NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S25G1430

In the Interest of D.H. et al., Children

On Writ of Certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Georgia

No. A24A1822

Argued: June 16, 2026 — Decided: October 14, 2026

LAGRUA, Justice.

Following an evidentiary hearing in April 2024, the juvenile court determined that Dy. H. and Da. H., the minor children of Petitioner Starlita Moore (the “Mother”), were dependent children as defined by OCGA § 15-11-2(22)(A) (defining a “[d]ependent child” as a child who has been “abused or neglected and is in need of the protection of the court”). In reaching this conclusion, the juvenile court determined that the minor children had been neglected by the Mother because she was “unable to provide proper parental care and control” based on her “untreated mental health condition,” citing OCGA §§ 15-11- 2(48)(A) (defining “[n]eglect” as “[t]he failure to provide necessary parental care or control”) and 15-11-311(a)(1) (providing that, in determining whether a child is “without proper parental care and control, the court shall consider, without being limited to, … [a] medically verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child”). The Mother appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, similarly relying on OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) to conclude that the juvenile court was authorized to find that the minor children were neglected by the Mother—and thus, dependent—due to the “Mother’s mental health deficiency,” which “was medically verified and of such duration or nature as would render her unable to provide adequately for her children.” In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. 212, 220 (2025). But see id. at 227–30 (Pipkin, J., dissenting). We granted the Mother’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider what kind of evidence is required in a dependency proceeding to support a finding of a “medically verified” health deficiency under OCGA § 15-11- 311(a)(1), and whether OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) requires only that the health deficiency be “medically verified,” or whether the “duration or nature” of that health deficiency must also be “medically verified” in order for the juvenile court to determine that it “render[ed] such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child.” Id.

As explained below, having considered the proper construction of OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), we conclude that any competent evidence may support a juvenile court’s determination that a parent suffers from a “medically verified deficiency of … physical, mental, or emotional health.” We also conclude that, just as the health deficiency must be “medically verified” (as we describe in Division (2)(a) below), so, too, must its “duration or nature.” It is then for the juvenile court to make the ultimate legal determination, based on competent evidence before it, of whether the medically verified duration or nature of a given deficiency renders the parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child. See id.

Here, the juvenile court and Court of Appeals concluded that the Mother had a “medically verified deficiency” of her “physical, mental, or emotional health”—and the juvenile court made explicit findings in support of that conclusion based on evidence presented at the dependency hearing—but the juvenile court made no determination that the “duration or nature” of the Mother’s mental health condition was “medically verified.” See OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1); In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 220. So, while the evidence introduced at the dependency hearing may have supported a finding that the minor children were dependent on grounds other than those set forth in OCGA § 15- 11-311(a)(1), the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that the children were dependent based on grounds set forth in the juvenile court’s order.

Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’s decision and remand this case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand to the juvenile court for the juvenile court to consider whether the evidence in the record as a whole supports a finding that Dy. H. and Da. H. were dependent children under OCGA § 15-11- 2(22)(A).

1. Pertinent Factual Background and Procedural History The record in this case demonstrates that Dy. H. and Da. H. are the biological children of the Mother and non-party Dionte Harvey (the “Father”) and were born in 2017 and 2020, respectively. The Mother and the Father ended their relationship in 2021, and Dy. H. and Da. H. remained in the Mother’s care. The Father ceased having any contact with or giving any financial support to Dy. H. and Da. H. in November 2021. The Mother married her current husband in the summer of 2022, and Dy. H. and Da. H. resided with the Mother and her husband in Gwinnett County, though it does not appear from the record that the Mother’s husband is a “legal parent” or “guardian” of the children.

This case arises out of an incident in 2024. During the early morning hours of February 1, 2024, the Mother was arrested in Hall County following a series of overnight incidents in which the Mother: (1) drove to an apartment complex and rammed through its metal security gate with her vehicle; 1 (2) crashed into another vehicle inside the apartment complex; (3) beat on the doors of several apartments, screaming for the residents to let her inside; (4) retrieved a firearm from her vehicle and, while sitting down in the stairwell of one of the apartment buildings, loaded the firearm with ammunition, dropping ammunition inside the stairwell in the process; and (5) returned to her vehicle with the firearm 2 and fled the scene as law enforcement officers arrived at the apartment complex. 3 The Mother then drove two to three miles with law enforcement officers in pursuit until she reached a lake; attempted to drive her vehicle into the lake; exited the vehicle and started running into the lake; and returned to shore, where she was eventually apprehended by law enforcement officers. After being arrested and advised of her Miranda 4 rights, the Mother told law enforcement officers that “she was looking for her kids,” who were “with the devil.” While being held at the police station, the Mother made several phone calls to family members in which she said that “God had sent her to save Gina’s son”—though law enforcement officers were never able to connect the Mother or any of the residents of the apartment complex to a person named “Gina.” On the morning of the Mother’s arrest, her husband contacted the Mother’s niece about allowing Dy. H. and Da. H. to

1 The record reflects that the Mother did not reside at this apartment complex or appear to know anyone who resided there.

2 Law enforcement officers later recovered a loaded firearm inside the Mother’s vehicle.

3 Several residents of the apartment complex called 911 during this incident. 4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

temporarily stay in her home, and the Mother’s niece brought the children to her home later that day.

On February 9, 2024, the juvenile court held an emergency hearing to address the care and custody of Dy. H. and Da. H. in light of the February 1 incident involving the Mother, 5 and the Mother testified at the hearing. Immediately after the hearing, the juvenile court issued a “Dependency Removal Order,” determining that, “based on the evidence presented in court[,] emergency removal [wa]s necessary based on the [Mother]’s recent mental health breakdown and arrest … leaving the children without a legal parent or guardian to care for them.” The juvenile court further determined that “continuation of the children in the [Mother’s] home [wa]s contrary to their welfare,” and “[r]emoval [wa]s in their best interest.” The juvenile court ordered the children placed in the temporary custody of the Gwinnett County Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”), and Dy. H. and Da. H. remained in the physical custody of the Mother’s niece, who was “vetted” as a placement by DFCS. The juvenile court also scheduled a preliminary protective hearing to take place on February 12, 2024.

DFCS subsequently filed dependency petitions for Dy. H. and Da. H. in the juvenile court, and on February 12, 2024, the parties appeared for the scheduled preliminary protective hearing. At that time, DFCS requested a continuance to conduct an investigation since it had only become involved with the family a few days earlier. The juvenile court granted DFCS’s request; ordered that the Mother would have periodic visitation with the minor children; and scheduled the preliminary protective hearing

5 It is not clear from the record how this hearing was initiated, and there is no transcript of the hearing in the record.

and an adjudication of dependency hearing for March 1, 2024. After another request for a continuance by the Guardian ad Litem, who was appointed by the juvenile court to represent the interests of Dy. H. and Da. H. in these proceedings, 6 the preliminary protective hearing and adjudication of dependency hearing were rescheduled again for April 15, 2024.

At the outset of the April 15 hearing, DFCS advised the juvenile court that it was not yet prepared to address “final disposition” because several witnesses were needed to testify at that phase of the proceedings and because the pertinent evaluations—psychological, parental fitness, etc.—needed to be finalized and submitted to DFCS. The juvenile court ruled that it would proceed with the preliminary protective hearing and dependency portions of the hearing but would stay the final disposition and schedule it to be heard on a later date.

The evidentiary portion of the hearing proceeded with DFCS calling the law enforcement officers who responded to the incident on February 1 to testify about the events leading up to the Mother’s arrest, as well as her statements and behavior before and at the time of her arrest. The Mother also testified, and while she invoked her Fifth Amendment right under the United States Constitution in response to most of the questioning about the February 1 incident, she testified that, following the incident, a psychologist at the hospital diagnosed her as having experienced “a manic episode.” The Mother also testified that, when this incident occurred, she had been “feeling overwhelmed with motherhood”; she “had been having brain fog” for two years; and she had been blacking out. And she stated that the “brain fog came from … metal … that was left in [her] tooth” during a root

6 Under OCGA § 15-11-104(a), “[t]he court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an alleged dependent child.”

canal in 2021. According to the Mother, the metal was surgically removed from her mouth on January 13, 2024, about two weeks prior to the incident, and it was her “understanding that [the surgery] … possibly led to the incident that happened.” The Mother also testified that she was prescribed antibiotics following the surgery and theorized that the “antibiotic could have led to the brain fog, … as well.”

A DFCS social services supervisor then testified and noted that, because of concerns about the Mother’s mental health, the Mother had undergone a psychological evaluation, but the results had not yet been returned to DFCS. Additionally, the social services supervisor testified that the Mother would be undergoing a parental fitness exam, which had not yet been completed. According to the social services supervisor, these evaluations were necessary for DFCS to make a final “recommendation about [the] return of custody” of Dy. H. and Da. H. to the Mother. No evidence was presented at the hearing to establish what a medical professional or other provider had determined to be the potential cause of the Mother’s February 1 manic episode or any kind of assessment, medical or otherwise, about the likelihood that such an episode would reoccur or continue into the future and, if so, with what frequency.

Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order of adjudication and temporary disposition, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Dy. H. and Da. H. were “dependent children as defined in OCGA § 15-11-2(22)” because “the Mother ha[d] neglected these children” through her “failure to provide necessary parental care and control,” OCGA § 15-11-2(48)(A). In support of this conclusion and after noting that OCGA § 15-11- 311(a) defines “proper parental care and control” as, among other things, “a medically verified health deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child,” id. at (a)(1), the juvenile court made the following findings: (1) the “Mother has behavioral instability as evidenced by the mental breakdown that she had on February 1, 2024[,] that resulted in her felony arrest”; (2) “[a]lthough the children were not present when [the] Mother had her mental breakdown, her mental health problems reduce her ability to cope with her parenting responsibilities and result in [the] Mother’s mental incapability to care for her children”; (3) “although the children were not with the Mother, the children were involved in that the Mother believed that the devil had the children and that [the] Mother needed to save them”; (4) the “Mother previously testified that the cause of her breakdown was from being overwhelmed as a parent”; and (5) the “Mother’s mental breakdown on February 1, 2024[,] was not an isolated incident.” The juvenile court further found that the Mother “testified that she ha[d] been in a brain fog for two years,” “suffered from blackouts and memory loss,” and “had a manic episode,” and that, “despite the recommendation of a psychologist[,] ha[d] failed to seek treatment.” “Based on [the] Mother’s untreated mental health condition,” the juvenile court concluded that “she is unable to provide proper parental care and control for her children.” The juvenile court further ordered that Dy. H. and Da. H. would remain in the legal custody of DFCS with the Mother’s niece and that the final disposition hearing would occur on July 11, 2024. 7

The Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Mother argued that the Court of

7 The final disposition hearing ultimately did not proceed because the Mother appealed.

Appeals should reverse the juvenile court’s order adjudicating dependency on the following grounds: (1) “the juvenile court’s reliance on OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) was misplaced”; (2) the record was “devoid of the detail necessary to make conclusions about the mother’s medical condition[], its effect on [her] parenting skills, or the likelihood that it would continue”; and (3) “the juvenile court’s order [wa]s insufficient because the State did not present testimony from a medical professional as to [the] Mother’s diagnosis and prognosis.” In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 218–19. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s adjudication of dependency, concluding that clear and convincing evidence had been presented to show that the Mother neglected Dy. H. and Da. H. through her “failure to provide proper care and control” under OCGA § 15-11-2(48). In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 219. The court further concluded that, in determining whether these children were “without proper parental care and control,” the juvenile court could properly consider the “medically verified health deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for … her child.” Id. at 219–20 (citing OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1)).

In support of these conclusions, the Court of Appeals explained that testimony from a medical professional regarding the Mother’s medical diagnosis and/or prognosis was not necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement that the Mother suffered from a “medically verified health deficiency of … [her] physical, mental, or emotional health” because OCGA § 15-11- 311(a)(1) “does not specify any particular type of evidence that is required to support a juvenile court’s finding of a medically verified mental health deficiency that renders a parent unable to meet the needs of her children.” In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 219. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that “the lack of such testimony in the instant case” did not warrant reversal because the evidence of the Mother’s

admitted medical diagnosis, coupled with the extreme nature of the February 2024 incident (which included a loaded firearm, a police pursuit, and delusions directly pertaining to the children), authorized the juvenile court to find that [the] Mother’s mental health deficiency was medically verified and of such duration or nature as would render her unable to provide adequately for her children.

Id. at 219–20 (emphasis omitted). On this basis, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s finding that Dy. H. and Da. H. were dependent children. See id. at 220.

Judge Pipkin wrote a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that, even accepting the juvenile court’s factual findings as true, DFCS presented insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s legal conclusions because—while the evidence “undoubtedly” showed that the Mother “reported some concerning physical ailments” and that the February 2024 incident was “patently disturbing”—“nothing presented at trial was medically verified” through the testimony of medical experts or the presentation of medical evaluations, as required by OCGA § 15- 11-311(a)(1). Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 228, 230.

We granted the Mother’s request for certiorari review to consider whether any specific kind of evidence is required to support a finding of a “medically verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health” under OCGA § 15- 11-311(a)(1) and to decide whether OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) requires only that the health deficiency be “medically verified,” or whether the statute also requires the “duration or nature” of that health deficiency to be medically verified. Id.

2. Legal Analysis

When we review questions of statutory construction on appeal, “our review is conducted under a de novo standard.” Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 205 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). So, we turn to the statutory language, mindful that “we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way.” State v. Cook, 317 Ga. 659, 660 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). “Of course, while the common and customary usages of the words are important, so is their context.” Id. (cleaned up) (citing May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391 (2014) (“In our search for the meaning of a particular statutory provision, we look not only to the words of that provision, but we consider its legal context as well.”)).

The statute at issue here, OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), appears in Georgia’s Juvenile Code, 8 OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq., and is a statute juvenile courts may look to when determining whether a minor child is dependent. See OCGA § 15-11-2(22)(A) (defining a “dependent child” as a child who has been “abused or neglected

8 In 2013, the General Assembly amended Title 15 of the Georgia Code “so as to substantially revise, supersede, and modernize provisions relating to juvenile proceedings and enact comprehensive juvenile justice reforms recommended by the Governor’s Special Council on Justice Reform in Georgia,” Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, and the provisions became effective on January 1, 2014. See Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5–1 (“This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date.”). See also OCGA § 15-11-1, et seq.

and is in need of the protection of the court”); OCGA § 15-11- 2(48)(A) (defining “[n]eglect” as, among other things, “[t]he failure to provide necessary parental care or control”). To that end, OCGA § 15-11-311(a) provides a non-exclusive list of circumstances that courts “shall consider in determining whether a child is without proper parental care and control” in the dependency context. Id. As relevant here, OCGA § 15-11- 311(a)(1), provides that courts “shall consider … [a] medically verified deficiency of such child’s parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child.” 9 Generally, a juvenile court’s determination that a minor child is

9 OCGA § 15-11-311(a) also provides several more circumstances courts must consider in determining whether a child is “without proper parental care and control,” including, but not limited to, the following:

(2) Excessive use of or history of chronic unrehabilitated substance abuse with the effect of rendering a parent of such child incapable of providing adequately for the physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of his or her child; (3) A felony conviction and imprisonment of a parent of such child for an offense which has a demonstrably negative effect on the quality of the parent-child relationship … (4) Egregious conduct or evidence of past egregious conduct of a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive nature by such parent toward his or her child or toward another child of such parent; (5) Physical, mental, or emotional neglect of his or her child or evidence of past physical, mental, or emotional neglect by the parent of such child or another child of such parent; and (6) Serious bodily injury or death of a sibling of his or her child under circumstances which constitute substantial evidence that such injury or death resulted from parental neglect or abuse.

OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(2)–(6).

dependent—whether based on the considerations set forth in OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) or otherwise—significantly impacts the family in question, as it can potentially necessitate a child’s removal from the custody and care of his or her parent and placement into foster care, the therapeutic or medical treatment of the parent, and the implementation of a detailed case plan to assist in reunification, among other things. See OCGA §§ 15-11- 130, et seq., 15-11-180, 15-11-200, et seq., 15-11-210, et seq. Notably, in such cases, DFCS is required to prove the dependency of the minor child by clear and convincing evidence. See OCGA § 15-11-180 (“The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the allegations of a dependency petition by clear and convincing evidence.”).

(a) Having considered the legal context in which OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) appears, we turn to the first question of statutory construction here: whether any particular kind of evidence is required for a court to be able to determine that a parent suffers from a “medically verified deficiency of … physical, mental, or emotional health.” OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). We conclude that, although such a determination must be supported by competent evidence, the statute does not require any particular kind of evidence. As a general rule, absent a law that says otherwise, no particular kind of evidence is required to prove a fact in court. See Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 21 (2022) (concluding that, in the criminal sufficiency-of-the-evidence context, “although the State is required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of evidence” (cleaned up)); Weed v. Davis, 25 Ga. 684, 686 (1858) (concluding that, in the civil fraudulent-conveyance setting, because the fraudulent-conveyance statute said nothing about the kind of evidence needed to prove fraudulent intent, it imposed no restriction on the evidence a party could offer to establish such intent); OCGA § 24-4-402 (“All relevant evidence shall be admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by law or by other rules, as prescribed pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority, applicable in the court in which the matter is pending.”). And neither OCGA § 15-11-311 nor any other part of the Juvenile Code says that any particular type of evidence is required to prove that a deficiency is medically verified.

OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) refers to a “medically verified deficiency” of a parent’s health. To “verify” something can mean affirming it by affidavit or under oath. See Verify, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012) (defining “verify” as “to attest to the truth of (something) formally or under oath” or “to establish or demonstrate the truth or accuracy of”); Verify, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010) (defining “verify” as “to testify or affirm formally or upon oath” or “to ascertain or test the accuracy or correctness of”). But nothing in this statutory provision suggests that the term “verified” means that here. For one thing, the provision requires the deficiency to be verified in a more specific way: “medically,” that is, by a physician or other medical professional. See OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). See also Medical, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012) (defining “medical” as “of or relating to the study or practice of medicine”); Medical, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010) (defining “medical” as “of, relating to, or designating the science or practice of medicine in general, or its practitioners”). If the statute simply referenced a “verified” deficiency, that might be best understood as a deficiency that is authenticated by an affidavit or otherwise sworn under oath, but here, “medically” modifies “verified” such that we know it is a specific type of verification best understood as something that is diagnosed or otherwise identified by a medical professional. See Medical, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012); Medical, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010); Verify, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2012); Verify, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010). And nothing in this statutory provision indicates that such a diagnosis must be proved by any particular kind of evidence to satisfy OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). 10 Any competent and relevant evidence can serve as a basis for the juvenile court’s determination that a health deficiency under subsection (a)(1) has been medically verified. And the juvenile court is still tasked with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses. See In re A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 836 (2009). (b) The second question of statutory construction here is whether the “duration or nature” of the subject health deficiency must also be “medically verified.” See OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). The answer to that question is yes.

(1) OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) describes a “medically verified deficiency of [a] parent’s ... health that is of such duration or nature so as to render such parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child.” (Emphasis supplied). So, to determine whether such a deficiency has been established, a juvenile court must consider the deficiency’s “duration or nature”—facts which must be based in evidence, not a juvenile court’s own speculation. And, if the deficiency itself must be “medically verified,” meaning

10 We need not decide here what kinds of medical professionals or medical evidence could provide evidence of a “medically verified” deficiency to satisfy OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), or whether something short of a formal diagnosis may suffice. That is because, in this case, there was evidence from which the court could conclude that a psychiatrist—a medical doctor— diagnosed the Mother with a manic episode, and whatever the bounds of the phrase “medically verified” are, a medical doctor’s diagnosis would certainly be sufficient.

diagnosed or otherwise identified by a medical professional as explained in Division (2)(a), it is hard to read this provision as requiring anything different with respect to the evidence of that deficiency’s “duration or nature.” In other words, just as the deficiency must be medically verified, so, too, must its “duration or nature,” which the juvenile court must consider in making the ultimate determination of whether the deficiency in question renders a parent unable to provide adequately for a child under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1).

(2) As noted above, OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) is part of a list of circumstances that, if established, a juvenile court “shall consider” in “determining whether a child is without proper parental care and control.” See id. § 15-11-311(a). That determination is equivalent to a finding of neglect, see id. § 15- 11-2(48)(A), which in turn permits a finding that a child is dependent, see id. § 15-11-2(22)(A). In short, subsection (a)(1) provides a basis for a juvenile court’s determination that a child is dependent. And, given the particular language of that subsection, if the circumstances it sets out are established, it may serve as a conclusive basis for a dependency finding (as it did in this case in the view of the juvenile court). Given the juvenile court’s role, it would be inconsistent with this statutory framework—of which OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) is a part—for subsection (a)(1) to wholly delegate a determination of whether a child has been neglected (and is thus dependent) to someone other than the juvenile court—whether that someone is a medical professional or anyone else. After all, that same statutory framework makes clear that any finding that a child is dependent (based on neglect or otherwise) is a finding that must be made by the juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-181(e). Thus, although the duration or nature of the deficiency must be medically verified, the ultimate finding of whether the duration or nature of that deficiency “render[s] [a] parent unable to provide adequately for his or her child” is one for the juvenile court to make. OCGA § 15- 11-311(a)(1).

(c) In this case, the juvenile court relied on OCGA § 15-11- 311(a)(1) to conclude that Dy. H. and Da. H. were “dependent” children as defined by OCGA § 15-11-2(22) because they had been neglected by the Mother, who was “unable to provide proper parental care and control” based on her “untreated mental health condition,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling on appeal. See In the Interest of D. H., 376 Ga. App. at 219. The juvenile court made explicit findings in support of its conclusion that the Mother suffered from a medically verified mental health deficiency—findings that were largely based on the Mother’s testimony at the dependency hearing that she was diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having a manic episode on the night of her arrest and her struggles with brain fog and periodic blackouts over the prior two years. But none of the evidence presented at the dependency hearing that established the Mother’s medically verified mental health deficiency gave any indication as to the “duration or nature” of that health deficiency. As we explained in Division (2)(b)(1), there has to be some evidence from a physician or other medical professional about the duration or nature of the deficiency that has been diagnosed. And, because there was no such evidence here, there was no evidence from which the juvenile court could have reached the ultimate legal conclusion that the medically verified “duration or nature” of the Mother’s mental health deficiency was such “as to render [her] unable to provide adequately” for Dy. H. and Da. H. under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1), or that, in turn, these children were neglected and thus dependent based strictly on this subsection.

Because OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) was the only basis the juvenile court gave for its dependency finding, we vacate the Court of Appeals’s decision and remand this case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand to the juvenile court for that court to determine whether the evidence in the record as a whole established the dependency of Dy. H. and Da. H. 11 See OCGA §§ 15-11-2(22)(A) and 15-11-181.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

11 The grant of certiorari encompassed whether the lower courts applied the correct standard for assessing whether the children were dependent under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). Nothing in this opinion is intended to limit the evidence that the juvenile court may consider on remand or the statutory grounds—including statutes other than OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1)— upon which the children may be deemed dependent.