# Search: right to a speedy trial 78 documents found; confidence high. 1. Bowman v. State (S22G0303) id: opinion:S22G0303 | opinion, Supreme Court of Georgia, 2023-02-21, decided https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22G0303 Summary (AI-written, not source text): The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that a Paulding County man's 2014 trial never happened in the eyes of the law because the 12 citizens who heard his case were never sworn in as a jury, so he is entitled to be discharged and acquitted under Georgia's speedy trial statute. > On November 27, 2019, through new counsel, Bowman filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. On the same day, the State filed a motion seeking a declaratory order that the December 2014 proceeding “constitute[d] a trial” for the purpose of satisfying Bowman’s Demand for Speedy Trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 and the speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. The court held an evidentiary hearing at which Bowman presented evidence that juries were impaneled and qualified … cite: opinion:S22G0303@cl-10680161#5688-7527 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22G0303#:~:text=On%20November%2027%2C%202019%2C%20through%20new > We granted Bowman’s petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Was [Bowman] deprived of his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial where the trial he received was held before a jury that had not sworn the oath required by OCGA § 15-12-139? The case was orally argued in this Court on September 20, 2022. 2. The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the words “trial” and “tried” in OCGA § 17-7-170. Subsection (a) of OCGA § 17-7-170 says: Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting … cite: opinion:S22G0303@cl-10680161#7529-9621 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22G0303#:~:text=We%20granted%20Bowman%E2%80%99s%20petition%20for%20certiorari 2. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170. Demand for speedy trial; service; discharge and acquittal for lack of prosecution; expiration; reversal on direct appeal; mistrial and retrial; special pleas of incompetency id: code:17-7-170 | code_section, Georgia General Assembly, active https://georgiacommons.org/code/17-7-170 > (a) Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting the defendant’s life may enter a demand for speedy trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; or, by special permission of the court, the defendant may at any subsequent court term thereafter demand a speedy trial. In either case, the demand for speedy trial shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the prosecutor and upon the judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the … cite: code:17-7-170@2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68#0-3026 | https://georgiacommons.org/code/17-7-170#:~:text=%28a%29%20Any%20defendant%20against%20whom%20a 3. Williams v. State (S22A0794) id: opinion:S22A0794 | opinion, Supreme Court of Georgia, 2022-09-20, decided https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22A0794 Summary (AI-written, not source text): The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a Richmond County man's murder conviction, rejecting his self-defense claim, his argument about an accomplice's guilty plea, and his claim that a 25-month delay before his retrial violated his right to a speedy trial. > 4. Finally, Williams argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated when he was not brought to retrial for 25 months after remittitur of his case to the superior court following the reversal of his convictions by this Court. The trial court determined that Williams’s constitutional speedy-trial right was not violated and denied both a motion for discharge and acquittal that Williams filed three months prior to his trial and Williams’s motion for new trial. In both instances, the trial court reviewed each of the Barker-Doggett factors and found that, overall, the factors … cite: opinion:S22A0794@cl-10679804#17868-19046 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22A0794#:~:text=4.%20Finally%2C%20Williams%20argues%20that%20his > Courts examining an alleged denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial first must consider whether the interval between the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation and the trial is sufficiently long so as to be characterized as presumptively prejudicial. If the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to … cite: opinion:S22A0794@cl-10679804#19048-21396 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S22A0794#:~:text=Courts%20examining%20an%20alleged%20denial%20of 4. House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, March 5, 2026 (part 2) id: meeting:2026-03-05/house-judiciary-non-civil-part-2 | meeting_transcript, Georgia House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, 2026-03-05, held https://georgiacommons.org/meetings/2026-03-05/house-judiciary-non-civil-part-2 Summary (AI-written, not source text): The committee approved HB 1255 by substitute, with an amendment assigning responsibility for sending charging documents to the state rather than court clerks. Discussion focused on evidence-sharing deadlines, delays in criminal cases, and whether prosecutors have enough staff and technology to meet > I think a lot of times we lose sight of what happens just down the street, for example, in the busiest court in the State of Georgia, which is Fulton County State Court. In Fulton County State Court, you routinely have cases that will be accused in 18 months to 24 months after the date of arrest. Roughly two years. A defendant's case is accused, and then it can languish for six to eight months before you have an arraignment date, uh, scheduled. People lose sight of the singular right that a defendant has during that period of time, is the demand f- a statutory demand for speedy trial. The … cite: meeting:2026-03-05/house-judiciary-non-civil-part-2@r60b0dbc0d78a#26430-28552 | https://georgiacommons.org/meetings/2026-03-05/house-judiciary-non-civil-part-2?t=2566 5. Senate Judiciary Committee, February 23, 2026 id: meeting:2026-02-23/senate-judiciary | meeting_transcript, Georgia Senate Judiciary Committee, 2026-02-23, held https://georgiacommons.org/meetings/2026-02-23/senate-judiciary Summary (AI-written, not source text): The committee approved four bills and held one for more work. Members unanimously approved a substitute to SB 470 addressing signal jammers, an amended SB 327 adding a sixth superior court judge in the Clayton Judicial Circuit, and SB 202 establishing reciprocal evidence-sharing rules for misdemeano > All right. Any questions for District Attorney Moseley or Judge Mason? Thank y'all. Thank y'all. We have one other person, Mr. Sullivan from the Black Republican Council, that's here. You want the last word? Yes, sir. Come on down. Oh, thank you. Nobody else told me. You know, this whole time, maybe it was better, I don't know. Okay, I will make this quick and brief. Um, I support the bill. Um, five reasons why. Number one is the growing caseload and population demand in Clayton County. Um, Clayton County continue to experience significant population growth and increased court filings as … cite: meeting:2026-02-23/senate-judiciary@r77c5b40aa8e2#122842-124629 | https://georgiacommons.org/meetings/2026-02-23/senate-judiciary?t=8977 > Justice delayed can feel like justice denied. And number five, economic and administrative efficiency. Delays in civil and business cases can negatively affect the economy development. Efficient courts attract businesses, support stable families, reduce detention and housing costs. Investing in one additional judgeship can reduce long-term systematic costs. Within closing, I say this, the question before us is not whether we can afford a sixth judge in the Clayton County Judicial Circuit. It is whether we can to afford to compromise the constitutional safeguards. The rights to a speedy trial, … cite: meeting:2026-02-23/senate-judiciary@r77c5b40aa8e2#124631-126679 | https://georgiacommons.org/meetings/2026-02-23/senate-judiciary?t=9112 6. Henderson v. State (S20A0986) id: opinion:S20A0986 | opinion, Supreme Court of Georgia, 2020-10-19, decided https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S20A0986 Summary (AI-written, not source text): The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a Gwinnett County man's murder conviction, rejecting his claims that his speedy trial rights were violated and that his lawyer's mistakes entitled him to a new trial. The court also overruled a prior precedent that assumed such lawyer mistakes always cause harm. > Henderson contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied. We disagree. The United States Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 3 We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the December term on August 3, 2020. and public trial,” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. … cite: opinion:S20A0986@cl-10367331#10429-12247 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S20A0986#:~:text=Henderson%20contends%20that%20his%20constitutional%20right > As we have explained, [i]f the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result. (Citations omitted.) Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 513 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 280) (2019). Speedytrial claims require trial courts “to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing … cite: opinion:S20A0986@cl-10367331#12249-14336 | https://georgiacommons.org/opinions/S20A0986#:~:text=As%20we%20have%20explained%2C%20%5Bi%5Df%20the 7. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-172. Requirement of announcement by state of readiness for trial prior to announcement by defendant; speedy trial id: code:17-7-172 | code_section, Georgia General Assembly, active https://georgiacommons.org/code/17-7-172 > The state shall be required in every case to announce ready or not ready for trial, except in those cases where the defendant is entitled by law to demand a speedy trial, before the defendant shall be called on to make such announcement. cite: code:17-7-172@2025-supplement-89aa39ab3c68#0-237 | https://georgiacommons.org/code/17-7-172#:~:text=The%20state%20shall%20be%20required%20in [3 more results not shown; lower `limit` or use `cursor`.]