CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY (Two Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0636

Catoosa County Republican Party et al.

v.

Steven M. Henry et al.

No. S26A0637

James Coles et al.

v.

Steven M. Henry et al.

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Catoosa County

No. SUCV2024000211

Decided: October 27, 2026

BETHEL, Justice.

These two appeals arise out of a dispute concerning qualifications to appear on the Republican primary ballot for local office in Catoosa County. The Catoosa County Republican Party (“CCRP”), operating under a belief that neither Georgia law nor the voters in the Catoosa County Republican primary election could adequately protect against the risk of insufficiently “Republican” candidates securing the party nomination for office, developed and added its own test to the qualifying process. Under the test, aspiring candidates for county-level partisan office seeking ballot access in the Republican primary, in addition to the other requirements for qualification, were required to interview with and secure a majority vote and “qualifying affidavit” from the CCRP’s executive committee. After the CCRP implemented this rule in connection with the qualifying process for the May 2024 primary election, four would-be candidates — Appellees Steven M. Henry, Larry C. Black, Jeffrey K. Long, and Vanita Hullander (collectively, “the Candidates”) — filed suit against the CCRP and some of its members, challenging the CCRP’s refusal to qualify them as candidates for the Republican primary based on their failure to obtain a qualifying affidavit. The Candidates prevailed, and these appeals followed.

In Case No. S26A0636, the CCRP and several individually named members (collectively, “the Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s order finding the CCRP and these members in contempt for violating an interlocutory injunction, granting attorney fees to the Candidates, and permanently enjoining the CCRP from prohibiting the qualification of candidates under OCGA § 21-2- 153 with the requirement of an affidavit of approval. And in Case No. S26A0637, James Coles, Mary Coles, Britt Fant, Charlie Lamar, Christine Lawson, and Adrienne Kittle, who are members of the CCRP but were not named parties to the litigation (collectively, “the nonparty CCRP members”), appeal the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees against them under OCGA § 9-15-14. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part in S26A0636, and we dismiss for failure to follow the required appellate procedure in S26A0637.

1. We begin with the relevant facts and procedural history underlying these appeals. At some point before the qualifying period for the 2024 election, the CCRP decided that the provisions of state law and state party rules governing the qualification of candidates for office were insufficient to ensure, as CCRP chairman Joanna Hildreth explained, “that the people [who] are running with an ‘R’ by their name[s] support[ ] those [R]epublican [Party] values.” So, to remedy that perceived infirmity, the CCRP adopted its own rule, which it labeled procedural, requiring prospective candidates to appear before the CCRP’s executive committee for an interview and obtain the committee’s approval by majority vote in order to appear on the Republican primary ballot in Catoosa County. 1 The executive committee’s deliberations were conducted during a closed meeting, and votes were cast by secret ballot. Candidates who received the committee’s approval were issued a “qualifying affidavit,” which they were required to present on the day of qualifying in order to be qualified as a candidate to appear on the Republican primary ballot (the “qualifying-affidavit rule”). Notably, the Georgia Republican Party has not imposed any similar rule, nor do the rules of the Georgia Republican Party purport to authorize the adoption of such a rule at the local level.

During the March 2024 qualifying period, the CCRP refused to qualify Appellees Henry, Black, Long, and Hullander

1 A document introduced as an exhibit below that Appellant Hildreth identified as the CCRP rules says that “to qualify for office as a Republican, a potential candidate must be approved by the [CCRP] County Committee within twelve (12) months prior to the date he or she attempts to qualify.” The document continues, “to qualify for office as a Republican in Catoosa County, a potential candidate must present, at the time of qualifying, a signed and notarized affidavit from the [CCRP] Chairman or Secretary, stating the date and location of the meeting that the [CCRP] County Committee voted to allow the proposed candidate to qualify for office as a Republican.” The trial court expressly found that these purported rules had not been “filed with the [Catoosa] County Board of Election in accordance with law as they are not certified pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-111(c).”

as Republican candidates for various offices of the Catoosa County Commission for the May 2024 primary election. The only basis for the refusal to qualify the Candidates was their failure to obtain a qualifying affidavit from the CCRP’s executive committee. After the CCRP refused to qualify them, the Candidates filed separate petitions against the CCRP and individual CCRP members Hildreth, Beth Cass, Ruth Fant, Sherre Bales, Marie Moore, and Debbie Morrison, as well as Jane Doe and John Doe members of the CCRP. These petitions, later consolidated into a single action, sought entry of a temporary restraining order, interlocutory injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellants from preventing the Candidates’ qualification as Republican candidates. On March 5, 2024, the trial court granted the temporary restraining order (“TRO”), “enjoining and restraining [the Appellants] from prohibiting the qualification of Plaintiff as a Republican candidate for the primary election scheduled for May 21, 2024, seeking election to the office of Catoosa County Commission[.]” Nevertheless, the CCRP continued to decline to participate in the Candidates’ qualification and filed an emergency motion to lift the TRO and dismiss the Candidates’ petitions. Following a March 7 hearing, the trial court denied the CCRP’s motion, renewed the prior TRO, and imposed specific penalties for noncompliance. That same afternoon, the CCRP continued to refuse to participate in the Candidates’ qualification.

On the morning of March 8, the trial court held a compliance hearing during which the Candidates reported that the Appellants were still preventing their qualification. The trial court responded by entering an interlocutory injunction, ordering that each candidate was “entitled to qualify with the Catoosa County election superintendent at their offices pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-153(c)(2)[.]” Following entry of the interlocutory injunction,

each of the Candidates was qualified and proceeded as candidates in the primary election. Also on March 8, the Candidates filed a motion for contempt based on the Appellants’ violation of the TRO; the motion identified Appellants Jack Byars, Mary Bugea, and Regina Gray “as previously unnamed Jane Doe and John Doe members of the [CCRP].” The CCRP appealed the entry of the injunction, and we dismissed the appeal without considering the merits of the case based on the CCRP’s failure to expedite the appeal. Catoosa County Republican Party v. Henry, 319 Ga. 794, 800 (2024) (“CCRP I”).

After the case returned to the trial court, the Candidates filed a motion for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 based on the litigation that arose from the Appellants’ refusal to comply with the TRO. Following an October 2025 evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the motions for contempt and attorney fees. Specifically, the trial court found the Appellants in contempt and ordered the CCRP, the individually named CCRP members, and several CCRP members who were not parties to this litigation to pay the Candidates’ attorney fees. The trial court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellants from “requiring any special affidavit or further substantive qualification for candidates to qualify as Republicans on a general primary ballot in Catoosa County, Georgia in the future.” These timely appeals followed.

In Case No. S26A0636, the Appellants challenge the trial court’s rulings finding them in contempt, awarding attorney fees against them, and permanently enjoining them from requiring candidates to obtain a qualifying affidavit in order to qualify as candidates pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-153. In Case No. S26A0637, the nonparty CCRP members against whom attorney fees were awarded appeal that ruling.

Case No. S26A0636 2

We begin with the appeal brought by the CCRP and its individually named members.

2 The Candidates assert that this case should be transferred to the Court of Appeals because, they say, it is not a “case[ ] of election contest” within our jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II–V (providing that this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases of election contest”). Specifically, pointing to our decision in Cook v. Bd. of Registrars, 291 Ga. 67, 70 (2012), they argue that the case “has nothing to do with the ‘candidates for and results of elections.’” But at the time of its inception, this case did concern candidates for election and constituted an election-contest case within our jurisdiction. See CCRP I, 319 Ga. at 796–97. See also id. at 798 (noting that prior appeal was “not an election contest under OCGA § 21-2-520 et seq. or a challenge to candidate qualifications brought under OCGA § 21-2-5 or OCGA § 21- 2-6” but rather was an “unusual action … brought by the Candidates themselves” in which “the CCRP Defendants [we]re challenging the eligibility of the Candidates for office”). And as a historical matter, this Court has retained appeals from ancillary rulings in election contests, including those involving contempt proceedings and awards of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 in cases initiated as pre- election challenges where the appeals arrived in this Court long after the elections had concluded. See, e.g., Davis v. Dunn, 286 Ga. 582 (2010) (retaining and deciding appeal from award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14). The Candidates make no argument as to why we should depart from that practice in this case.

2. The Appellants first argue that the trial court erred by permanently enjoining them “from prohibiting the qualification of candidates pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-153 with the requirement of an affidavit of approval by the local party, so long as said candidates meet the state requirements found in said [C]ode section.” The Appellants advance several arguments in support of this contention. First, they argue that, under OCGA § 21-2-153, the CCRP has “the sole authority to qualify candidates for placement on the Republican primary ballot” and, consistent with that authority, the CCRP properly established and enforced a procedural rule requiring prospective Republican candidates in Catoosa County to obtain a qualifying affidavit. Second, they contend that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution grants them the right of freedom of association, which includes the right to approve Republican candidates who will appear on the ballot in Catoosa County by employment of the qualifying-affidavit rule. And third, they assert that the grant of injunctive relief was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to law and equity. As we explain below, the Appellants’ claims fail on all fronts, so we affirm the grant of injunctive relief.

The legal principles governing the grant of injunctive relief are well settled. “Generally, a writ of injunction may be used to enjoin illegal conduct for which no adequate remedy is provided at law.” Western Sky Financial, LLC v. State of Ga., 300 Ga. 340, 350 (2016). See also OCGA § 9-5-1 (“Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain … any … act of a private individual or corporation which is illegal or contrary to equity and good conscience and for which no adequate remedy is provided at law.”). “The decision whether to grant a request for injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge according to the circumstances of each case,” and the grant of injunctive relief will not be reversed on appeal “absent an error in the law

contributing to that decision, a manifest abuse of discretion, or a finding of no evidence on which to base the trial court’s ruling.” Sentinel Offenders Servs., LLC, v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 336 (2014). See also OCGA § 9-5-8 (“The granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each case. This power shall be prudently and cautiously exercised and, except in clear and urgent cases, should not be resorted to.”).

(a) We begin with the Appellants’ contention that their establishment and enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was consistent with the relevant statutory authority and, as such, the trial court erred by permanently enjoining them from requiring prospective candidates to comply with the rule. The Appellants’ argument rests primarily on their reading of OCGA § 21-2-153(b), so we examine and determine the meaning of the relevant statutory text. We are guided in that task by a few well- settled principles of statutory interpretation. “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–73 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). This requires us to “afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,” “view the statutory text in the context in which it appears,” and “read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” In the Interest of T.B., 313 Ga. 846, 850 (2022) (quotation marks omitted).

Beginning, as we must, with the statutory text, OCGA § 21-2-153(b) says:

Unless otherwise provided by law, all candidates for party nomination in a state or county primary shall qualify as such candidates in accordance with the procedural rules of their party; provided, however, that no person shall be prohibited from qualifying for such office if he or she:

(1) Meets the requirements of such procedural rules;

(2) Is eligible to hold the office which he or she seeks;

(3) Is not prohibited from being nominated or elected by provisions of Code Section 21-2-7 or 21-2- 8; and

(4) If party rules so require, affirms his or her allegiance to his or her party by signing the following oath: “I do hereby swear or affirm my allegiance to the (name of party) Party.”

The Appellants do not precisely spell out where in this statutory language they find authority to promulgate and enforce rules for candidate qualification as a county-level party organization. Their theory seems to be that the language “all candidates for party nomination … shall qualify … in accordance with the procedural rules of their party,” OCGA § 21-2-153(b) (emphasis added), encompasses rules established by county-level party organizations. As they read the statute, “party” includes the CCRP and presumably the numerous other county-level party

organizations fulfilling this role in the qualification process. 3 In other words, they view OCGA § 21-2-153(b) as a freestanding grant of authority for county-level party organizations to make and enforce their own procedural candidate-qualification rules. We do not endorse this reading of the statute.

Appellants’ argument rises and falls on the meaning of “party” as used in OCGA § 21-2-153(b). Although that statute does not define “party,” the term is defined elsewhere in the Election Code. For purposes of Chapter 2 of Title 21 (the title and chapter in which OCGA § 21-2-153(b) appears), “party” is defined as “any political organization which at the preceding … [g]ubernatorial election nominated a candidate for Governor and whose candidate for Governor at such election polled at least 20 percent of the total vote cast in the state for Governor” or “[p]residential election nominated a candidate for President of the United States and whose candidates for presidential electors at such election polled at least 20 percent of the total vote cast in the nation for that office.” OCGA § 21-2-2(25). No party disputes that the Georgia Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Georgia fit that definition, and these Code provisions obviously apply to them. But there is no evidence — nor would it be reasonable to suggest — that the CCRP fielded either a gubernatorial or presidential candidate at the preceding elections. As a county-level entity within the structure of a state party, the CCRP does not run candidates statewide. As such, the CCRP does not meet the definition of “party” for purposes of the Election Code. So we reject the contention that OCGA § 21-2-

3 Georgia has 159 counties and two parties that have

general statewide ballot access under the current election scheme.

153(b) imbues the CCRP with authority to craft its own rules for candidate qualification and prohibit candidates from qualifying based on their failure to comply with CCRP-specific rules. 4

In short, this argument is predicated on the erroneous belief that the CCRP wields power legally reserved to the state party. It does not. In the context of elections, a county-level party organization has a role in qualifying candidates seeking nomination in the name of the state party. See, e.g., OCGA § 21- 2-153(c)(2) (establishing contingency where political party fails to designate “a party official in a county with whom the candidates of such party for county elective offices shall qualify”). But Georgia law does not empower any such organization to create county-level, county-specific rules unmoored from the governing statutory law and the rules of the state party for qualifying candidates. See OCGA § 21-2-111(c) (“The respective county executive committees of each political party shall formulate, adopt, and promulgate rules and regulations, consistent with law and the rules and regulations of the state executive committee, governing the conduct of conventions and other party affairs.” (emphasis added)). Georgia law contemplates that the CCRP, like any other county-level Republican Party organization, qualifies prospective candidates as Georgia Republicans — not as Catoosa

4 Because we conclude that the CCRP is not a “party”

within the meaning of OCGA § 21-2-153, we need not consider the CCRP’s argument that a rule requiring a majority vote by a county-level party organization’s executive committee on the question of whether a candidate is sufficiently “Republican” to stand for election is a procedural as opposed to substantive rule.

County Republicans. 5 This argument fails.

(b) The Appellants further assert that the permanent injunction was improper because the First Amendment to the United States Constitution affords them the right of freedom of association, which, they say, includes the right to determine which candidates will appear on the Republican primary ballot in Catoosa County by employment of the qualifying-affidavit rule. Again, we disagree.

Political parties have a First Amendment right of association. As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, “[a] political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate- selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform.” N.Y. State Bd. of Elecs. v. Lopez Torres, 552 US 196, 202–03 (2008). And “a corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate.” Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 US 567, 574–75 (2000) (“Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s being. In no area is the political association’s right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee.” (cleaned up)). But these related rights are not implicated by the trial court’s permanent injunction.

As we detailed above, the trial court permanently enjoined the Appellants from “prohibiting the qualification of candidates pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-153 with the requirement of an affidavit of approval by the local party,” where the candidates at issue

5 Similarly, county-level Democratic Party organizations qualify Georgia Democrats.

otherwise meet the requirements found in that same statute. And as we concluded in Division 2(a) above, the qualifying-affidavit rule finds no support in the statutory law governing the candidate-qualification process. Moreover, as explained above, qualifying Georgia Republicans under state law does not otherwise designate any candidate as a member or associate of the CCRP. 6 So the permanent injunction does nothing more than

6 It seems clear that the CCRP has a right to freedom

of association under the First Amendment to control membership in its own organization. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 US 107, 122 (1981) (“[T]he inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisions — thus impairing the party’s essential functions — and … political parties may accordingly protect themselves from intrusion by those with adverse political principles.”). And the CCRP has a right to assert such claims. See Catoosa County Republican Party v. Catoosa County Bd. of Elections & Voter Registration, 2025 WL 1662455, at *10–12 (11th Cir. June 12, 2025). But it does not follow that the CCRP can control membership in its state-level parent political organization, the Georgia Republican Party, or assert the right to freedom of association of that state-level entity. The CCRP and the Georgia Republican Party are distinct entities. And as we concluded above, as a matter of Georgia law, the act of qualifying a person as a candidate for the Republican nomination for county-level office qualifies him or her as a candidate of the Georgia Republican Party. See OCGA §§ 21- 2-2(25), 21-2-153(b). That person is not qualified as a “Catoosa County Republican.” So when the CCRP attempts prohibit the Appellants from enforcing the legally invalid qualifying-affidavit rule against candidates for the Republican Party nomination in Catoosa County primary elections. In short, the permanent injunction has no bearing on the Appellants’ associational rights under the First Amendment. 7

Moreover, consistent with our explanation in Division 2(a), while local candidates are qualified to run in the partisan primary election by county-level party organizations under the applicable statutory scheme, they do not qualify as candidates of such an organization. When acting on behalf of a state party to qualify its candidates, county-level party organizations are best thought of as agents assisting the state party in exercising the state party’s

to preclude an otherwise-qualified candidate from appearing on the ballot as a Georgia Republican, it is attempting to control the association of candidates with the Georgia Republican Party. The CCRP might wish that the state-level party not associate with a particular candidate, but that is an issue for the Georgia Republican Party to decide, not the CCRP.

7 The Appellants summarily assert that if “OCGA § 21-

2-153 requires candidates to be placed on the Republican primary ballot in Catoosa County against the party’s will, then the statute is unconstitutional” for the same reasons they advance in support of their constitutional challenge to the permanent injunction. To the extent they raised this argument in the trial court, they did not obtain a distinct ruling on it, so we will not address it. See City of Winder v. Barrow County, 318 Ga. 550, 557 (2024) (declining to address constitutional argument raised in but not ruled upon by trial court).

ballot access.

Appellants nevertheless insist that “political parties have an almost unfettered right to control their own affairs, voters, rules, and associations” upon which the permanent injunction infringes. But that simply is not true, at least in the conduct of public elections. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly affirmed the notion that a political party’s associational rights “are circumscribed … when the [s]tate gives the party a role in the election process” and that the state has “a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the fairness of the party’s nominating process, enabling it to prescribe what that process must be.” Lopez Torres, 552 US at 203. See also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 US 428, 433 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. It does not follow, however, that the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes through the ballot are absolute.” (cleaned up)); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 US 214, 231 (1989) (“A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process. Toward that end, a State may enact laws that interfere with a party’s internal affairs when necessary to ensure that elections are fair and honest. … [A] State may impose restrictions that promote the integrity of primary elections.”); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 US 767, 781 (1974) (considering it “too plain for argument” that the state “may insist that intraparty competition be settled before the general election by primary election”); Storer v. Brown, 415 US 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”). Thus, the First Amendment provides no basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the continued

enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule.

(c) In their final challenge to the permanent injunction, the Appellants argue that the issues addressed by the injunction are moot and that the Candidates otherwise have an adequate remedy at law, thereby precluding equitable relief. Again, we disagree.

We turn first to the Appellants’ contention that the issues addressed by the injunction are moot. They premise this argument on the fact that the election during which the issues in this case first arose has already occurred. As Appellants frame the case, the Candidates sought only to enjoin the Appellants from prohibiting the Candidates’ qualification for the 2024 primary election. And because the Candidates cannot definitively show that they will face the same roadblocks in a future election, the Appellants say, any issue addressed by the permanent injunction is moot. But the permanent injunction does not “order[ ] the Appellants to ‘stop not-qualifying’ [the Candidates] on a permanent basis,” as the Appellants characterize it. Rather, the permanent injunction prohibits the Appellants from enforcing the illegal qualifying-affidavit rule in future elections. And the Appellants’ claim that the Candidates sought only to require the Appellants to qualify them for the 2024 election is not supported by the record. In addition to asking the trial court to order the Appellants to stop preventing them from qualifying, the Candidates asked the court for “such other and further relief as … the Court may deem just and proper.” Under these circumstances, the occurrence of the 2024 election does not render the issues in this case moot.

“To say that a claim has become moot typically means that intervening events have rendered the relief sought impossible or pointless.” Miller v. Hodge, 319 Ga. 543, 548 (2024). That is, a case is moot when “its resolution would amount to the determination of an abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights[.]” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Resolving the instant dispute did not answer an abstract question. Instead, it addressed the concrete dispute about whether the Appellants can continue to deny ballot access to statutorily qualified candidates through implementation of the qualifying-affidavit rule. The Appellants’ expressed desire to continue doing so is an existing fact — indeed, during the October 2025 hearing, Appellant Hildreth acknowledged that the qualifying-affidavit rule remained in place for the 2026 primary election. And all eligible candidates’ entitlement to qualification is an existing statutory right. See OCGA § 21-2-153(b) (“no person shall be prohibited from qualifying for such office if he or she” meets certain statutory requirements). Three of the four Candidates are current officeholders, having won election in 2024, and they may run to retain their seats in future elections. A permanent injunction in the Candidates’ favor thus “would have a practical effect on this controversy”: it would forbid the Appellants from continuing to refuse qualification to eligible candidates based on the qualifying- affidavit rule and ensure that the Candidates — plus any others the Appellants might attempt to exclude from the ballot — have the ballot access to which they are statutorily entitled. See Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram, 292 Ga. 828, 832 (2013) (affirming permanent injunction against county as to operation and staffing of magistrate court where there was “evidence portending future acts which would affect the [court’s] operation and staffing”); Jacobs v. Chatham County, 295 Ga. App. 74, 77 (2008) (“past infractions and a reasonable fear of future infractions justify a permanent injunction”). See also Consumers Fin. Corp. v. Lamb, 217 Ga. 359, 362 (1961) (“Equity will intervene, and injunction is proper, to prevent a multiplicity of actions.”). For these reasons,

we reject the contention that the issues in this case are moot.

The Appellants’ argument that the Candidates have an adequate remedy at law is likewise unpersuasive. As support for this argument, the Appellants point to litigation they have initiated in federal court — litigation to which the Candidates are not parties — in which the Appellants have raised the issue of “the right of a county party to vindicate its [First] Amendment rights by selecting its own ‘Republican’ candidates.” The Appellants also assert that the Candidates could seek a declaratory judgment. But just because Appellants are able to identify potential alternative legal remedies does not mean that equitable relief is unavailable. It is well settled that

[a] remedy at law, to exclude appropriate relief in equity, must be complete and the substantial equivalent of the equitable relief. It is not enough that there is a remedy at law. It must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.

Clear-Vu Cable, Inc. v. Trion, 244 Ga. 790, 793 (1979) (quotation marks omitted). Appellants make no attempt to show that their proposed alternative remedies would constitute the “substantial equivalent” of the permanent injunction entered here. And under the circumstances of this case and particularly the Appellants’ professed and demonstrated intent to continue enforcing the qualifying-affidavit rule, even in the face of a court order directing otherwise, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to enter a permanent injunction. See Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760, 764 (1982) (“[U]nder the facts of this case the legal remedy of taking warrants for violations of the criminal laws would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done, would not afford the full relief to which the facts and circumstances entitle it, and would not be as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.” (cleaned up)).

3. The Appellants next assert that the trial court erred by finding them in contempt based on their violation of the March 7, 2024 TRO. The Appellants argue that the TRO was unclear and that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the Appellants willfully violated the TRO. We agree that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the contempt finding as to Appellants Byars and Bugea, but we otherwise affirm the trial court’s finding of contempt.

The courts of this state have “power to compel obedience to [their] judgments, orders, and processes.” Crutchfield v. Lawson, 294 Ga. 407, 409 (2014) (cleaned up). See also OCGA § 15-1-3(3) (“Every court has power … [t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process[.]”). Thus, the courts necessarily have “the powers to punish those who refuse to obey [their] rulings and orders.” In re Pruitt, 249 Ga. 190, 192 (1982). See also Ford v. Hanna, 292 Ga. 500, 502 (2013) (“[A] court’s right to punish for contempt is based on the theory that every court has the power to compel obedience to its own orders and judgments.” (cleaned up)); Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 170 (1900) (“The power to punish for contempts is inherent in every court of justice. It is absolutely necessary that a court should possess this power in order that it may carry on the administration of justice and preserve order and decorum in the court.”). Where, as here, the contempt finding is

criminal in nature,8 the standard of appellate review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Adams, 292 Ga. 617, 617 (2013). “Like all crimes, contempt has an act requirement (actus reus) and a mental component (mens rea).” In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 218 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). “The basis for a contempt action is a ‘wil[l]ful’ refusal to comply with a judgment or order of the court.” Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 246 (1977) (quotation marks omitted). See also Davis v. VCP South, LLC, 297 Ga. 616, 623 (2015) (“[T]o be held in contempt, one must willfully disobey the court’s decree or judgment.”). So the two elements of the crime at issue here — the Appellants’ violation of the TRO — that must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt are (1) the willful (2) refusal to comply with a judgment or order of the court. See Cousins v. Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 570, 575 (2008) (“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense, requiring proof of the elements of the alleged contempt … beyond a reasonable doubt.”). And in a contempt hearing where the lower

8 Although the Candidates assert that the contempt

finding was both civil and criminal, the trial court’s ruling reflects that the contempt finding was only criminal in nature because it punished the CCRP and its individual members for “past conduct and offered no opportunity to purge.” Steel v. State, 320 Ga. 184, 187 n.4 (2024) (“The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is that criminal contempt imposes unconditional punishment for prior acts of contumacy, whereas civil contempt imposes conditional punishment as a means of coercing future compliance with a prior court order.” (cleaned up)).

court sits as the finder of fact, “it, not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.” Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, Inc., 254 Ga. 258, 259 (1985).

(a) We begin our analysis with the contempt finding as to Appellants Byars and Bugea. The trial court’s order does not identify the evidence upon which it based its contempt finding as to these Appellants, and from our own review, we see no evidence in the existing record to show beyond a reasonable doubt that these Appellants willfully violated the TRO. The Candidates, in urging us to affirm the contempt finding as to these Appellants, cite their motion for contempt, which identified Byars and Bugea as the individuals who specifically prohibited the Candidates from qualifying on March 7, 2024, as evidence of these Appellants’ violation of the TRO. 9 But arguments and representations made in court filings are not record evidence that support factual findings. See Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 516 (2018) (“Arguments and representations made in court briefs … do not constitute record evidence to support a finding of fact.”). See also Cousins, 283 Ga. at 575 (reversing criminal contempt finding premised “at least in part on unsworn statements, unauthenticated bank documents, and other unreliable ‘evidence’ improperly obtained by the judge in an ex parte manner”). Furthermore, Appellants Byars and Bugea were not specifically named by the trial court as being subject to the TRO, and there is no indication in the record that they were individual officers or members of the CCRP’s executive board. Given these circumstances, we reverse the contempt finding as to Appellants

9 It does not appear from the record — and the Candidates do not argue — that the motion for contempt was either verified or supported by an affidavit.

Byars and Bugea.

(b) We turn to the remaining Appellants who were found to be in contempt — the CCRP and individually named CCRP members Cass, Fant, Bales, Hildreth, Moore, Morrison, and Gray. The Appellants first argue that the TRO was vague and confusing because it did not expressly order them to qualify the Candidates. “Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order should inform him in definite terms as to the duties imposed, and the command must be expressly stated in clear and certain language.” Scherer v. Testino, 291 Ga. 75, 77 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). The plain language of the TRO was clear about what the Appellants were and were not permitted to do. The original TRO entered on March 5, 2024, said:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a temporary restraining order is hereby issued to Defendants [CCRP], an unincorporated association, Beth Cass, Ruth Fant, Sherre Bales, Joanna Hildreth, Marie Moore, Debbie Morrison enjoining and restraining them from prohibiting the qualification of Plaintiff as a Republican candidate for the primary election scheduled for May 21, 2024, seeking election to the office of Catoosa County Commission, District 1.

The amended TRO entered on March 7, 2024, by its plain and express terms maintained the March 5 TRO and further said:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that two Catoosa County Sheriff Deputies are to escort [the Candidates] to the qualifying location of the Defendant [CCRP] … . Said deputies are hereby ordered to record and activate their bodycams while on the premises … and enforce this Court’s order of March 5, 2024[.]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should the Respondents prohibit the qualification of [the Candidates] as Republican candidates for the primary election scheduled for May 21, 2024, seeking election to various offices of the Catoosa County Commission, a $1,000.00 fine shall be hereby enforced per Respondent per [Candidate] for each hour that Respondents prohibit the qualification of [the Candidates].

It cannot seriously be argued that the Appellants, who were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, 10 were confused or misunderstood these plain directives. And to the extent the Appellants were confused, they should have sought clarification from the trial court. General Teamsters Local Union v. Allied Foods, 228 Ga. 479, 481 (1971) (“If the defendant is in doubt as to what acts he may or may not do under the [injunctive] order, he should request a modification or construction of its terms. If he proceeds under his own construction, he does so at his own peril.”).

The Appellants next challenge the sufficiency of the

10 The language of the orders was sufficient to inform

an ordinary reader of the English language what was required and prohibited. Moreover, in light of their continuous representation by counsel, we find concerning Appellants’ emphasis on their status as non-attorneys to support their claim of confusion. This emphasis reflects either a disingenuity on their part or a woeful failure of counsel to apprise the Appellants of the plain meaning of the orders and the consequences of disobedience. Neither possibility affords relief.

evidence proving that they willfully violated the TRO, offering various reasons that they say preclude a finding of criminal contempt. To begin, they assert, as they did below, that the TRO conflicted with CCRP rules and statutory law, as they understand it, such that compliance with the TRO was “impossible.” Even if the Appellants were correct on this point (they are not, as explained above), “[t]he disobedience of an unsuperseded order within the jurisdiction of a court is contempt of court, even though the order is erroneous.” Anderson v. Dowd, 268 Ga. 146, 148 (1997). So this contention provides no basis for reversal.

Appellant Gray complains that the contempt finding against her was improper because she was not initially named as a party to the action and was not served with the TRO. But “injunctions run by operation of law not only to the parties, but also to ‘their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.’” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 444 n.32 (2017) (quoting OCGA § 9-11-65(d)). So Gray’s status as a nonparty and the lack of personal service make no difference if there was evidence from which the trial court could find beyond reasonable doubt that Gray was “in active concert or participation” with the CCRP and “otherwise” “receive[d] notice” of the TRO. OCGA § 9- 11-65(d). And the record contains such evidence. Specifically, the evidence shows, and Gray concedes, that she was designated by the CCRP “as [a] contact[ ] for qualifying during the week of March 4, 2024” and was “scheduled to man the qualifying table” that week. And Hildreth testified at the hearing on the contempt motion that the CCRP members who staffed the qualifying table on March 7 were aware that two TROs had been entered requiring the CCRP to qualify the Candidates. Thus, this contention likewise presents no basis for reversal.

The individually named Appellants also disclaim any authority to take action to qualify the Candidates, asserting that, by statute, only the CCRP has authority to conduct the qualifying process and, as such, they could not be found in contempt. But the CCRP can act only through its individual officers and members. See Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, 267 Ga. 801, 803 (1997) (“[A] corporation is an artificial, not a natural, person. As an artificial person, a corporation can act, and does act, alone through agents. It deals with other corporations and with natural persons by its agents; it can deal with the world in no other way.” (quotation marks omitted)). And of course, individuals responsible for organizational affairs can be individually held in contempt for disobeying a known injunctive order. See Tolleson v. People’s Savings Bank, 85 Ga. 171, 179 (1890) (“[T]he law will regard a direction to the corporation as a direction to the officers whose duty it is to perform the ordinary business of such corporation. In such case the disobedience to the judgment could be punished as a contempt, and the officers committed until the performance of the required act.” (quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Adcock, 377 Ga. App. 375, 381 (2025) (affirming contempt finding against individual appellants for failing to produce records of family business in response to discovery requests and rejecting argument that contempt finding was unauthorized on basis that appellants were “individuals, and not the businesses from which the records were sought”). See also United States v. Fleischman, 339 US 349, 356–57 (1950) (“When one accepts an office of joint responsibility, whether on a board of directors of a corporation, the governing board of a municipality, or any other position in which compliance with lawful orders requires joint action by a responsible body of which he is a member, he necessarily assumes an individual responsibility to act, within the limits of his power to do so, to bring about compliance with the order. … [T]o hold that, because compliance with an order directed to the directors of a corporation or other organization requires common action by several persons, no one of them is individually responsible for the failure of the organization to comply, is effectually to remove such organizations beyond the reach of legislative and judicial commands.”); Wilson v. United States, 221 US 361, 376 (1911) (“A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. If they, apprised of the writ directed to the corporation, prevent compliance or fail to take appropriate action within their power for the performance of the corporate duty, they, no less than the corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience and may be punished for contempt.”). Hildreth, as chairman of the CCRP; Cass, Fant, Bales, Moore, and Morrison, as members of the CCRP’s executive committee; and Gray, who was tasked by the CCRP with managing the qualification process during the relevant time period, all were required to abide by the TRO and were properly found to be in contempt for violating the TRO by continuing to prohibit the Candidates’ qualification. See OCGA § 9-11-65(d). The trial court did not err by finding the CCRP and Appellants Hildreth, Cass, Fant, Bales, Moore, Morrison, and Gray to be in criminal contempt of court, and this claim fails.

4. Finally, the Appellants challenge the award of attorney fees against them,11 arguing that the trial court’s order does not

11 In its ruling on attorney fees, the trial court expressly indicated that the attorney-fee award was against Appellants Fant, Hildreth, Gray, Bales, Bugea, and Morrison, as well as the non-party CCRP members addressed below in Case No. S26A0637. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, attorney fees were not

contain the necessary findings of fact and insisting that they were simply defending their “right” to approve candidate applicants such that the attorney-fee award against them was improper. We again disagree.

“OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes a trial court to award ‘reasonable and necessary’ attorney fees and litigation costs in civil cases against a party [who] has engaged in abusive litigation.” Williams v. Becker, 294 Ga. 411, 413 (2014). Under OCGA § 9-15-14(b), pursuant to which the trial court awarded attorney fees here, a court may award fees against any party who “brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or … was interposed for delay or harassment” or who “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “An award of [attorney] fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) is discretionary[,] and the standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Abt v. Abt, 289 Ga. 166, 167 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).

The Appellants’ contention that the trial court’s order omits the requisite factual findings to support the attorney-fee award is unavailing. As we have said, “[i]f the court awards attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, it must make express findings specifying the abusive conduct for which the award is made and whether the award is made under subsection (a) or (b) or both[.]” Amayo v. Amayo, 301 Ga. 660, 660 (2017) (cleaned up). Here, the trial court based the attorney-fee award on its findings that the Appellants “have expanded the litigation, been stubborn and litigious[,] and continued to require further court appearances by their inaction[.]” Those findings in turn were based on the Appellants’ “willful[ ] violat[ion of] Georgia law

awarded against Appellants Cass, Moore, or Byars.

without a basis for doing so,” repeated refusals to qualify the Candidates despite the entry of two court orders requiring them to do so, and the necessity of multiple hearings to address the Appellants’ noncompliance. We thus reject the Appellants’ contention that the attorney-fee award was unsupported by the requisite factual findings. See Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 253–54 (2017) (rejecting challenge to attorney-fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) where order found that appellant’s “‘egregious and improper behavior and his abuse of the discovery process’ were interposed for delay or harassment”).

We also reject the Appellants’ assertion that attorney fees were unauthorized because they were simply defending their “right” to approve candidate applicants before qualifying them. Even if the Appellants’ disregard of the TRO was predicated on the belief that the order erroneously infringed on such a right, that belief did not entitle them to violate the TRO. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the Appellants’ violation of the TRO unnecessarily expanded the litigation and by awarding attorney fees against them on that basis. See Wilson v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 582, 585 (2007) (“[E]ven an erroneous order may not be simply disregarded, but must be obeyed until set aside,” and “an erroneous order will support rights, remedies[,] and proceedings predicated thereon.” (quotation marks omitted)). As such, this claim fails.

Case No. S26A0637 We turn now to the appeal brought by the nonparty CCRP members against whom the trial court awarded attorney fees.

5. The nonparty CCRP members timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court, asserting that they have standing to appeal, despite their status as non-parties, on the basis that the judgment under appeal awarded attorney fees and expenses of litigation against them. The notice of appeal also asserted that a direct appeal was procedurally proper because the order being appealed is final within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1). While we agree the nonparty CCRP members have standing to appeal the judgment against them, that standing is necessarily limited by their status as nonparties — they are entitled to appeal only the portion of the judgment that directly impacts them, namely, the award of attorney fees against them pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14. And OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10) requires appeals of that sort — even appeals of final orders — to come by discretionary application. Because the nonparty CCRP members did not follow the discretionary application requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35, this appeal is dismissed.

We have an independent obligation, even when not raised by the parties, to inquire into our own jurisdiction and satisfy ourselves that we may properly reach the merits of the case before us. See State of Ga. v. Fed. Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 324 (2022). “The provisions of the law respecting the procedure to be followed in perfecting appeals to this Court are jurisdictional,” and if we lack jurisdiction over a case, we likewise are “without power or authority to render a judgment upon review.” Sockwell Corners, LLC v. Newton County, 324 Ga. 612, 613 (2026) (quotation marks omitted).

We turn first to the issue of the nonparty CCRP members’ standing to pursue this appeal. As a general matter, the Appellate Practice Act, OCGA § 5-6-30 et seq., “grants the right of appeal only to either party in any civil case and the defendant in any criminal proceeding.” State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 93 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). But under certain circumstances, a nonparty may nevertheless have standing to appeal a judgment. Specifically, we have recognized that, “where judgment is entered against a nonparty, that nonparty becomes a party with standing to appeal.” Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 376 (2013). A nonparty’s standing to appeal is limited, however, to those portions of the judgment by which the nonparty is “directly aggrieved.” Bennett v. Etheridge, 302 Ga. 33, 34 (2017). Cf. Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 643 (2025) (“[A]n appellant lacks standing to appeal without asserting that the judgment below affected her own rights.”); Cooper Motor Lines, Inc. v. B. C. Truck Lines, Inc., 215 Ga. 195, 195 (1959) (“A party not aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court is without legal right to except thereto, since he has no just cause of complaint.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, the nonparty CCRP members are aggrieved only by the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney fees and expenses against them pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14, so they have standing to appeal only that ruling.

Having concluded that the nonparty CCRP members have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award, we turn to the method by which they must pursue their appeal. The primary method for bringing appeals in this Court and in the Court of Appeals is governed by two statutes — OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35. Subsection (a) of OCGA § 5-6-34 identifies the types of rulings that are immediately appealable and are not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements set forth in subsection (b) of the same statute. Relevant to our purposes here, OCGA § 5-6- 34(a)(1)(B) authorizes the immediate appeal of “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]” But “even where the judgment or order is subject to an immediate appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a), if the underlying subject matter is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35(a), a party must follow the discretionary application process.” Cook-Rose v. Waffle House, Inc., 320 Ga. 567, 569 (2024). Indeed, “[b]ecause certain orders that are subject to immediate review may still require a discretionary application, we have repeatedly advised litigants that they must review the discretionary application statute to see if it covers the underlying subject matter of the appeal.” Grogan v. City of Dawsonville, 305 Ga. 79, 82 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

This case is no longer pending in the court below, so the judgment on appeal is final for purposes of OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1) and, thus, is subject to an immediate appeal. So the only remaining question is whether the nonparty CCRP members were entitled to appeal merely by filing a notice of appeal, as they did. The trial court’s order contains some rulings that are properly the subject of an immediate appeal. See OCGA § 5-6- 34(a)(2), (a)(4). We noted above, however, that the nonparty CCRP members have standing to appeal only the portion of the trial court’s judgment that awards attorney fees and expenses against them under OCGA § 9-15-14. And OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10) requires a discretionary application for “[a]ppeals from awards of attorney’s fees or expenses of litigation under Code Section 9-15- 14[.]” That the attorney-fee award against the nonparty CCRP members is part of an order that also contains immediately appealable rulings not subject to the discretionary application process is of no moment in light of the nonparty CCRP members’ limited standing to appeal. Cf. Davis v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 285 Ga. 22, 24 (2009) (“The trial court’s joining of a ruling disposing of [a nonparty’s] motion to intervene with a ruling granting summary judgment to one of the parties to the suit does not make [the nonparty] a party to the suit, and does not confer standing on her to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment to one of the parties.”). Accordingly, the nonparty CCRP members were required to follow the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 in order to appeal the attorney-fee award against them. Because they failed to do so, this appeal is dismissed. 12

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No. S26A0636. Appeal dismissed in Case No. S26A0637. All the Justices concur.

12 We note that the nonparty CCRP members raise,

among other things, a colorable argument that the attorney- fee award against them is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Based on the required procedural dismissal described above, we express no opinion on the merits of that argument. We note, however, that “[a] judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction of the person or subject matter may be attacked at any time.” OCGA § 9-11-60(f). So the merits of this argument may be raised and considered in the appropriate setting.