Dorsey v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0733

Cordarius Dorsey

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County

No. 20CR11713

Decided: October 14, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.

A DeKalb County jury found Cordarius Dorsey guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Sulaiman Jalloh. 1 Dorsey contends that the trial court

1 The crimes occurred on October 15, 2019. A DeKalb County grand jury returned an indictment on January 23, 2020, charging Dorsey and his co- defendant, Quintavious Jackson, with malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder predicated on armed robbery and aggravated assault, respectively (Counts 2 and 3), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). Dorsey was separately charged with one count of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 4) and for the underlying firearm offense (Count 7). During a trial that began on December 5, 2022, the jury found Dorsey guilty on all counts. (The jury found Jackson not guilty of malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. This Court affirmed Jackson’s convictions in Jackson v. State, 324 Ga. 75 (2026).) On December 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced Dorsey to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and to five consecutive years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). The

abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective, and that he is entitled to a new trial due to the collective prejudicial effect of the errors alleged. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of conviction for the reasons set forth below.

The evidence presented at trial shows that, on October 15, 2019, Dorsey and Quintavious Jackson met at a gas station in DeKalb County and waited there together for about half an hour. After Jalloh drove his car into the gas station’s parking lot and stopped near the door to the convenience store, Dorsey fatally shot Jalloh while Jackson took a bag from Jalloh’s possession. These events were recorded from various angles on the gas station’s surveillance video cameras.

The surveillance video recordings, which were viewed by the jury, show Jackson and Dorsey interacting with each other for about 30 minutes prior to the shooting. The video recordings show that Dorsey wore black clothing, orange Nike shoes, and a burgundy Polo-branded bucket hat. At one point, Jackson tried on

remaining counts either merged for purposes of sentencing or were vacated by operation of law. As to Count 7 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), we note that the trial court improperly merged Count 7 into Count 4 (felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) because Count 4 was vacated by operation of law. While the trial court should have sentenced Dorsey on Count 7, the issue was not raised below or on appeal, and we have said that, “when a merger error benefits a defendant,” we “exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional circumstances,” which do not exist here. Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 617, 618 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).

Dorsey filed a motion for new trial on December 13, 2022, which he subsequently amended. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on November 13, 2025, and denied it on November 24, 2025. On December 3, 2025, Dorsey filed a notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court to the

April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

Dorsey’s hat. When Jackson entered the convenience store, the surveillance camera recorded clear, color images of his face, two- toned “twists” hair style, and clothing.

At about 10:15 p.m., Jalloh drove his car into the gas station parking lot. Dorsey, who was standing outside alone at the time, tapped on the glass window to get Jackson, who was inside, to join him. A video recording shows that Dorsey pulled a handgun from his clothing as he walked to Jalloh’s car. As Jalloh opened his car door, Jackson went to the rear of the car and glanced around the parking lot, as if looking for someone. Dorsey stood beside Jalloh’s open car door pointing his gun toward Jalloh. Upon seeing Dorsey, Jalloh tried to close the car door, but Dorsey pulled it open. As Dorsey struggled with Jalloh, Jackson ran to Dorsey’s side. Jackson took a blue bag from Jalloh, and Dorsey shot Jalloh in the chest. As Jalloh fell from his car onto the pavement, Jackson sprinted away and Dorsey slowly walked off in a different direction. Jalloh died as a result of the gunshot wound to his chest.

A witness, Dwayne Williams, testified that a person he knew as “Polo” had been at the gas station “all day” on October 15, 2019. He noticed that Polo was wearing a burgundy bucket hat. Williams, who was working across the street at a car wash when the shooting occurred, testified that, immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw Polo walking away from the gas station. Williams identified Dorsey as the person he knew as “Polo” from a photographic line-up as well as at trial.

Acting on information gathered from Williams and other witnesses to the shooting, as well as from an anonymous tip, investigators determined that an individual known as “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” had been involved in the shooting. One of the investigators, Detective Brown, was familiar with “Juicy Boy,” and knew him as Dorsey. He testified that Dorsey was also known as “Polo” or “J. B.” Detective Brown identified Dorsey in court as the person he knew as “Juicy Boy.” He watched the surveillance video recording of the shooting as it was played for the jury, and he identified Dorsey as the person in the burgundy bucket hat and dark clothing.

The State introduced through the testimony of Investigator J. B. Williams images from Facebook accounts for persons using the names “Ike Tina” and “Polo Rollack.” The accounts displayed images of Dorsey, including one showing tattoos on his arms, as well as posts where Dorsey was referred to as “Polo.” In a video recording posted to an account on October 14, 2019, the day before the shooting, Dorsey wore orange Nike shoes like those worn by the shooter. Dorsey’s social media accounts contained information that led investigators to Jackson’s Instagram account. Using data from Jackson’s social media, the investigators were able to obtain Jackson’s email address and driver’s license information. They learned that Jackson got a driver’s license two days after the shooting. The photograph of Jackson’s driver’s license showed the same two-toned “twists” hairstyle worn by the shooter’s accomplice in the gas station surveillance video recordings. Images from Jackson’s social media page and Jackson’s driver’s license both show that he had “21” tattooed on his face.

Investigators went to Jackson’s home where they interviewed his mother. They showed her a still image taken from the surveillance video recordings, and she identified the person in the still image as Jackson. In the still image, Jackson wore a navy-blue shirt and had a two-toned “twists” hairstyle. On October 24, the investigators obtained an arrest warrant for Jackson, and he was taken into custody the following day. Shortly thereafter, Jackson was interviewed. When an investigator showed him a still image taken from the video recording of Dorsey’s accomplice, Jackson identified it as an image of himself.

During a subsequent search of Jackson’s home, investigators saw a pile of clothing that included a navy-blue shirt like that worn by Jackson and a burgundy Polo-branded bucket hat matching the hat worn by Dorsey during the shooting. The hat was swabbed for DNA. Subsequent testing showed that the DNA on the hat matched DNA samples taken from both Jackson and Dorsey. Investigators searched Jalloh’s car and found blue bags beneath Jalloh’s passenger seat like the one taken by Jackson. The bags contained more than $30,000 in cash.

Investigator Williams testified that Dorsey obtained a new cell phone on October 16, 2019, the day after the shooting. He also testified about the text messages and social media accounts on the phone. One of the first Instagram messages sent from the new phone stated: “I whacked a n***a the other day.” The phone also showed internet searches on October 17, 2019, for news reports involving a man killed at a gas station. In all, there were 22 searches related to the shooting. On October 24, 2019, Dorsey sent an Instagram message stating that he was “on the run” because of an “armed robbery in Fulton County.”

An arrest warrant for Dorsey was taken out on October 29, 2019, and he was apprehended on January 16, 2020. After his arrest, Dorsey made several phone calls from jail. In one of those calls, he identified himself as “Polo.” In another, he said that he “did something to get some money” and “Google me and you will see it.” 1. Dorsey contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in several respects. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dorsey must show “both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense.” Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2016). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Dorsey must “overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 385 (quotation marks omitted). To meet the prejudice prong, Dorsey must establish “a reasonable probability that, absent any unprofessional errors on counsel’s part, the result of his trial would have been different.” Id. And, “[i]f the defendant fails to satisfy either the ‘deficient performance’ or the ‘prejudice’ prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required to examine the other.” Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845, 850–51 (2015). (a) Dorsey argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the in-life photograph of Jalloh introduced by the State through Jalloh’s daughter on the ground that its “relevancy is tenuous.” He contends that the photograph had scant probative value because the forensic pathologist had already established that Jalloh was deceased and that law-enforcement witnesses could have identified Jalloh instead. He argues that the admission of the photograph prejudiced his defense because it aroused sympathy in the jury. For the following reasons, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-402 (“Rule 402”), “[a]ll relevant evidence shall be admissible[.]” To evaluate relevancy, this Court relies on OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

However, relevant evidence may be excluded under OCGA § 24- 4-403 (“Rule 403”) “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” This Court has held that in-life photographs of murder victims constitute relevant evidence but that they have “tenuous probative value”; therefore, “every effort should be made to proffer a photograph of the victim alone,” instead of, for example, standing with his family, and the “better practice” is not to have a family member identify the victim. Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 832–33 (2016).

But the “better practice” noted in Ragan did not establish a categorical rule that a victim’s relative can never identify an in-life photograph of the victim. Indeed, … we distinguished Ragan and concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim’s [relative] to identify a single photograph of the victim, alone in a neutral background, where the [relative] did not have a strong emotional reaction during her identification testimony.

Tabb v. State, 324 Ga. 622, 627 (2026) (citations omitted).

Here, the record reflects that the State introduced only one photograph of Jalloh. The photograph depicted him standing alone against a neutral background. Although the photograph was admitted through Jalloh’s daughter, there is nothing in the record indicating that she had a “strong emotional reaction” when she made the identification. See id. The identification was brief, consisting only of her “yes” answer to a single question: “Is that a photo of your father?” Because there was only a single photograph of the victim admitted in this case, just as in Tabb, Dorsey has not demonstrated that the photograph of Jalloh was inadmissible and that an objection pursuant to Rules 402 and 403 would have been sustained. As a result, he has failed to show that trial counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient performance. See Tabb, 324 Ga. at 627. See also Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 762–63 (2018) (holding that counsel is not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection).

(b) Dorsey contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the State’s line of questioning eliciting inadmissible victim-impact evidence from Jalloh’s daughter during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. The daughter’s testimony informed the jury that Jalloh was married, had young children, and that several crying relatives were present when the daughter learned of her father’s death. Dorsey argues that the admission of this testimony was improper; moreover, it was prejudicial, as it was likely to engender the jury’s sympathy.

The record shows that Jalloh’s daughter briefly testified about how she found out about her father’s death. She had been asleep “and then basically [she] heard crying downstairs and that’s what woke [her] up.” Her family told her that her father had been killed. When the prosecutor asked her who was crying, she responded that it was her mom, step-grandmother, aunt, and uncles, and that “[i]t was very close family members at the house.” At the hearing on Dorsey’s motion for new trial, defense counsel testified that he “didn’t consider that [testimony] victim impact[, a]nd considering that [the] strategy was that [Dorsey] was not the person who shot Jalloh, [he] didn’t see a strategic reason to attack [the daughter’s testimony].”

“[E]vidence about a crime victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, and the victim’s community generally is not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial.” Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 363 (2020). Although Jalloh’s daughter’s testimony may have been inadmissible, it was brief. And trial counsel’s strategy of not objecting — and risking being perceived as attacking a sympathetic witness — was not objectively unreasonable given that the witness’s testimony had little if any effect on the defense strategy that someone other than Dorsey killed Jalloh. Accordingly, this claim of error fails. See, e.g., Tabb v. State, 324 Ga. at 626–27 (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to object to the witness’s victim-impact testimony was not unreasonable where the testimony was brief and counsel believed that interrupting a crying witness “would have a negative effect on the jury, as the jury seemed to connect with her”); Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 743 (2019) (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to object to the State’s victim-impact argument was reasonable where the argument was brief and counsel did not want to “draw more attention” to it).

(c) Dorsey contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Brown’s identification of Dorsey in the surveillance video recordings of the shooting. We disagree. Lay opinion testimony identifying a defendant in surveillance photographs and video recordings is admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24-7-701 (“Rule 701”) where “there is some basis for concluding that a witness is more likely [than is the jury] to correctly identify a defendant as the individual depicted in surveillance photographs [or video recordings].” Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 280 (2017) (citing United States v. Pierce, 136 F3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up)).

A number of factors may determine if a witness is better suited than the jury to identify the defendant in such instances, but perhaps the “most critical [factor] to this determination is the witness’s level of familiarity with the defendant’s appearance.” Glenn, 302 Ga. at 280 (noting that “in most cases, the opportunity to observe a person’s mannerisms, gait, and similar characteristics depicted in video footage will increase the likelihood that a lay witness familiar with a defendant will be better equipped than jurors to identify the defendant from such images”). Here, Detective Brown knew what Dorsey looked like. He was familiar with his appearance, tattoos, height, and mannerisms because he had been around Dorsey and had seen him before the shooting occurred. He also knew that Dorsey went by the names “Juicy Boy,” “Polo,” and “J.B.” Moreover, he correctly identified Dorsey at trial.

Detective Brown testified that he reviewed the surveillance video from the shooting and was able to identify Dorsey as the person wearing the burgundy bucket hat. This testimony was based on the detective’s own perceptions and was helpful to the jury in determining the identity of the shooter. Because Detective Brown’s testimony was not improper lay opinion testimony, an objection on this ground would have been overruled, and trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing to make such meritless objection. See Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 564 (2020) (holding that any “objection to Agent Smith’s testimony as improper lay witness testimony would have been properly overruled, and Appellant’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection,” citing Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. 475, 480 (2019)). 2

2 In Dorsey’s co-defendant’s appeal, we held the trial court did not

2. Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a State’s witness, over defense counsel’s objection, to recount hearsay statements from witnesses and an anonymous tipster on the ground that the statements were admissible non- hearsay offered for the purpose of “explaining conduct” rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. He also contends that the admission of the anonymous tipster’s statement violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he contends that the court allowed Investigator Williams to testify that he learned from three sources — a witness on the scene, detectives who spoke to witnesses on the scene, and an anonymous tip — that a person called “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” was present at the scene of the shooting. Counsel objected on hearsay grounds and requested a curative instruction. Counsel also challenged the admission of the information gleaned from the tipster on Confrontation Clause grounds. The court overruled the objections and gave no curative instruction. For the following reasons, we discern no reversible error. (a) With respect to Dorsey’s hearsay argument, it is not necessary to consider whether the admission of the statements was an abuse of discretion because, assuming without deciding that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that any error in admitting them was harmless.

In determining whether an error was harmless, we

plainly err in allowing the detective to identify Jackson in the surveillance video: “Based on the record before us, even if Jackson had objected, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in admitting the detective’s testimony identifying Jackson on the surveillance video recordings.” Jackson, 324 Ga. at 81.

review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.

The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

Perez v. State, 303 Ga. 188, 191 (2018). See also OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). The record, viewed in this way, shows that, with respect to the name “Polo,” a witness had previously testified that he had seen a man he knew as Polo walking away from the gas station immediately after the shooting. The transcript also shows that Detective Brown, who was familiar with Dorsey, identified him in the gas station’s surveillance video recordings and knew him by a number of aliases, including “Polo” and “Juicy Boy.” Further, Dorsey identified himself in a recorded phone call as “Polo.” And Dorsey’s social media accounts contained numerous references to his aliases. Thus, the statements Dorsey complains about were cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. “[T]he erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where substantial, cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2017). Additionally, the evidence against Dorsey was overwhelming. It included eyewitness identification, surveillance video recordings of the crimes, inculpatory social media and text messages, and DNA evidence. For these reasons, any error in admitting the out- of-court statements was harmless as it was highly probable that they did not contribute to the verdict. See Perez, 303 Ga. at 91.

(b) Dorsey also contends that the admission of the investigator’s testimony concerning the anonymous tip violated his right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him.

The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” US Const. Amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the admission of out-of- court testimonial statements made by a declarant who is unavailable for cross-examination. See Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 26 (2011). “A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose was to establish evidence that could be used in a future prosecution.” Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 845 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that Investigator Williams’s testimony recounting an anonymous tip implying that “Juicy Boy” was involved in the shooting violates the Confrontation Clause, based on the evidence outlined in Division 2 (b), the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the investigator’s testimony about the anonymous tip did not contribute to the verdict. See Kingdom v. State, 321 Ga. 363, 367 (2025) (“A constitutional error is harmless when the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming.”).

3. Dorsey contends that the “trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce improper character evidence regarding [Dorsey’s] involvement in an unrelated armed robbery in Fulton County, over defense objection.” Specifically, he argues that the trial court should have excluded a statement from Dorsey’s Instagram messaging account that he was “on the run” because of an “armed robbery in Fulton County.” He argues that the statement constituted “wholly irrelevant” evidence of another crime and the trial court should have concluded that it was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).

As we have explained, Rule 404(b) generally prohibits the admission of evidence of the defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove the defendant’s character, but it allows such “other acts” evidence for certain limited purposes. See OCGA § 24-4-404(b). ... [H]owever, ...

Rule 404(b) applies only to other acts that are extrinsic to the charged crime, and … other acts that are intrinsic to the charged crime may be admissible without respect to Rule 404(b).

Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 653, 666 (2025). In this case, the State contended that Dorsey’s statement, which was made on October 24, 2019, shortly after the shooting and the same day an arrest warrant was issued for Jackson, constituted intrinsic evidence of flight, and revealed Dorsey’s consciousness of guilt concerning the armed robbery for which he was being tried, which occurred in the City of Atlanta. The State agreed to contextualize the admission of the evidence by having the testifying investigator explain that he has encountered people who mistakenly assume that the City of Atlanta is entirely within Fulton County. The trial court agreed with the State and overruled the objection.

The evidence was properly admitted as evidence of flight, which is generally considered intrinsic evidence that is not subject to Rule 404(b). As we have explained,

[e]vidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. Evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury. Evidence of other acts is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.

And this sort of intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant’s character at issue.

Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24–25 (2021) (cleaned up). “Evidence of flight is generally intrinsic, as the fact of an accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and thus of guilt itself.” Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (2022) (cleaned up). See also Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 218–19 (2020) (holding that “evidence of flight may be admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt”). Therefore, because the evidence was intrinsic, the “limitations and prohibition on ‘other acts’ evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404(b) do not apply[.]” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (2017).

For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See Williams, 302 Ga. at 485. We are unpersuaded by Dorsey’s argument that the jury would have assumed from his statement that he had committed a separate, unrelated crime in Fulton County. The State did not characterize the statement as a separate offense, and the investigator testified that people often mistakenly assume that the City of Atlanta is entirely in Fulton County. Further, Dorsey’s phone records also show that he conducted internet searches for a single armed robbery involving a man shot at a gas station. Given this evidence, the trial court had discretion to conclude that the jury was unlikely to believe Dorsey had committed a separate armed robbery in the days between the shooting and the day he wrote in his new Instagram messaging account that he was “on the run.” 3 Consequently, this claim of error fails.

4. Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting through the testimony of Investigator Williams screenshots from Dorsey’s Facebook account that had not been properly authenticated. Specifically, he contends the State failed to demonstrate that State’s Exhibits 154 through 163 were “true and accurate reflections of the content of the Facebook page viewed by the investigator during his investigation.”

The record shows, however, that the trial court properly overruled Dorsey’s authentication objection and admitted the

3 We note that OCGA § 24-1-104(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[p]reliminary questions concerning … the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,” and that those “questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard.” And “[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.” OCGA § 24-1-104(b). See Gallegos- Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 (2024) (Pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-104(b), “when the relevancy of evidence depends upon proof of a conditional fact, the trial court examines all the evidence in the case and admits the evidence if a jury could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”). So, under the circumstances here, the trial court was permitted to determine that the statement was made in connection with the same crime and to admit it on that basis.

exhibits only after Investigator Williams had given testimony that sufficiently authenticated them.

Evidence like a digital photograph may be authenticated with evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” OCGA § 24-9-901 (a). Indeed, documents from electronic sources are subject to the same rules of authentication as other more traditional documentary evidence and may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence, which may include the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the documents, taken in conjunction with circumstances. Once the party seeking to authenticate evidence presents a prima facie case that the evidence is what it purports to be, the evidence is properly admitted, leaving the ultimate question of authenticity to be decided by the jury.

Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 475 (2019) (cleaned up). In this case, the investigator testified that he had watched the surveillance videos from the gas station with Detective Brown, who had previously identified Dorsey and linked him to several aliases. Thereafter, the investigator searched for and ultimately located Facebook accounts under the names “Ike Tina” and “Polo Rollack” which contained still images and video recordings of Dorsey. Investigator Williams testified that he recognized the images of Dorsey because he had become familiar with Dorsey’s appearance, his tattoos, and the sound of his voice. He then personally took the screenshots of Dorsey’s images from these Facebook pages. Thus, the investigator’s testimony established a prima facie case of authenticity that allowed the Facebook screenshots to be admitted and for the jury to decide whether the evidence was what the investigator claimed it was. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 87 (2023) (“The photos here were authenticated by Investigator Pinckney, who testified that he was familiar with them and with the people in them.”); Hawkins v. State, 304 Ga. 299, 304 (2018) (explaining that screenshots of Facebook messages were sufficiently authenticated by a witness who recognized the messages as coming from defendant’s Facebook account, given that the witness was familiar with the account and recognized a photograph of the defendant associated with the user account). For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits.

5. Dorsey contends that to the extent that any of the errors alleged may be deemed harmless, he is entitled to a new trial “due to the collective prejudicial effect of all trial court errors and any deficient performance” on the part of Dorsey’s trial counsel. We disagree.

Under State v. Lane, we must “consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” 308 Ga. 10, 17 (2020). To establish cumulative error, a defendant must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial” and that “the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the [defendant] a fundamentally fair trial.” Id. at 21 (quotation marks omitted). Because we have assumed only one evidentiary error — the admission of out-of- court statements that a person called “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” was present at the scene of the shooting (see Division 2) — and have determined that Dorsey’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently, cumulative error analysis under Lane is not applicable. See Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 251 n.16 (2022) (holding that to show cumulative error, an appellant must show that at least two errors were committed).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.