s vehicle and his belief that Pough was trying to set him up. In either case, the probative value of the evidence was high. The question, then, is whether the conversation’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej- udice or related confusion. Williams essentially argues that the State failed to establish that he authored the messages at issue, that the admission of the Instagram conversation invited the jury to attribute authorship of hallowixk’s messages to him, and that this attribution of authorship was an improper basis for the jury’s decisions about his guilt or credibility, making the resulting prej- udice unfair. But we concluded above that the State properly au- thenticated the evidence at issue and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by leaving the ultimate question of the con- versation’s authenticity to the jury. And because this question of authenticity was ultimately for the jury to decide, attribution of hallowixk’s messages to Williams was not an “improper basis” for further inferences concerning Williams’s credibility or guilt and therefore was not a source of unfair prejudice. See Old Chief 519 US at 180. Given the high probative value of the evidence and the lack of any unfair prejudice, we conclude that the conversation’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice or related confusion and therefore that the trial court did not err by declining to exclude the evidence sua sponte under Rule 403. 5. Finally, Williams argues that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and his trial counsel’s deficiencies deprived him of a fair trial, even if no single error did so. “To establish cu- mulative error,” an appellant “must show that ‘at least two errors 17 were committed in the course of the trial[,] and considered to- gether along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [him] a fundamentally fair trial.’” Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 796 (2021) (quoting State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (2020)) (cleaned up). But in resolving Wil- liams’s claims above, we have assumed only a single deficiency by his trial counsel: that he failed to further investigate his client’s phone records. And because we assumed only a single instance of trial counsel deficiency, Williams’s cumulative error claim fails. See id. at 797. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating. 18