Mcmullin v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0723

DeQuivon Hykeim McMullin

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Spalding County

No. 22R368C

Decided: October 14, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.

DeQuivon McMullin, Isaac Reid, and Kinesa Harvey were jointly tried for murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Wildarius Draggs, and McMullin was convicted of felony murder. 1 On appeal, McMullin contends that the

1 The crimes occurred on March 15, 2022. On June 8, 2022, a Spalding County grand jury returned an indictment charging McMullin, Reid, Cameron Barkley, and Harvey, individually and as parties to the crimes, with malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2 and 4); aggravated battery (Count 3); aggravated assault (Counts 5-6, for assaulting both Draggs and Rayshon Goodrum); and violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (Counts 7-9). Barkley testified against his co-defendants at trial in the hope of obtaining leniency from the State. At the conclusion of a jury trial that began on September 18, 2023, the jury found McMullin guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated battery and aggravated battery (Counts 2 and 3) and not guilty of the remaining counts. Reid was found not guilty of Count 8 but guilty of the remaining counts, and we have affirmed his convictions. See Reid v. State, 322 Ga. 858 (2025). Harvey was found not guilty on all counts. On September 25, 2023, the trial court sentenced McMullin to life in prison with

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to corroborate the testimony of Cameron Barkley, his accomplice; that the evidence was insufficient because it was entirely circumstantial and failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt; that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; and that the trial court committed plain error in permitting the testimony of a GBI Special Agent. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. In Reid v. State, 322 Ga. 858, 859–61 (2025), in which we affirmed the convictions of one of McMullin’s co-defendants, we set forth the facts of this case as follows:

The evidence presented at trial included a surveillance video from a local school building, which showed that, at approximately 5:19 p.m. on March 15, 2022, Rayshon Goodrum arrived at 1001 Lake Avenue in Griffin, Georgia, where Draggs lived with his aunt, Monica Fambro. After Goodrum arrived at Fambro’s house, he and Draggs sat on the front porch of the home. Fambro’s home was located on the corner of North 16th Street and Lake Avenue, with the front porch facing Lake Avenue and one side of the house facing North 16th Street, and the neighborhood is part of “Lit Block,” an area controlled by the Bloods Rollin’ 20s gang, also known

the possibility of parole for felony murder; the aggravated battery count was merged for sentencing purposes. McMullin filed a timely motion for new trial on October 13, 2023, which he amended with new appellate counsel on August 30 and October 7, 2024, and on March 17, 2025. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion for new trial on July 17, 2025. McMullin filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

as the “Zoo Krew.”

The surveillance video showed that, at approximately 5:29 p.m., about ten minutes after Goodrum arrived at Fambro’s house, a white Ford Fusion, which belonged to DeQuivon McMullin’s mother, drove down North 16th Street toward its intersection with Lake Avenue. With the front passenger window down, the car “slow rolled” through the intersection and “slowly passed” Fambro’s house in front of the porch where Draggs and Goodrum were sitting. The car was driven by Kinesa Harvey, and Reid (Harvey’s brother) was in the front passenger seat, while McMullin and Cameron Barkley were in the rear passenger seat. Barkley testified that he, Reid, and McMullin were members of the Zoo Krew, but Harvey was not.

During the car ride, Reid showed a gold Glock 19 handgun to Barkley and McMullin. The surveillance video shows that, at 5:44 p.m., the Ford Fusion was again driving north on North 16th Street toward its intersection with Lake Avenue, but stopped in front of a house on North 16th Street that was several houses before the intersection. Three people exited the car at that house. Barkley testified that he, Reid, and McMullin were the three who exited the car, and a law enforcement official also identified the three people from surveillance video as Reid, McMullin, and Barkley. The house on North 16th Street was a popular spot for neighborhood teenagers to buy snacks after school and for gang members to gather.

A path ran from the backyard of the house on North 16th Street to 1010 Lake Avenue, which was down the block and on the opposite side of the street from Fambro's house. Reid, McMullin, and Barkley stood on the front porch of the house on North 16th Street for about a minute before moving to the side of the house toward the path, at which point they disappeared from the video camera’s view toward the backyard. Barkley testified that once they were on the path behind the house, Reid offered the gun to both Barkley and McMullin. When both refused to take it, Reid continued down the path alone, and Barkley saw Reid fire shots toward Draggs and Goodrum from 1010 Lake Avenue. Reid was gone about thirty seconds, and the group ran after the shooting. At 5:53 p.m., Reid, McMullin, and Barkley reappeared on camera at the house on North 16th Street and then walked away together, heading south on North 16th Street away from Lake Avenue. The surveillance camera at the school building did not capture any part of the shooting.

Barkley testified that he, Reid, and McMullin thought that there was an “opp,” a member of an opposing gang, on the porch of the house and that was the reason Reid fired shots at the porch. Law enforcement officials found six shell casings along the side of the house at 1010 Lake Avenue, but because no handgun was ever located, the casings were not sent for any kind of forensic testing. The State, however, did introduce into evidence a photograph of members of the Zoo Krew holding a gold gun, and Barkley testified that members of the gang shared guns and that the gold gun in the photograph was the gun that Reid had on the day of

the crimes.

At 5:50 p.m., shortly before the shooting, Fambro arrived home from work. She walked by Draggs and Goodrum on the porch, “came in the house, went towards the kitchen, and then ... just heard six shots”; Draggs and Goodrum then ran inside. Draggs stated “I’ve been hit,” and Goodrum hid in Fambro’s pantry. Fambro called 911 at 5:54 p.m. and police officers began arriving on the scene a few minutes later. Draggs told the first officer who arrived that he had been shot by a stray bullet and did not see who shot him. Draggs later died from a single gunshot wound that penetrated both of his lungs

and his heart.

A law enforcement officer testified that he thought that the shooting occurred at 5:52 p.m., as, according to his review of the surveillance footage, a bird, which had not reacted to cars driving by Fambro’s house, flew away from her house at that time.

However, when asked on cross whether it was possible that the bird just decided that it was going to fly away at that time and that the shooting occurred after the bird flew away, the officer said that was “plausible.”

In an interview with law enforcement officials on the day of the crimes, Reid admitted that he was dropped off at the house on North 16th Street on the day of the crimes. He also said that he heard the gunshots and thought that someone might be shooting at him. The evidence at trial also showed that on March 17, Reid sent Harvey a screen shot of a newspaper article about the shooting of Draggs.

The State’s gang expert testified that he knew that Goodrum lived in an area of Griffin known to be “Crip territory” and that he saw Goodrum there “constantly.” He could not, however, “say that he is a Crip.” The expert was not familiar with Draggs and did not know whether he had any kind of gang affiliation. The expert explained that the Zoo Krew referred to a member of a rival gang as an “opp, short for opposition.” Under Zoo Krew rules, “no Crips [are] allowed on their turf,” and if a Zoo Krew member saw a Crip in his territory, the member “would have to act upon that.” Moreover, a Zoo Krew member could gain respect and rank in the gang by committing acts of violence against rival gang members. Further, failure to assault a rival gang member found in Zoo Krew territory could result in discipline from gang leadership. The expert added that based on his investigation of Reid, McMullin, and Barkley, including the language and hand signs they used in social media posts and the clothes they wore, they were members of the Zoo Krew.

In addition to the foregoing evidence, Lakeisha McMullin, McMullin’s mother, testified that McMullin lived with her at the time of the crimes and that she lived close to North 16th Street.

When asked by the prosecutor whether she had told a law enforcement officer that she had dropped McMullin, Reid, and Barkley off near the house on North 16th Street on the day of the crimes, Lakeisha said that she could not remember. On cross- examination by McMullin, Lakeisha testified that she got home from work around 5:15 p.m. to 5:25 p.m. on the day of the crimes and that McMullin was home when she arrived. She added that he took a shower around 5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and then lay down in his room. She looked at her Facebook account around 5:55 p.m. and saw a posting that there had been a shooting on 16th Street. She testified that McMullin was home at that time.

Vickie Harvey, McMullin’s grandmother, lived with Lakeisha and McMullin. She testified on direct examination by the prosecutor that she got home that day around 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. and that McMullin was there, talking on the phone. She heard Lakeisha come home around 5:15 p.m. Vickie dozed off and later heard Reid arrive at the house to see McMullin. When asked if she remembered telling the prosecutor before trial that Reid, McMullin, and Kinesa Harvey left her house in a Ford Fusion around 5:00 p.m., Vickie denied doing so. On cross-examination by McMullin, Vickie reiterated that Lakeisha got home from work that day around 5:15 to 5:20 p.m. and that McMullin was home at that time. Once Lakeisha got home, McMullin took a shower and lay down. Vickie testified that McMullin got up when Reid came over to the house and that it had to be around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. by that time.

An assistant district attorney, who was present when the lead prosecutor spoke with Vickie about her testimony a few days before trial, testified that Vickie told them that McMullin, Reid, and Kinesa Harvey left the house in the Ford Fusion around 5:00 p.m. and that Kinesa was driving the vehicle.

In a statement to investigators on the night of the crimes, McMullin admitted that he had been to the house on North 16th Street that day.

2. McMullin contends that the testimony of Barkley, an accomplice, was not sufficiently corroborated, as required by OCGA § 24-14-8. We disagree.

Under OCGA § 24-14-8, the testimony of an accomplice is not sufficient to establish a fact in felony cases, unless the accomplice’s testimony is corroborated “by other evidence implicating the defendant.” McGarity v. State, 308 Ga. 417, 420 (2020). Corroborating evidence “must be independent of the accomplice’s testimony and must directly connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference of guilt.” Reid, 322 Ga. at 863 (cleaned up). “The corroborating evidence need only be slight and can be entirely circumstantial,” “need not be of itself sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged,” and need not “match the testimony of the accomplice in every detail.” Bowdery v. State, 321 Ga. 890, 896 (2025) (cleaned up).

Here, there was evidence from a number of sources providing at least slight corroborating evidence of Barkley’s testimony identifying McMullin as a participant in the crimes. To begin, surveillance video showed that, at approximately 5:29 p.m., a Ford Fusion drove slowly in front of the porch on which the victims were sitting, and that, at approximately 5:44 p.m., the car stopped in front of the house on North 16th Street. In addition, Reid, McMullin, and Barkley were identified from the surveillance footage as the three people who were dropped off from the Ford Fusion at the house on North 16th Street a few minutes before the shooting. That same surveillance video showed that, after being dropped off, the three then walked behind the house, where there was a path that led to the location from which the shots were fired, and that they reemerged by the house on North 16th Street shortly after the shooting. Moreover, photographic evidence showed that members of the Zoo Krew had a gold gun, and the State’s “gang expert testified, independently of Barkley, that Reid, Barkley, and McMullin were members of the Zoo Krew and that the gang encouraged retaliation against members of other gangs who were in its territory.” Reid, 322 Ga. at 864. Additionally, McMullin’s grandmother told the prosecutor that McMullin, Reid, and Harvey left McMullin’s house around 5:00 p.m. in the Ford Fusion on the day of the crimes, with Kinesa driving the vehicle. Considered together, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate Barkley’s testimony and thus satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 24-14-8. See Reid, 322 Ga. at 864 (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate Barkley’s testimony in Reid’s appeal based on most of these same considerations); Bowdery, 321 Ga. at 896–97 (concluding that an accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by, among other things, evidence that the defendant and his accomplice were in the same gang and that there was a gang-related motive for the shooting); Washington v. State, 320 Ga. 839, 845 (2025) (concluding that surveillance video that showed the movements of the defendant to which the accomplice had testified adequately corroborated the accomplice’s testimony).

3. McMullin contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under OCGA § 24-14-6. Under that statute, “a conviction that rests only on circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the evidence ‘excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’” Lee v. State, 322 Ga. 44, 56 (2025) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6; punctuation omitted). “But if there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the circumstantial evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency analysis.” Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 492 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, as Barkley’s eyewitness testimony about McMullin’s participation in the crimes was direct evidence of guilt. See Rouse v. State, 322 Ga. 328, 334 (2025) (holding that the testimony of an eyewitness whom we assumed to be an accomplice constituted direct evidence of guilt, making OCGA § 24-14-6 inapplicable); Pindling v. State, 321 Ga. 231, 239 (2025) (holding that the defendant’s conviction was not based entirely on circumstantial evidence, as the eyewitness testimony of an accomplice constituted direct evidence of guilt); Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (2024) (“Eyewitness testimony based on the witness’s firsthand observations of the crime is direct, not circumstantial, evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because there was direct evidence of McMullin’s guilt, his argument under OCGA § 24-14-6 fails.

4. McMullin contends that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) (“It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.”). McMullin, however, has not shown that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence.

During Reid’s cross-examination of Barkley, Reid asked Barkley if he had told the District Attorney in a pre-trial interview that Reid showed him “a gun in the car.” Barkley said that he had. Reid then asked whether Barkley had testified on direct examination that Reid had showed him the gun “on the path.” Barkley answered that he had not. Reid’s counsel then said, “You just testified to that not 20 minutes ago.” The trial court asked Barkley whether Reid had “show[ed] [him] the gun in the car.” Barkley answered, yes. The trial court then asked, “And did he show you the gun on the path?” Barkley answered that he had. Speaking to Reid’s counsel, the court said, “I think he just explained that he saw the gun in the car and on the path.” McMullin did not make any objection to the court’s statement, but he now argues that it was an improper comment on the evidence.

Because McMullin did not raise this claim below, we review it only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-57(b) (“[F]ailure to make a timely objection to an alleged violation of [OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1)] shall preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties.”). To show plain error, McMullin must demonstrate that the alleged error “was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Tedder v. State, 320 Ga. 29, 38 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, McMullin has failed to carry his burden to show plain error. It is not clear and obvious that the trial court’s statement violated OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1), as the trial court merely repeated, without elaboration, Barkley’s testimony that Reid showed him the gun in the car and on the path. In repeating that testimony, the trial court did not obviously express an opinion about whether a fact at issue had or had not been proved. The court thus did not plainly err in making the comment. See Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 105 (2024) (holding that a trial court’s “statement did not obviously violate OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) because the trial court did not appear to express or intimate an opinion about the evidence or whether a fact at issue was proven,” but “[i]nstead, … simply repeated the witness’s testimony nearly verbatim”).

5. McMullin contends that the trial court committed plain error when it qualified a GBI agent as an expert on criminal street gangs and when it failed to exclude certain parts of the agent’s testimony on the ground it was speculative or irrelevant or on the ground that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. We conclude that McMullin has failed to show plain error.

At trial, Special Agent Colt Tolen of the GBI testified that he was assigned to the GBI Gang Task Force. He added that he had been a gang investigator since 2015, had taken 295 hours of training about criminal street gangs, and had become certified to instruct other law enforcement officers regarding criminal street gangs. Agent Tolen testified that he had investigated over 200 gang members and that his job consists of “investigating criminal street gangs,” interviewing gang members “on a constant basis, reviewing social media records, cell phone extractions, and just steadily staying on top of criminal street gangs and ongoing trends.” He added that the cell phones of gang members often contain valuable information about gang rules and clothing and that he had been qualified as an expert 11 times in cases involving criminal street gangs. Finally, Agent Tolen added that he was familiar with the history of the Zoo Krew and its leadership and had read its “Book of Knowledge,” which sets forth the gang’s rules. The trial court qualified Agent Tolen as an expert on criminal street gangs, and McMullin did not object. Similarly, when Agent Tolen testified about social media messages sent between McMullin and Reid and others, McMullin voiced no objection.

Because McMullin did not object to Agent Tolen’s expert qualifications or testimony at trial, we review his claims only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). McMullin first complains that the trial court clearly erred in qualifying Agent Tolen as an expert on criminal street gangs, arguing that the State failed to lay the foundation for his testimony pursuant to OCGA § 24-7- 702(b) (setting forth the standards that govern the admissibility of expert testimony). But McMullin does nothing more than cite the statute; he does not cite any record evidence relating to Agent Tolen’s gang expertise, cite to any case law, or make any legal argument as to why the record evidence demonstrates that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for Agent Tolen’s testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702(b). Thus, McMullin has not carried his burden to show that the trial court obviously erred in failing to exclude Agent Tolen’s testimony under § 24-7-702(b). See Mansfield v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A1122, slip op. at 8-9 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (holding that the appellant failed to carry his burden to show plain error by failing to identify specific evidence that should not have been admitted under a rule of evidence and by failing to provide meaningful argument); Calhoun v. State, 324 Ga. 683, 693 (2026) (holding that where the appellant failed to cite to any record evidence or make meaningful legal argument, he failed to carry his burden to show error, explaining that, “as a general matter, a legal argument in support of a claim of error on appeal involves the presentation of reasoning based on the law and the specific facts of the case aimed at persuading a court that the claim of error has merit” (cleaned up)).

McMullin also claims that the trial court plainly erred by failing to exclude Agent Tolen’s testimony for various reasons. He contends that some of the messages were exchanged weeks before the shooting and thus lacked probative value as to the shooting; that much of Agent Tolen’s interpretation of the gang lingo in the messages was “speculative”; and that some of the messages were not relevant because it was not clear whom McMullin was talking to. He also argues that Agent Tolen’s testimony was prejudicial because the trial court relied on it in finding that all the defendants shared a common intent to shoot Goodrum for gang- related purposes. But McMullin does not cite any authority to support that Agent Tolen’s testimony should have been excluded for any of the reasons he claims. To show clear and obvious error on plain-error review, the appellant “must identify on-point controlling authority or the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establishes that the trial court erred.” Adams v. State, 322 Ga. 155, 162 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). McMullin has not cited any authority at all, let alone authority that “plainly establishes that the trial court erred,” id., so he has not carried his burden to show clear and obvious error. See Sanders v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0682, slip op. at 11 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (holding that because the defendant failed “to identify on-point controlling authority” that plainly established that the trial court erred, he failed to carry his burden to show plain error (quotation marks omitted)); Kerns v. State, 323 Ga. 510, 523 (2026) (holding that the defendant’s claim of plain error failed because he identified no controlling authority that established that the trial court plainly erred). So this claim of plain error fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.