---
title: Jenkins v. State
collection: opinions
id: S25A1050
cite_as: Jenkins v. State, S25A1050 (Ga. Feb. 3, 2026)
canonical_url: https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S25A1050
md_url: https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S25A1050.md
text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S25A1050/text
source_url: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10846035/jenkins-v-state/
date: 2026-02-03
status: published
corpus_version: opinions-2026-09-14
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docket: S25A1050
court: Supreme Court of Georgia
case_type: criminal appeal
authoring_justice: Colvin
disposition: Appeal dismissed
vote: All the Justices concur
word_count: 808
date_filed_source: courtlistener
record_source: courtlistener
legal_areas:
  - criminal law
  - civil procedure
  - constitutional law
upstream_id: "10846035"
summaries_model: claude-sonnet-5
---

# Jenkins v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia, docket S25A1050, filed 2026-02-03.

## Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 3, 2026

S25A1050. JENKINS v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

In this case, Appellant Roshoun Jacarri Jenkins appealed directly from the dismissal of his statutory speedy trial demand, which he made pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171. Because the dismissal of a speedy trial demand does not fall within one of the categories of cases from which a direct appeal is authorized under OCGA § 5-6-34(a), Jenkins was required to follow the procedures for interlocutory appeals set forth in § 5-6-34(b). But he did not do so. We are therefore without jurisdiction to consider his appeal, and it is accordingly dismissed. See Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172 (2019) (“The provisions of the law respecting the procedure to be followed in perfecting appeals to this Court are jurisdictional, and unless this Court has jurisdiction of a case, it is without power or authority to render a judgment upon review.” (cleaned up)); Dias v. Boone, 320 Ga. 785, 789 (2025) (“It is incumbent upon this Court, even when not raised by the parties, to inquire into its own jurisdiction.” (quotation marks omitted)). ***

In Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694 (1985), we held that when a defendant files a speedy trial demand under OCGA § 17-7-170, which governs speedy trial demands in noncapital cases, and later moves to dismiss the indictment against him under that statute, he may appeal directly from the denial of such motion without following the interlocutory appellate procedures found in OCGA § 5-6-34(b). Hubbard, 254 Ga. at 695. In doing so, we implicitly applied the collateral-order doctrine, under which we have permitted direct appeals from “a very small class of interlocutory rulings” that “are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Duke, 306 Ga. at 172–73 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). In Hubbard, we explained that though the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him was not a final judgment, the collateral-order doctrine applied because the right to a speedy trial includes not only the right to be tried within a certain timeframe, but also the right to be free from the “uncertainty, emotional stress and the economic strain” of pending prosecution once that time has passed. 254 Ga. at 695. Moreover, we reasoned, affording defendants the “full protection” of this right requires “recogniz[ing] the right of [appellate] review before subsequent exposure to trial.” Id. (emphasis added).

Though the reasoning in Hubbard applies with equal force to the present case, we decline to extend our application of the collateral-order doctrine to the circumstances here. As Justice Pinson explained in his concurrence in Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823 (2022), “our Court imported the collateral-order doctrine from federal law,” id. at 833, where it serves as a “‘practical rather than a technical construction’” of the language in the federal appellate-jurisdiction statute, 28 USC § 1291. Id. at 834 (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 US 100, 106 (2009)). See also 28 USC § 1291 (providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”). But as Justice Pinson correctly pointed out, the “language, context, and history” of the federal statute differs materially from our own appellate- jurisdiction statute. Compare 28 USC § 1291 (authorizing direct “appeals from all final decisions”), with OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1)(B) (authorizing direct appeals from “[a]ll final judgments”). See also Abney v. United States, 431 US 651, 658 (1977) (noting the significance of Congress’s choice to make “final decisions” appealable, rather than “final judgments,” and explaining that “[w]hile a final judgment always is a final decision, there are instances in which a final decision is not a final judgment”). As such, our use of the collateral-order doctrine rests on “doubtful authority.” Buckner-Webb, 314 Ga. at 836 (Pinson, J., concurring). The question of whether to overturn Hubbard is not now before us. But we decline to extend the collateral-order doctrine relied on in Hubbard to the circumstances here, where Appellant appeals from an order dismissing the speedy trial demand he made under OCGA § 17-1-171.

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.

## Summaries written by Georgia Commons

The following was written by claude-sonnet-5 from the opinion above and is not part of the court's opinion. Quote the opinion, not the summary.

The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed a man's direct appeal from the denial of his statutory speedy trial demand, ruling he was required to use interlocutory appeal procedures instead and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case as filed.

### Plain-language summary

Roshoun Jacarri Jenkins asked a trial court to dismiss the charges against him because the State had not brought him to trial quickly enough under Georgia's speedy trial demand statute. When the trial court denied that request, Jenkins tried to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia without first getting permission through the state's interlocutory appeal process, which applies to non-final rulings.
The court explained that a past decision, Hubbard v. State, had allowed direct appeals in a similar situation by borrowing a legal doctrine from federal courts that lets certain important, separate rulings be appealed right away. But the Justices said that doctrine rests on shaky legal footing when applied to Georgia's own appeal statute, and they declined to extend it to Jenkins's situation. Because Jenkins did not follow the required interlocutory appeal steps, the court found it had no power to consider his appeal and dismissed it.

### Holding, as summarized

Because dismissal of a speedy trial demand is not one of the case types Georgia law allows to be appealed directly, and because the court declined to extend the collateral-order doctrine used in Hubbard v. State to this situation, Jenkins was required to follow interlocutory appeal procedures, which he did not do.

### Disposition

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.

### Why it matters

Criminal defendants and defense lawyers across Georgia now know they cannot bypass interlocutory appeal procedures when challenging denial of a speedy trial demand outside the narrow Hubbard situation, meaning they must seek a trial court's or appellate court's permission before appealing such rulings.

> The summarized reasoning, checked quotes, suggested questions, and the CourtListener opinion records (2,033 characters) are at https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S25A1050.md?full=1