NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A1079

Daniel Wright

v.

The State

No. S26A1080

T’lani Robinson

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County

No. 22SC184612

Decided: October 27, 2026

COLVIN, Justice.

Daniel Wright and T’lani Robinson appeal their convictions for felony murder predicated on the attempted purchase of mari- juana in connection with the shooting death of Daniel Ricardo Johnson. 1 On appeal, Robinson challenges the sufficiency of the

1 The shooting occurred on July 1, 2022. On October 11, 2022, a Fulton County grand jury returned a 12-count indictment against Wright and Robin- son. Wright and Robinson were jointly charged with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4), armed robbery (Counts 6 and 7), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Counts 8 and 9), attempted purchase of mariju- ana (Count 10), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 11). In addition, Robinson was separately charged with felony murder (Count 5) and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count

evidence supporting her conviction and argues that the jury’s ver- dicts were mutually exclusive and repugnant. The appellants also raise numerous claims of trial court error and ineffective assis- tance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the appellants’ convictions.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. Around 10:30 at night on July 1, 2022, Johnson was shot outside an Atlanta home located on a street adjacent to a gas station. That night, Johnson, who sold marijuana, drove his girlfriend, Kayla Tucker, to the gas station in her Acura MDX. Tucker testified that Johnson had a quarter pound of marijuana with him that night, which he kept in a fanny pack inside the vehicle’s trunk, that Johnson had made two drug sales before they arrived at the gas station, and that she kept a .40-caliber Glock pistol in the driver’s side door of her ve- hicle.

Tucker testified — and surveillance footage from the gas

12). A jury trial was held from June 10 through 19, 2024. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to Count 4 (felony murder predicated on the attempted purchase of marijuana) and Count 10 (attempted purchase of marijuana) and not guilty as to Counts 5, 7, and 12. The jury was deadlocked on the seven remaining counts. The partial verdicts were accepted, and the court declared a mistrial as to the counts on which the jury could not return a verdict. The court granted a motion from the State to nol pros those counts, sentenced Wright and Robinson to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 4), and merged for sentencing purposes the charge of attempted purchase of marijuana (Count 10). Robinson timely filed a motion for new trial on June 24, 2024, and amended the motion through new counsel on November 14 and 20, 2025. Wright timely filed a motion for new trial on July 8, 2024, and amended the motion through new counsel on November 14, 2025. Following hearings on the motions, the trial court denied Robinson’s motion for new trial on January 28, 2026, and denied Wright’s motion for new trial on January 29, 2026. Wright and Robinson filed timely notices of appeal directed to this Court. The appeals were docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term and submitted for decisions on the briefs.

station showed — that, shortly before the shooting, Johnson parked Tucker’s car in the gas station parking lot and got out, while Tucker remained in the vehicle. The surveillance footage showed that Johnson, who appeared to have a gun handle stick- ing out of his pocket, spoke to a man in the parking lot. The man in the parking lot then gestured toward a gray Hyundai Sonata, which was parked at a gas pump.

The record showed that the Sonata was registered to Rob- inson, who had been in a relationship with Wright for years, and that cell phones registered to Robinson and Wright were both in the area encompassing the gas station and crime scene at the time. The gas station surveillance footage showed that, after the man in the parking lot gestured toward Robinson’s Sonata, a man — whom Tucker later identified in a photo lineup and at trial as Wright — got out of the passenger seat of Robinson’s Sonata and walked over to Tucker’s Acura. Shortly thereafter, the surveil- lance footage showed, Robinson’s Sonata drove over to Tucker’s Acura and parked next to it.

Tucker testified that a woman got out of the gray car (Rob- inson’s Sonata) and that Johnson spoke to the woman and the man (whom Tucker later identified as Wright). Although Tucker initially indicated that she did not hear what they were talking about, she later affirmed that Johnson had said to the man and woman, “[I]f you don’t feel comfortable doing this right here at the gas station, then you can pull around … where no police [a]re.”

The gas station surveillance footage showed that Tucker’s Acura then turned out of the gas station parking lot onto the ad- jacent street, followed by Robinson’s Sonata. And surveillance footage from a home on that street showed that Robinson’s Sonata parked behind Tucker’s Acura.

Tucker testified that, after parking, Johnson got out of her vehicle, walked to the trunk, opened the trunk, and met the two people from the gas station, who had parked behind them to com- plete a drug transaction. Consistent with that testimony, the home surveillance footage showed that a man got out of the driver’s seat of Tucker’s Acura, that a woman and man then got out of Robinson’s Sonata, and that the three people then stood for a period of time next to the Acura’s open trunk.

According to Tucker, Johnson then closed the trunk and walked back to the driver’s side door. Tucker testified that she then heard Johnson say, “Oh, s**t,” and that gunshots rang out, at which point Johnson ran away. Immediately thereafter, ac- cording to Tucker, the man who had met Johnson at the trunk pointed a gun at her and ordered her out of the vehicle. Tucker testified that she was “a hundred percent sure” Wright was the person who pointed a gun at her. According to Tucker, she com- plied with Wright’s instruction, got out of the vehicle, and ran away to hide.

Consistent with Tucker’s testimony, the home surveillance footage showed that a commotion occurred on the driver’s side of Tucker’s Acura and that Tucker then stumbled out of the car and ran away. The home surveillance footage further appeared to show that the woman from Robinson’s Sonata opened the trunk of Tucker’s Acura and took something out of the trunk before the man and woman got back into the Sonata and drove away in the direction of the gas station. The gas station surveillance footage captured Robinson’s Sonata turning from the street where the shooting occurred back into the gas station parking lot and then driving away from the scene. And Tucker testified that, when she came back to her vehicle, Johnson’s quarter pound of marijuana was missing from the trunk.

Johnson was later found shot and bleeding several blocks away from the location of the shooting. He was transported to the hospital, where he died from multiple gunshot wounds, including a contact gunshot wound to the left thigh and a gunshot wound in his back resulting from gunfire less than three feet away.

Officers followed a trail of blood left by Johnson back to the scene of the shooting, where they found Robinson’s unlocked cell phone lying on the ground, along with two 9mm cartridge casings that had been fired from the same gun and an older-looking, crushed 9mm cartridge casing that had been fired from a different gun. 2 The lead detective testified that he later got in contact with Robinson, who told him that “she was buying some weed, there was a shooting, she ran[, and,] as she ran, she dropped her phone.” Robinson’s mother similarly testified that Robinson had said she lost her phone around the time the record shows the shooting occurred. And officers testified that someone remotely wiped Robinson’s cell phone while it was in their possession and that someone with an IP address linked to Robinson’s mother’s house also deleted the Google account linked to the phone.

Robinson, who testified in her own defense, identified her- self and Wright in the surveillance footage and admitted that she was present at the gas station and for the shooting, but she denied planning to commit or participating in any crime. Robinson testi- fied that she and Wright went to the gas station to get gas, and that, while they were there, two men waved them over. According to Robinson, over the course of her four-year relationship with Wright, she had “learned to just kind of go along with” what Wright asked her to do. And she claimed that, on the night of the shooting, she did not know what was going on and was simply following Wright’s instructions when she followed the other car.

2 Neither Tucker’s firearm nor the guns that fired the casings left at the scene were recovered.

She further testified that, without knowing what was going on, she followed an instruction from Wright to open a mobile payment application on her phone and to give the phone to Johnson. Then, according to Robinson, she heard gunshots, ran back to her vehi- cle, and drove away.

According to Robinson, she did not see who was shooting, but Johnson was the only person she saw with a gun that day. Robinson further testified that the surveillance footage showed her (not Wright) near the Acura’s trunk just before she and Wright got back into her vehicle, and she did not take anything from the trunk. Robinson admitted that her phone was the one officers had found at the scene and testified that she had remotely wiped it, saying that she did not know who had it and was con- cerned that someone might “try[ ] to find me.” Robinson also ad- mitted that she had told an investigator “a lot of lies,” including that Wright was not present for the shooting. Explaining one of the reasons she had lied to the investigator, Robinson testified, “I thought maybe he was trying to accuse me or accuse Daniel [Wright] of doing this. And I know for a fact that we didn’t.” And Robinson, who had been sentenced as a first-offender probationer for aggravated assault and family-violence battery, acknowledged that she was prohibited from having contact with Wright at the time, due to a term of her probation.

2. On appeal, Robinson argues that, for three reasons, the trial evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support her con- viction for felony murder predicated on the attempted purchase of marijuana. First, Robinson contends that the predicate felony here could not support a felony-murder conviction because it in- volved an attempted marijuana transaction, not “the sale of dan- gerous drugs,” and thus was not an inherently dangerous felony.

Second, Robinson argues that the felony-murder statute’s causa- tion requirement was not satisfied because “[t]he attempted pur- chase of marijuana did not ‘cause the death’ of the [v]ictim.” Fi- nally, Robinson argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to show that her conduct proximately caused the victim’s death be- cause death was not “a for[e]seeable consequence of the attempted purchase.” As explained below, these claims fail.

“Evidence is sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process if a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 849 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the suffi- ciency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most fa- vorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 849–50 (cleaned up).

As relevant here, a person commits felony murder when, “in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of an- other human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1(c). “From this statutory language, our decisional law has identified certain related prerequisites the State must establish to convict a defendant of felony murder.” Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 568 (2023). “First, the predicate felony that the defendant committed must be inherently dangerous to human life, meaning that it is one from which it was reasonably foreseeable that death could re- sult.” State v. Ovalle, 932 SE2d 579, 582 (Ga. 2026) (quotation marks omitted). “Second, the defendant’s criminal conduct must proximately cause the victim’s death.” Id. at 582–83. “Finally, the death must have been caused ‘in the commission of’ the predicate felony.” Id. at 583 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Robinson’s three challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence fail. First, our precedent does not support Robinson’s ar- gument that the predicate drug offense in this case was not inher- ently dangerous. “We have recognized time and again that trans- actions in illegal drugs are inherently dangerous … because it is among the incidental, probable consequences of an illegal drug transaction that something may go wrong and someone may be killed.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 733–34 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). And this principle applies equally to predicate drug offenses like Robinson’s, which involve the attempted pur- chase of marijuana. See id. (holding that conspiracy to purchase marijuana is an inherently dangerous felony). Thus, the trial ev- idence was sufficient to prove that the felony predicate for Robin- son’s felony-murder charge — attempted purchase of marijuana — was an inherently dangerous felony.

Second, Robinson misreads the felony-murder statute in arguing that the predicate felony (here, attempted purchase of marijuana) must cause the death. The felony-murder statute re- quires that the death be caused “in the commission of a felony,” not that the felony must cause the death. OCGA § 16-5-1(c) (em- phasis added). As we have explained, a death is caused “in the commission of” a predicate felony if “the cause of death [is] con- current with the defendant’s commission of the predicate felony in time and circumstances.” Bell v. State, 932 SE2d 626, 634 (Ga. 2026) (quotation marks omitted). And the trial evidence was suf- ficient to satisfy that element here, as the record showed that the parties relocated to the location of the shooting to complete a sale of marijuana and that the shooting occurred while the parties were completing the sale.

Finally, the trial evidence was sufficient to prove the prox- imate cause element of felony murder. “Under the proximate- cause standard, the defendant is liable for the reasonably foresee- able results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independ- ent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Wilson, 315 Ga. at 733 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence showed that “the parties met for a drug transaction and something went wrong — which was reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 734 (cleaned up). Ac- cordingly, Robinson has not shown that the trial evidence was constitutionally insufficient.

3. Robinson argues that the jury verdicts in this case should be vacated because they were “mutually exclusive” and “repugnant.” In support of this argument, Robinson notes that the jury found Robinson guilty of felony murder predicated on the at- tempted purchase of marijuana but that it acquitted her of sev- eral other counts and was unable to reach a verdict on others. As explained below, we conclude that Robinson has not shown that these verdicts were mutually exclusive or repugnant.

First, Robinson has not shown that the jury’s guilty ver- dicts were mutually exclusive. As we have explained, convictions must be set aside and a new trial must be granted if the convic- tions rest on guilty verdicts that are “mutually exclusive.” Adams v. State, 322 Ga. 155, 160 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). Two guilty verdicts are “mutually exclusive” if they “cannot legally ex- ist simultaneously,” meaning that “it is both legally and logically impossible to convict on both counts.” McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 110 (2020) (cleaned up). In determining whether verdicts are “mutually exclusive,” as we have defined the term, we confine our analysis to verdicts of guilty, which necessarily represent affirm- ative jury findings of the sort that can support a determination that verdicts were legally and logically incompatible. See Rutland v. State, 315 Ga. 521, 522–23 (2023) (explaining that “it is not generally within the court’s power to make inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the reasons for any in- consistency between guilty and not guilty verdicts” (quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the jury found Robinson guilty only of attempted pur- chase of marijuana and felony murder predicated on that at- tempted purchase of marijuana. Robinson has not offered any rea- son to think that it is legally or logically impossible to find Robin- son guilty as to both offenses. Indeed, the jury could not have found Robinson guilty of the felony-murder count charged here unless it also found that she was committing the predicate felony when the shooting occurred. See OCGA § 16-5-1(c) (providing that a person commits felony murder when he causes the death of an- other person “in the commission of a felony”). Accordingly, she has not met her burden to establish mutually exclusive verdicts.

Second, Robinson has not shown that the jury returned re- pugnant verdicts. “When verdicts are repugnant, they must be vacated.” Feder v. State, 319 Ga. 66, 68 (2024). “Repugnant ver- dicts occur when, in order to find the defendant not guilty on one count and guilty on another, the jury must make affirmative find- ings shown on the record that cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Robinson has listed the counts on which the jury found her guilty, found her not guilty, and could not return a ver- dict. But Robinson has not identified any affirmative findings made by the jury that might be logically or legally incompatible. Accordingly, she has not carried her burden on appeal to show that the jury’s verdicts were repugnant. See Sims v. State, 931 SE2d 82, 93 (Ga. 2026) (holding that the appellant had not carried his burden on appeal to show legal error where he failed to make a substantive legal argument).

4. Arguing in conclusory fashion, Robinson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when “[t]he lead detective was allowed to give improper opinion and conclusion testimony as to identity based on a courtroom viewing of a video, over objection.” However, “we are unable to meaningfully analyze the merits of [this] claim because we cannot clearly discern what the claim is” based on Robinson’s citation to the record and argument on ap- peal. Pierce, 319 Ga. at 854–55. Although Robinson appears to as- sert that the trial court should not have permitted the lead detec- tive to offer testimony about the identity of people in a video, she “has not specifically identified” what testimony about what video she “contends was objectionable.” Id. at 855. An independent re- view of the record indicates that the lead detective on the case testified about several different surveillance videos. But Robinson has not cited any portion of the record containing testimony from the lead detective and thus has not identified any testimony from the lead detective concerning “identity.” Nor has Robinson pro- vided “any meaningful analysis explaining why” testimony about identity would have been inadmissible under the circumstances of this case. Id.

“It is not this Court’s job to cull the record on behalf of an appellant to find alleged errors.” Pierce, 319 Ga. at 855 (cleaned up). Nor is it “the function of this Court to make an appellant’s legal argument for [the appellant].” Sims, 931 SE2d at 93. Be- cause Robinson “has failed to identify what evidence [s]he claims should not have been admitted or to present a legal argument in support of this claim of error, [s]he has not met h[er] burden of showing that the trial court erred in this respect.” Id. Accordingly, this claim fails.

5. Wright argues that, because the photo lineup Tucker used to identify him was impermissibly suggestive, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the lineup. As explained below, however, we conclude that Wright has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the lineup was not impermissibly suggestive.

By way of background, before trial, Wright filed a motion to suppress the photo lineup that included his photo, arguing that it was highly suggestive, but the trial court noted that it “didn’t see anything particularly suggestive about [the photo lineup]” from a preliminary review and reserved ruling on the matter. The lead detective then testified at trial that Tucker described the male suspect as a “light skinned male” “between the ages of 20 and 30,” who was “about 6ft tall” with an “average build,” “a low haircut or fade,” and “big or wide eyes.” The lead detective further testified that he searched for men matching Tucker’s description who were associated with Robinson (whose phone had been found at the scene). The lead detective found Wright’s driver’s license photo, which the record shows was used in the photo lineup at issue here.

When the State moved to admit the photo lineup at trial, Wright announced that he had “no objection,” and the court stated that it was “admitted.” The State then announced that it was pub- lishing the admitted photo lineup, at which point Wright stated, “Subject to my previous objection regarding that lineup.” The court noted an objection for the record, and the lineup was shown to the jury.

Tucker and the lead investigator each testified that Tucker identified Wright’s photo in the photo lineup, and the lead detec- tive added that Tucker had said she was “very certain” when she made the identification. When asked by Wright’s counsel on cross- examination, Tucker agreed that the only light-skinned person in the lineup was Wright and that the only picture that matched the description of the person she gave to the police was Wright. The six-person photo lineup introduced at trial, however, showed that Tucker had signed an admonition “not[ing] that photographs do not always depict the true complexion of a person,” which “may be lighter or darker than shown.” Further, the lead detective tes- tified that he had read that admonition to Tucker, and Tucker confirmed that she had signed it. In ruling on Wright’s motion for new trial, the trial court determined that “there was nothing un- duly suggestive in the photo lineup that would have compelled suppression of the identification evidence.”

Assuming without deciding that this issue is preserved for ordinary review, Wright has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photo lineup depicting him. “This Court employs a two-step process in examining a trial court’s ad- mission of identification evidence for error.” Singleton v. State, 320 Ga. 714, 716 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). First, “we con- sider whether the identification procedure used was impermissi- bly suggestive.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “An identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive when it is the equivalent of the authorities telling the witness, ‘this is our suspect.’” Id. (cleaned up). Second, “[i]f we conclude that the lineup was imper- missibly suggestive,” we then “determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification of the de- fendant in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quota- tion marks omitted).

This claim fails at the first step of the analysis because Wright has not shown that the identification procedure was im- permissibly suggestive. Relying on Tucker’s trial testimony, Wright contends that he was the only person in the photo lineup who matched Tucker’s description of the suspect being light- skinned with short hair. But the trial court was authorized to con- clude otherwise, as the photo lineup included five men (including Wright) with similarly low haircuts and two men who appeared to have lighter skin than Wright. Further, although the focus of Wright’s argument appears to be on the skin tone of the men de- picted in the photos, the standard admonition form included with the photo lineup, which the trial testimony shows was read to and signed by Tucker, indicated that Tucker should not rely on the appearance of skin tone in the photos because the “photographs do not always depict the true complexion of a person,” which “may be lighter or darker than shown.” Because Wright has not shown that the photo lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive, he has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in admit- ting the photo lineup. See Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 663 (2022) (holding that a photo lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive where “the photographs in the lineup at issue con- sist[ed] of [the defendant] and five other males of similar age, race, hairstyles, and facial features” and the detective “read the standard admonitions”); Bowen v. State, 299 Ga. 875, 879 (2016) (holding that a photo lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive where the lineup included “pictures of black males with similar hairstyles” and “[t]he investigating officer read [the witnesses] a standard admonition”).

6. For a variety of reasons, Robinson and Wright each claim that their respective trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffec- tive.

“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must prove both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice.” Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy the deficiency prong, a de- fendant must demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circum- stances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). “The law recognizes a strong pre- sumption that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To carry this burden, a defendant must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did[ ] or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (quota- tion marks omitted). And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Id. (quotation marks omit- ted). “If a defendant fails to carry his burden of proving either deficient performance or prejudice, the defendant’s ineffective-as- sistance-of-counsel claim fails, and we need not consider the other prong of the test.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

(a) Robinson contends that her trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons. As explained below, her claims fail.

We begin with Robinson’s contention that her trial counsel failed to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing because, according to Robinson, her counsel failed to “present an effective defense” or to “function in any meaningful sense as the government’s adversary” and engaged in “pervasive” ineffective- ness. Robinson raises this claim for the first time on appeal. And because Robinson “failed to raise th[is] claim at the motion-for- new-trial stage, when she had the assistance of new counsel,” the claim is “procedurally barred.” Rainey v. State, 324 Ga. 22, 28 n.7 (2026) (quotation marks omitted).

Turning to Robinson’s three remaining ineffective-assis- tance-of-counsel claims, we note that Robinson raised those claims in her second amended motion for new trial, but the trial court did not rule on them in its order denying Robinson’s motion for new trial. “Although we often remand for consideration of un- resolved issues, a remand is unnecessary here because we can de- termine from the record” that Robinson cannot establish deficient performance. Stitts v. State, 323 Ga. 109, 118 (2025).

First, Robinson argues that “Defendant did not have suffi- cient time to prepare for trial as trial counsel was appointed only 2 weeks before trial and meet [sic] with Defendant no more than two times in preparation for trial.” Charitably reading this claim as a contention that trial counsel (as opposed to Robinson herself) was insufficiently prepared for trial, 3 Robinson has not carried her burden to show deficient performance. Although Robinson contends that her counsel only met with her on two occasions, “there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client,” and Robinson has made no effort to explain why constitutionally adequate representation re- quired counsel to visit with her more times. Rice v. State, 301 Ga. 746, 748 (2017) (quotation marks omitted) (rejecting a defend- ant’s claim that, because counsel “failed to meet with [the defend- ant] enough times prior to trial,” counsel was deficient). Further, Robinson has not identified any other way in which her trial coun- sel could have provided better representation if she had addi- tional time to prepare. 4 Id. (holding that the defendant failed to

3 At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Robinson testified that the “is- sue about ineffective assistance of counsel” that she wanted to raise was that she personally “didn’t have any time to prepare for trial” because her “attorney had just been assigned to [her] case, and [her attorney] only came to see [her] maybe once or twice.”

4 We note that Robinson’s claim that her trial counsel had only two weeks to prepare for trial is inaccurate. The record indicates that Robinson’s trial counsel made an official appearance in the case through a notice of sub- stitution of counsel more than six weeks before trial.

show deficient performance based on a lack of preparation be- cause the defendant “fail[ed] to articulate with any specificity how [counsel] could have better represented him had she been given more time to prepare” (quotation marks omitted)). See also Taylor v. State, 323 Ga. 524, 527 (2026) (concluding that the appellant had failed to show deficient performance because “she has neither pointed us to any specific action taken by her counsel at trial that she claims was deficient nor identified any instance where her counsel failed to act when action reasonably was required under prevailing professional norms”).

Second, Robinson asserts that “[t]rial counsel failed to file a bifurcation of the prior conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon” and was ineffective for “failing to move for bifurcation of the charges.” This claim is difficult to interpret because the record on appeal does not reference any prior conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon and Robinson does not specify which charges she contends trial counsel should have moved to bifurcate. Char- itably reading Robinson’s brief in light of the charges in the in- dictment, we construe her contention as a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move either to bifurcate the predicate charge of possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer from the associated felony-murder charge or to bifurcate both of those charges from the remaining charges. But Robinson has failed to show deficient performance as to this claim because the trial court would not have been required to grant such motions. See Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 247 (2022) (holding that the de- fendant had not shown that the failure to move to bifurcate on such grounds was deficient performance because a trial court does not err either “in refusing to bifurcate the charge of possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer where … the possession charge was an underlying felony to a murder count of the indict- ment” or in refusing to bifurcate a “felony murder count from the rest of [a] trial” involving a charge of malice murder of the same victim (cleaned up)).

Finally, Robinson argues that “[t]rial counsel failed to move, in writing or orally, for a motion for severance from the codefendant.” “Whether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 819 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). Here, Robin- son has not identified any reason to believe that severance would have been a strategic benefit to her or presented any evidence that her trial counsel, whom she did not call to testify at the mo- tion-for-new-trial hearing, made a strategic error in failing to move for severance. Accordingly, she has not carried her burden to show deficient performance as to this claim. Cf. Leanos v. State, 303 Ga. 666, 672 (2018) (holding that the defendant could not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s decision not to move to file a motion to sever counts was strategic “[w]ithout trial counsel’s testimony or some other evidence explaining the basis for [counsel’s] decision[ ]”).

(b) Wright argues that his trial counsel was constitution- ally ineffective for failing to object to or mitigate improper victim- impact statements that the State elicited from Tucker during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Specifically, Wright contends that trial counsel should have objected or taken other measures to mit- igate resulting prejudice when, at trial, the prosecutor asked Tucker if there was a reason she had joined the Navy, and Tucker responded:

Yes. I joined the Navy because due to the situation of losing my boyfriend and my child’s father [John- son], I — it’s fair to say I lost everything. I couldn’t work, so I lost my job at [a company]. I stopped eat- ing, I lost a lot of weight. I just really couldn’t do an- ything, so I just really wasn’t myself. So, I decided, after a while, that I wanted to try and pick myself up, you know, do the best that I can. Do the best that I can as a single mom for my son. I just — I don’t want to work at a regular nine-to-five job. I wanted to be able to provide the best life for my son as a sin- gle mom.

Here, Wright has not shown deficient performance. Trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that she did not object to Tucker’s brief testimony about the impact Johnson’s death had on her because she wanted to avoid “com[ing] across as … aggressive towards” a grieving witness and did not want the jury to think the defense was “trying to hide something.” We can- not say that strategically choosing to forgo an objection to Tucker’s testimony on those grounds was objectively unreasona- ble. See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 269 (2022) (rejecting a claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object when the vic- tim’s mother testified about “how devastated she was” as a result of the death because reasonable counsel could have thought it was best “to avoid the appearance of attacking a grief-stricken wit- ness”); Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 889 (2014) (holding that a decision not to object to brief testimony “in an effort to show the jury that the defense had nothing to hide” was a reasonable trial strategy). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(c) Wright argues that his trial counsel was constitution- ally ineffective for failing to raise a character-evidence objection, under OCGA § 24-4-404, to testimony from Robinson’s mother re- garding prior instances in which, according to Robinson’s mother, Wright had physically abused Robinson. See OCGA § 24-4-404(a) (providing that, generally, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of prov- ing action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion”); OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). As explained below, we assume that trial counsel was deficient in this respect and con- clude that Wright has not shown prejudice.

By way of background, the State called Robinson’s mother as a trial witness to elicit testimony that Robinson reported losing her phone around the time of the shooting. On cross-examination by Robinson, Robinson’s mother testified that Wright had “worked really hard to win her over,” that Robinson “was pretty smitten with him,” and that Wright had moved in with Robinson. But Robinson’s mother testified that Robinson’s demeanor changed after Wright moved in, that arguments between Robin- son and Wright escalated into physical fights, that Robinson’s mother once saw Robinson return limping after going to pick up Wright, and that on other occasions she had seen Robinson with a black eye, with abrasions, or bleeding. According to Robinson’s mother, by the time of the shooting, Robinson “was going along with whatever [Wright] wanted” just to “get along.”

On appeal, Wright argues that trial counsel should have objected on character-evidence grounds to Robinson’s mother’s testimony about hearing physical fights between Robinson and Wright, seeing evidence of physical fights on Robinson’s body, and noticing that, as a result, Robinson attempted to keep the peace by doing whatever Wright wanted. But assuming without decid- ing that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object and that an objection would have been sustained, Wright has not shown a “reasonable probability” that Robinson’s mother’s testimony im- pacted the verdict because the other evidence of Wright’s guilt was overwhelming. Asmelash v. State, 323 Ga. 33, 42 (2025). Spe- cifically, cell-phone location data indicated that Wright and Rob- inson were together in the area of the crime scene when the shoot- ing occurred; Tucker’s testimony indicated that a drug transac- tion involving marijuana was in progress when the shooting oc- curred; Tucker identified Wright in a photo lineup and in the courtroom as the man who pointed a gun at her immediately after Johnson was shot; surveillance footage captured the parties’ ve- hicles and the events surrounding the shooting; and Tucker’s de- scription of how the events unfolded, combined with the fact that Robinson left her phone at the crime scene, established the iden- tities of the people seen in the surveillance footage. Given the strength of this evidence against Wright, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Minor v. State, __ Ga. __ (2026), S26A0840, slip op. at 12, 19–20 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (2026 WL 2349403) (no prejudice due to “overwhelming” evidence of the de- fendant’s guilt, including testimony from eyewitnesses who saw the shooting, surveillance footage capturing the shooting and the aftermath, testimony identifying the defendant in the surveil- lance footage, and evidence that a vehicle matching the defend- ant’s arrived at the crime scene shortly before the shooting and fled moments after); Asmelash, 323 Ga. at 40, 42 (no prejudice where, among other things, eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the perpetrator and cell-site evidence corroborating that testimony provided “fairly strong” evidence of the defend- ant’s guilt); Sharkey v. State, 320 Ga. 477, 483 (2024) (no preju- dice because there was “strong” evidence of his guilt, including eyewitness testimony that the defendant “[w]as the man they saw with a gun standing over [the victim’s] unresponsive body” and the fact that the defendant’s cell phone was at the crime scene).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

(d) Wright contends that his trial counsel was constitution- ally ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to sever the co-de- fendants’ trials to prevent Robinson from introducing the im- proper character evidence discussed in the previous enumeration of error. But assuming without deciding that trial counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to sever Wright’s trial from Robinson’s and that the trial court would have granted such a motion, Wright has not established prejudice.

Wright argues that a joint trial prejudiced him because it enabled the State to introduce evidence through Robinson’s mother about his prior abuse of Robinson, which cast Wright in a negative light. But as explained above, Wright has not shown a reasonable probability that such evidence affected the outcome of his trial because the other evidence of his guilt was overwhelm- ing. 5 Accordingly, this claim fails. See Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 67 (2026) (holding that a defendant was not prejudiced by coun- sel’s failure to move to sever due to the “overwhelming evidence” of the defendant’s guilt).

(e) Finally, Wright argues that cumulative prejudice from the asserted trial court errors and instances of deficient perfor- mance warrant a new trial. This claim fails.

Establishing cumulative error requires a defendant to demonstrate that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that

5 In addition to the evidence of Wright’s guilt highlighted above, we note that Robinson’s testimony also placed Wright at the crime scene when the shooting occurred and that Wright has not argued that Robinson could not, or would not, have testified if he had been tried separately.

they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” Bradford v. State, 323 Ga. 675, 694 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). “When considering the cumulative effect of presumed errors by trial counsel and the trial court, this Court considers collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the prej- udice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, we have assumed two instances of deficient perfor- mance — that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to bad character evidence admitted through Robinson’s mother and that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to sever Wright’s trial from Robinson’s to prevent that bad character evi- dence from being admitted through Robinson’s mother. Because the harm from these assumed instances of deficient performance (namely, the admission of the bad character evidence through Robinson’s mother) “is the same,” and because we have concluded that those instances of deficient performance “did not likely affect the outcome of the trial,” Wright’s claim that he suffered cumula- tive prejudice fails. Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 414 (2024) (quo- tation marks omitted).

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.