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Georgia Commons

Constitución del Estado de Georgia

Artículo I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Artículo I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Sección I. RIGHTS OF PERSONS

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXVII. Spouse’s separate property.

Vigente

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Una disposición constitucional que se muestra como vigente está vigente tal como está impresa en el volumen. Una decisión judicial puede hacer inaplicable una disposición impresa sin cambiar el volumen, y el volumen no registra eso.

El texto siguiente es la ley tal como la imprime el estado, en inglés.

  1. The separate property of each spouse shall remain the separate property of that spouse except as otherwise provided by law.

Las notas siguientes se imprimen con la sección, pero no son ley promulgada (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). Se muestran aparte del texto.

Editor's notes

Some of the cases annotated under this paragraph were decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIV and antecedent provisions providing for the separation only of the wife’s property. Barring of wife’s action for loss of consortium against husband’s employer was not a constitutional deprivation of right of wife when the husband had no tort claim against his employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act, as the wife’s right was derivative of the husband’s right. Henderson v. Hercules, Inc., 253 Ga. 685, 324 S.E.2d 453 (1985). This provision constitutes women as feme soles. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975). This paragraph does not restrict a woman’s assumption of debts of her husband. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975). Sale by married woman to pay debt

Cross references

Each spouse’s property separate, § 19-3-9.

Law reviews

For note, ‘‘The Economics of Divorce in Georgia: Toward a Partnership Model of Marriage,’’ see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 640 (1978). For comment as to larceny of separate property of wife or husband, in light of Gaines v. State, 65 Ga.App. 763, 16 S.E.2d 517 (1941), see 4 Ga. B.J. 44 (1942).

Otras notas

1976 Constitution.
Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIV.
of husband is valid.
A sale by a married woman of property belonging to her separate estate, though made for the sole purpose of raising money with which to pay a debt or liability of her husband, is nevertheless valid and binding upon her, even if the purchaser, not being a creditor of the husband and having nothing to do with any arrangement or transaction between the husband and wife, knew that the proceeds thereof were to be applied for the purpose stated. Ross v. Durrence, 173 Ga. 457, 160 S.E. 370 (1931), later appeal, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935). son to pay debt of her husband, and will be bound by her contract to reimburse the third person for so doing. Ross v. Durrence, 173 Ga. 457, 160 S.E. 370 (1931), later appeal, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935). Recovering part of separate estate
Wife may legally procure third perapplied on husband’s debt.
When the defendant made threats to have the plaintiff’s husband criminally prosecuted for a misappropriation of the defendant’s funds unless she consented to a sale of a part of her separate estate and delivered the proceeds to the defendant to be applied against the debt due by the husband on account of the misappropriation, there was duress as to the plaintiff wife and the law would not deem her to be in pari delicto with the defendant so as to deny her relief in recovering a part of her separate estate which was, with the knowledge of the defendant, applied on her husband’s debt. Thrift Credit Union v. Moore, 88 Ga. App. 92, 76 S.E.2d 129 (1953). Action by husband against wife for recovery of property converted by
her.
While the statutes of this state do not purport to change the common law in respect to personal torts committed by one spouse against the other, they do change the common law in respect to property rights of the wife; with respect to such rights she is a feme sole, and may be sued by her husband in a bail-trover proceeding for recovery of his personal property converted by her. Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937).
Void instrument cannot be validated by subsequent conduct of married woman.
When an instrument is made by a married woman, ‘‘which is void by reason of being in violation of the special provisions of the law on that subject,’’ it cannot be vitalized by any subsequent conduct on her part; she is as much disabled from rendering it valid after she makes it as she is from making it in the first instance. Baxter v. Bank of Grantville, 48 Ga. App. 458, 172 S.E. 810 (1934). Cited in Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964); Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 273 S.E.2d 169 (1980).
Am. Jur. 2d.
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Husband and Wife, §§ 11 et seq., 19.
C.J.S.
41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 16 et seq.
ALR.
Right of wife to exclude husband from possession, use, or enjoyment of family residence or homestead owned by her, 21 ALR 745. Validity of testamentary trust to promote women’s rights, 28 ALR 720. Marriage as extinguishing contractual indebtedness between parties, 45 ALR2d 722. Divorce and separation: appreciation in value of separate property during marriage without contribution by either spouse as separate or communal property, 24 ALR4th 453. Divorce property distribution: real estate or trust property in which interest vested before marriage and was realized during marriage, 60 ALR4th 217.

Leer la página oficial (el PDF del estado, abierto en la página de la que se leyó este texto).

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Texto leído de 2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf, Volumen V2, edición 2016, páginas 663 a 665; acción de fusión: carried; SHA-256 del archivo 1b27199d8655.