Muhammad et al. v. Clayton County et al.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26G0935

Stanley Muhammad et al.

v.

Clayton County et al.

On Writ of Certiorari from the Court of Appeals

No. A25A2167

Decided: August 11, 2026

COLVIN, Justice.

For the reasons stated below, we grant plaintiffs Stanley and Ruth Muhammad and third-party defendant Safiyyah Mu- hammad’s petition for certiorari, vacate the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1. This case arises out of a fatal car accident involving a Clayton County firetruck and a Mercedes-Benz sedan driven by Safiyyah Muhammad. Safiyyah’s parents filed suit against sev- eral parties, including Clayton County and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”). Later, MBUSA filed a third-party complaint, adding Safiyyah as a third-party defendant. After granting sum- mary judgment in favor of Clayton County and dismissing many of the Muhammads’ claims, the Muhammads’ suit concluded on April 3, 2025, when the trial court granted summary judgment on the remaining claims against MBUSA. Although the Muham- mads remained formally represented by counsel at that time, they timely filed, relevant here, a pro se notice of appeal on May 1, 2025, seeking to challenge the trial court’s order granting MBUSA summary judgment and other rulings. MBUSA filed a motion to dismiss the Muhammads’ post-judgment filing, arguing that the filing was a legal nullity because the Muhammads re- mained represented when it was filed. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Muhammads’ attorneys’ legal obligation ceased when the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, and the appeal was then docketed in the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on Ro- mich v. All Secure, Inc., 361 Ga. App. 505 (2021), the Court of Appeals concluded that the Muhammads’ pro se notice of appeal was a legal nullity because they were represented by counsel at the time of filing. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged this Court’s decision in Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023), which held that a represented party’s pro se filing is not automat- ically a nullity, the Court of Appeals did not apply Johnson. In- stead, it distinguished Johnson, noting that Johnson was decided in the criminal context and that this Court had not explicitly dis- approved or overruled Romich. Accordingly, it held that Romich remains binding precedent and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals erred in applying Romich instead of Johnson. Although Johnson focused on pro se filings by counseled criminal defendants (because the case arose in that context), its holding was not limited to criminal cases. In Johnson, we recon- sidered and ultimately discarded the “absolute nullity” rule, which deemed pro se filings by a counseled party automatically void. That rule had resulted from a construction of Article I, Sec- tion I, Paragraph XII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which is not limited to criminal cases. Paragraph XII guarantees a right of self-representation “in any of the courts of this state,” but, un- like its predecessor in the Georgia Constitution of 1976, it lacks language guaranteeing a right to hybrid representation. See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 880. Some of our earlier decisions turned that absence of a right to hybrid representation into an effective pro- hibition on hybrid representation by deeming pro se filings by counseled parties automatically void. In Johnson, we corrected that overreading of Paragraph XII and discarded the “absolute nullity” rule. Important here, we did so without distinguishing between civil and criminal cases. See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 877. Along the way to that decision, we stated simply that “we are aware of no constitutional or statutory provision that precludes a court from exercising discretion to allow it when appropriate.” Johnson, 315 Ga. at 881. And after we overruled decisions that had applied the “absolute nullity” rule, we explained that “our past decisions recognizing that courts retain discretion to allow hybrid representation control,” again, without distinguishing be- tween civil or criminal cases. Johnson, 315 Ga. at 877. In short, despite the language in Johnson that focused on “defendants” or “criminal defendants,” our holding in Johnson was simply that pro se filings by counseled parties are not automatically void and that courts retain discretion to consider such filings. That holding controls over any Court of Appeals decisions in conflict with it, whether or not we have expressly “overruled” such decisions by name. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III (“The de- cisions of the Court of Appeals insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedents.”); Beasley v. Lee, 155 Ga. 634, 745 (1923) (explaining that a Court of Appeals decision must “yield to” a de- cision of this Court “if there is any conflict between” them). Ro- mich is just such a decision, because it applied the “absolute nul- lity” rule rather than recognizing that courts retain discretion to allow hybrid representation. So Romich is in conflict with John- son and, thus, is no longer good law. We now expressly overrule Romich and any other Court of Appeals decisions in similar con- flict with Johnson.

Since courts retain discretion to allow hybrid representa- tion, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Romich and treating the Muhammads’ pro se notice of appeal as automatically void. Its judgment dismissing their appeal on that basis is thus va- cated, and the case is remanded for the Court of Appeals to exer- cise its discretion with respect to whether to recognize that filing. See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 890–91.

On remand, the Court of Appeals must determine whether to recognize the validity of the Muhammads’ notice of appeal and may reference the trial court record in so doing. Johnson, 315 Ga. at 891, n.15 (“[T]he decision whether to recognize a pro se notice of appeal remains one for appellate courts to make.”). See also Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 732, 733–34 (2025) (noting that we were “aided” in the task of determining whether to recognize the valid- ity of a filing by a represented pro se party by the trial court’s finding and record on the issue).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.