---
title: Godfrey v. State
collection: opinions
id: S26A0785
cite_as: Godfrey v. State, S26A0785 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026)
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text_url: https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S26A0785/text
source_url: https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/s26a0785.pdf
date: 2026-08-13
status: published
corpus_version: opinions-2026-09-14
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docket: S26A0785
court: Supreme Court of Georgia
case_type: criminal appeal
case_name_full: Harry Van Godfrey, Jr. v. The State
authoring_justice: Pinson
disposition: Appeal dismissed
vote: All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating
word_count: 1203
date_filed_source: courtlistener
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legal_areas:
  - criminal law
  - appellate procedure
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---

# Godfrey v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia, docket S26A0785, filed 2026-08-13.

## Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0785

Harry Van Godfrey, Jr.

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Polk County

No. 1998CR700

Decided: August 13, 2026

PINSON, Justice.

Harry Van Godfrey, Jr., pleaded guilty to murder and other crimes and was sentenced to life in prison. Years later, he moved to vacate his sentence as void. On October 1, 2025, a trial court granted Godfrey’s motion to vacate and re-entered his judgment of conviction with a different sentence. Godfrey filed a timely no- tice of appeal. We now dismiss that appeal for lack of jurisdiction because under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3), a direct appeal from a guilty plea must come by discretionary application.

In 2000, Godfrey entered a negotiated guilty plea to malice murder and other crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Angela Godfrey. Under the plea agreement, Godfrey would be sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years, the State would not seek the death penalty, and Godfrey agreed “not [to] seek the benefit of parole eligibility for a period of not less than thirty-five (35) years.” Godfrey’s agreement not to seek parole for 35 years was a concession: under the statute in effect at the time, he would oth- erwise have been eligible for parole after 14 years. See OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(1) (2000).

Twenty-five years later, Godfrey moved pro se to vacate his sentence as void. Relying on our decision in Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349 (2015), Godfrey argued that the parole restriction in his plea agreement made his sentence illegal and void, because it “impos[ed] limitations on parole eligibility that extend beyond what is statutorily authorized.” See Humphrey, 297 Ga. at 350– 51 (“a sentence that purports to limit eligibility for parole in a way that is not authorized by statutory law … intrudes upon the con- stitutional prerogative of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to extend clemency to persons under sentence”). The trial court agreed, and so it entered a judgment that vacated the sentence from 2000 and re-sentenced Godfrey to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, followed by 20 years in prison for cruelty to children. Godfrey then filed a notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court.

Before we may address the merits of his appeal, however, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction to decide it. See State of Ga. v. Fed. Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 324 (2022). As it turns out, we do not.

By statute, certain kinds of cases may be appealed only if the appellant files an “application in the nature of a petition” (we call such applications “discretionary applications”) with the ap- pellate court. See OCGA § 5-6-35(b). This application require- ment is jurisdictional: if the appellant does not file one in a case the requirement applies to, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(d); Burkett v. State, Case No. S26A0395, slip op. at 3–4 (May 19, 2026) (2026 WL 1391215); Ga- ble v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 82–85 (2011).

The kinds of cases for which a discretionary application is required are listed at OCGA § 5-6-35(a), and as of May 2025, that list includes “[d]irect appeals from guilty pleas.” See OCGA § 5-6- 35(a)(5.3); Ga. L. 2025 at § 1–2. That amendment was in effect when the trial court here re-entered the judgment in Godfrey’s case in October 2025, so it applies to this appeal. See Murphy v. Murphy, 295 Ga. 376, 378 (2014) (the “law regarding appellate procedure in effect at the time of the judgment” governs).

And this appeal is, in fact, a “direct appeal from a guilty plea” for which OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a discretionary ap- plication. The trial court’s October 2025 judgment vacated the original 2000 judgment that was entered on Godfrey’s guilty plea, then modified and re-entered it. The fact that the judgment was vacated, modified, and re-entered does not make it any less the judgment of conviction and sentence that resulted from Godfrey’s long-ago guilty plea. Indeed, without the guilty plea, there would be no judgment of conviction to appeal. See OCGA § 16-1-3(4) (de- fining “conviction” as “a final judgment of conviction entered upon a verdict of finding of guilty of a crime or upon a plea of guilty”). In other words, Godfrey seeks to appeal the judgment entered on his guilty plea, which makes his appeal an appeal from a guilty plea. And that appeal is “direct” because it is an appeal by right from the final judgment, and not, for instance, an interlocutory appeal or a collateral attack on the judgment. See OCGA § 5-6- 34(a)(1)(B) (providing that “Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from … [a]ll final judgments”); Sockwell Corners, LLC v. Newton County, Case No. S26A0807, slip op. at 3 (June 2, 2026) (2026 WL 1541174) (explaining that appeals authorized under OCGA § 5-6-34(a) are those that “may be appealed directly”).

Finally, this is a direct appeal from a guilty plea even though it is an appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant God- frey’s motion to vacate his sentence. Again, that decision resulted in the trial court vacating, modifying, and then re-entering its judgment based on Godfrey’s guilty plea. And an appeal from that re-entered judgment is still just that — an appeal from the judg- ment. 1 See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 294 Ga. 842, 842–43 (2014) (con- sidering appeal from re-entered judgment after first judgment was vacated as void on the defendant’s motion); Moore v. State, 308 Ga. 556, 557 (2020) (explaining that when the trial court does not provide the statutorily required notice of a judgment to the losing party, “that party should file a motion to set aside, and the trial court should grant the motion and re-enter the judgment, whereupon the 30-day appeal period [to appeal from the judg- ment] would begin to run again” (cleaned up)).

In sum, by the time Godfrey’s judgment on his guilty plea was re-entered, direct appeals from guilty pleas had to be taken by discretionary application. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3). Godfrey then sought a direct appeal from the judgment entered on his guilty plea but did not file such an application. Because that re- quirement is jurisdictional and Godfrey did not satisfy it, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.

1 This does not mean, however, that an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a sentence or withdraw a guilty plea would be a “direct appeal from a guilty plea” for which a discretionary application is required. We express no opinion about that question.

## Summaries written by Georgia Commons

The following was written by claude-sonnet-5 from the opinion above and is not part of the court's opinion. Quote the opinion, not the summary.

The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed a man's appeal from his re-sentencing after his 2000 guilty plea sentence was vacated, ruling he needed prior court permission to appeal because it counted as a direct appeal from a guilty plea.

### Plain-language summary

In 2000, Harry Van Godfrey, Jr. pleaded guilty to malice murder and other crimes in the stabbing death of Angela Godfrey, receiving life plus 20 years and agreeing to waive parole eligibility for 35 years. In 2025, representing himself, he asked a Polk County trial court to vacate that sentence as void, arguing the parole waiver was unlawful under a prior Supreme Court of Georgia decision. The trial court agreed, vacated the original sentence, and re-entered a new judgment sentencing him to life without parole plus 20 years.
Godfrey then appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case here. But a Georgia law that took effect in May 2025 requires anyone appealing directly from a guilty plea to first file a discretionary application, a kind of permission request, rather than appeal automatically. Because Godfrey's new sentence still stemmed from his original guilty plea and he never filed that application, the Supreme Court of Georgia held it had no power to hear his appeal and dismissed it.

### Holding, as summarized

The court held that a direct appeal from a guilty plea, including one resulting from a re-entered judgment after an earlier sentence was vacated as void, requires a discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3). Because Godfrey filed a direct notice of appeal instead, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

### Disposition

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.

### Why it matters

The ruling clarifies that anyone whose sentence from a guilty plea is later vacated and re-entered, even years afterward, must file a discretionary application to appeal, not a direct appeal. This affects defendants statewide seeking to challenge void sentences and shapes how trial courts and appellate clerks handle such re-entered judgments.

> The summarized reasoning, checked quotes, suggested questions (1,688 characters) are at https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S26A0785.md?full=1