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Constitution of the State of Georgia

Article I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Article I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Section I. RIGHTS OF PERSONS

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXVII. Spouse’s separate property.

Active

Current through: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

A constitution provision shown as in force is in force as printed in the volume. A court decision can make a printed provision unenforceable without changing the volume, and the volume does not record that.

  1. The separate property of each spouse shall remain the separate property of that spouse except as otherwise provided by law.

The notes below are printed with the section but are not enacted law (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). They are shown apart from the text.

Editor's notes

Some of the cases annotated under this paragraph were decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIV and antecedent provisions providing for the separation only of the wife’s property. Barring of wife’s action for loss of consortium against husband’s employer was not a constitutional deprivation of right of wife when the husband had no tort claim against his employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act, as the wife’s right was derivative of the husband’s right. Henderson v. Hercules, Inc., 253 Ga. 685, 324 S.E.2d 453 (1985). This provision constitutes women as feme soles. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975). This paragraph does not restrict a woman’s assumption of debts of her husband. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975). Sale by married woman to pay debt

Cross references

Each spouse’s property separate, § 19-3-9.

Law reviews

For note, ‘‘The Economics of Divorce in Georgia: Toward a Partnership Model of Marriage,’’ see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 640 (1978). For comment as to larceny of separate property of wife or husband, in light of Gaines v. State, 65 Ga.App. 763, 16 S.E.2d 517 (1941), see 4 Ga. B.J. 44 (1942).

Other notes

1976 Constitution.
Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIV.
of husband is valid.
A sale by a married woman of property belonging to her separate estate, though made for the sole purpose of raising money with which to pay a debt or liability of her husband, is nevertheless valid and binding upon her, even if the purchaser, not being a creditor of the husband and having nothing to do with any arrangement or transaction between the husband and wife, knew that the proceeds thereof were to be applied for the purpose stated. Ross v. Durrence, 173 Ga. 457, 160 S.E. 370 (1931), later appeal, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935). son to pay debt of her husband, and will be bound by her contract to reimburse the third person for so doing. Ross v. Durrence, 173 Ga. 457, 160 S.E. 370 (1931), later appeal, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935). Recovering part of separate estate
Wife may legally procure third perapplied on husband’s debt.
When the defendant made threats to have the plaintiff’s husband criminally prosecuted for a misappropriation of the defendant’s funds unless she consented to a sale of a part of her separate estate and delivered the proceeds to the defendant to be applied against the debt due by the husband on account of the misappropriation, there was duress as to the plaintiff wife and the law would not deem her to be in pari delicto with the defendant so as to deny her relief in recovering a part of her separate estate which was, with the knowledge of the defendant, applied on her husband’s debt. Thrift Credit Union v. Moore, 88 Ga. App. 92, 76 S.E.2d 129 (1953). Action by husband against wife for recovery of property converted by
her.
While the statutes of this state do not purport to change the common law in respect to personal torts committed by one spouse against the other, they do change the common law in respect to property rights of the wife; with respect to such rights she is a feme sole, and may be sued by her husband in a bail-trover proceeding for recovery of his personal property converted by her. Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937).
Void instrument cannot be validated by subsequent conduct of married woman.
When an instrument is made by a married woman, ‘‘which is void by reason of being in violation of the special provisions of the law on that subject,’’ it cannot be vitalized by any subsequent conduct on her part; she is as much disabled from rendering it valid after she makes it as she is from making it in the first instance. Baxter v. Bank of Grantville, 48 Ga. App. 458, 172 S.E. 810 (1934). Cited in Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964); Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 273 S.E.2d 169 (1980).
Am. Jur. 2d.
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Husband and Wife, §§ 11 et seq., 19.
C.J.S.
41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 16 et seq.
ALR.
Right of wife to exclude husband from possession, use, or enjoyment of family residence or homestead owned by her, 21 ALR 745. Validity of testamentary trust to promote women’s rights, 28 ALR 720. Marriage as extinguishing contractual indebtedness between parties, 45 ALR2d 722. Divorce and separation: appreciation in value of separate property during marriage without contribution by either spouse as separate or communal property, 24 ALR4th 453. Divorce property distribution: real estate or trust property in which interest vested before marriage and was realized during marriage, 60 ALR4th 217.

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Current through: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Text read from 2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf, Volume V2, 2016 edition, pages 663 to 665; merge action: carried; file SHA-256 1b27199d8655.