McAlister v. Clifton

Erin McAlister and Wendi Clifton were former domestic partners. After they separated, Clifton asked a trial court for visitation with McAlister's adopted daughter, Catherine, under Georgia's equitable caregiver statute, a law that lets certain non-parents who have acted like a parent seek visitation or custody. McAlister fought back, arguing the statute itself was unconstitutional and that Clifton had no legal standing to seek visitation. The trial court rejected those arguments and awarded Clifton visitation. By the time McAlister's appeal reached the Supreme Court of Georgia, Catherine had turned 18, becoming a legal adult no longer subject to anyone's custody or visitation rights. The court held that this made the whole dispute moot: there was nothing left for a ruling to accomplish. Rather than simply dismissing the appeal, the court vacated the trial court's orders and sent the case back with instructions to dismiss it, so the now-unreviewable rulings would not have lingering legal effects.

The court held that once a child reaches the age of 18, she is no longer subject to any custody or visitation order, so an appeal challenging such an order becomes moot; because the case became moot through the mere passage of time, the proper remedy is to vacate the lower court's orders and remand with direction to dismiss, not merely to affirm or deny the appeal.

Georgia parents and equitable caregivers involved in custody or visitation fights should know that once a child turns 18, court orders about that child's custody or visitation become void and unenforceable, and appellate courts will not rule on the constitutionality of the underlying law in that same case.

Vacated and remanded with direction to dismiss

1. The court explained that mootness is a jurisdictional issue that must be resolved before reaching the merits of any claim, so it addressed whether the appeal was still live before considering McAlister's constitutional challenge.
2. Applying the general mootness rule, that a case is moot when deciding it would only answer an abstract question with no effect on real rights, the court found that Catherine's eighteenth birthday ended any custody or visitation rights over her by operation of Georgia law (O.C.G.A. §§ 39-1-1, 19-7-1), leaving nothing left to decide.
3. The court considered and rejected McAlister's argument that the case fit an exception for issues 'capable of repetition yet evading review,' finding that future litigants challenging the equitable caregiver statute could raise the same constitutional question in their own trial court proceedings, so the issue would not evade review.
4. The court also rejected McAlister's argument that a broader 'public interest' exception should apply, noting that Georgia has never clearly endorsed public-interest mootness exceptions on their own, and that McAlister failed to show the specific factors such an exception would require.
5. The court found no proof that the visitation order would create ongoing legal consequences in a separate guardianship proceeding pending in the Probate Court of DeKalb County, so that argument could not keep the appeal alive.
6. Because the case became moot purely through the passage of time rather than through any settlement or voluntary action by the parties, the court applied the rule that the better practice is to vacate the judgment and remand with direction to dismiss, clearing the field of any unreviewed and unreviewable ruling.

• equitable caregiver statute
• child visitation rights
• mootness doctrine
• child turning 18
• guardianship dispute