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Constitución del Estado de Georgia

Artículo I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Artículo I. BILL OF RIGHTS · Sección I. RIGHTS OF PERSONS

Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXVI. Exemptions from levy and sale.

Vigente

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Una disposición constitucional que se muestra como vigente está vigente tal como está impresa en el volumen. Una decisión judicial puede hacer inaplicable una disposición impresa sin cambiar el volumen, y el volumen no registra eso.

El texto siguiente es la ley tal como la imprime el estado, en inglés.

  1. The General Assembly shall protect by law from levy and sale by virtue of any process under the laws of this state a portion of the property of each person in an amount of not less than $1,600.00 and shall have authority to define to whom any such additional exemptions shall be allowed; to specify the amount of such exemptions; to provide for the manner of exempting such property and for the sale, alienation, and encumbrance thereof; and to provide for the waiver of said exemptions by the debtor.

Las notas siguientes se imprimen con la sección, pero no son ley promulgada (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). Se muestran aparte del texto.

Cross references

Exemption from levy and sale, § 44-13-1 et seq.

Law reviews

For article discussing liens and assignments of bankrupt exemption property under Georgia practice and decisions, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. No. 2, p. 31 (1927).

Otras notas

1976 Constitution.
Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII.
‘‘Setting apart’’ explained.
‘‘Setting apart’’ of debtor’s exempt property is a mere identification of property to which exemption shall be applied, the burden of securing which is put on the debtor. In re Trammell, 5 F.2d 326 (N.D. Ga.), petition denied, 8 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 649, 46 S. Ct. 349, 70 L. Ed. 780 (1925). ing that certain property shall be exempt from levy and sale was not to prohibit any other species of property from being declared exempt, but to guarantee the exemption of the property specified for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto, to be set aside in the manner to be provided by the General Assembly. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936). Provision not exhaustive as to other species of property which may
Purpose of Constitution in providbe exempted.
Even if the legislature may not amend the homestead exemptions provided for in the Constitution so as to lessen or extend the exemption as to the species of property therein dealt with, the constitutional provisions are not exhaustive as to other species of property. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936). Exemption provided for in this paragraph does not include money as subject to exemption. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936). Legislature, in enacting former Code 1933, § 51-601, was dealing with different species of property from
that dealt with in the Constitution.
Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936). ing to exemption of benefits to be paid by fraternal benefit societies, is not violative of this paragraph providing for exemption from levy and sale of the property of certain specified persons, realty or personalty, or both, to the value in the aggregate of $1,600.00; such provision not being a limitation upon legislative power as to a species of property not therein dealt with and not being applicable to cases of exemption of ‘‘money or other benefit’’ payable by a fraternal benefit society. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936). thorized to take both statutory and constitutional homesteads. Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947). Judgment debtor claiming invalid
Former Code 1933, § 46-213, relat-Applicant for homestead is not austatutory homestead entitled to constitutional homestead.
When statutory homestead claimed by a judgment debtor is valid, and the debtor cannot thereafter take constitutional homestead, but, if the former was invalid the debtor was entitled to the latter. Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947). No valid conveyance of land during
existence of homestead.
When a homestead was set apart to the head of a family, under the Constitution of 1877, in land belonging to the head of the family, the head of the family could not make a valid conveyance of the land during the existence of the homestead, and a deed so made was void. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 189 Ga. 662, 7 S.E.2d 273 (1940).
Creditor may seek to have exempted property subjected to payment when debtor has waived exemption.
When a debtor has not set aside household and kitchen furniture as prescribed in Ga. L. 1924, p. 57, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-13-42), and when the debtor has executed a note to a creditor waiving this exemption, the creditor may seek to have the exempted property subjected to the payment of the debtor’s note. Turner v. Caudill, 175 Ga. 170, 165 S.E. 24 (1932). Homestead right can be asserted
against purchaser with notice.
Real estate paid for in full with other realty previously set apart in due and proper manner under the homestead and exemption laws of this state, and dealt with by the head of the family and the spouse (there being no other beneficiaries of the homestead) as exempted property, takes the place of the latter and is impressed with the homestead character, and such homestead right can be asserted against a purchaser with notice. Amerson v. Cox, 173 Ga. 477, 160 S.E. 506 (1931). Cited in Aspinwall v. Latimer, 174 Ga. 712, 164 S.E. 50 (1932); Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. Carter, 180 Ga. 828, 181 S.E. 155 (1935); McDaniel v. Kelley, 61 Ga. App. 105, 5 S.E.2d 672 (1939); Pass v. Pass, 195 Ga. 155, 23 S.E.2d 697 (1942); Rose v. Crane Heating Co., 198 Ga. 295, 31 S.E.2d 717 (1944).
Homestead exemption must be ap-Delinquent state tax collection.
A taxpayer’s assertion of the statutory homestead exemption contained in a former law would not prevent the Revenue Department from levying upon the taxpayer’s personal automobile to satisfy delinquent state taxes. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 83-14.
Am. Jur. 2d.
31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exemptions, §§ 1 et seq., 24 et seq.
C.J.S.
35 C.J.S., Exemptions, § 1 et seq.
ALR.
Validity of mortgage executed by entryman on public land before patent, 41 ALR 938. Loss of homestead rights by wife through absence enforced by act of husband, 42 ALR 1162; 129 ALR 305. Deposit of exempt funds as affecting debtor’s exemption, 67 ALR 1203. Estoppel to claim, or waiver of, homestead by direction of judgment debtor to levy on real estate, 101 ALR 851. One who supports (or is under a duty to support) in whole or part relatives who do not live with him as ‘‘head of family,’’ ‘‘householder,’’ etc., within homestead exemption statute, 118 ALR 1386. Debtor’s exemption of personalty as attaching to proceeds of sale or exchange thereof, 119 ALR 467. Creation of homestead right in real estate as affecting previous mortgage, trust deed, or purchase money or vendor’s lien, 123 ALR 427. Constitutionally permissible classification or discrimination in debtors’ exemption statutes, 128 ALR 107. Exemption of motor vehicle from seizure for debt, 37 ALR2d 714. Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 54 ALR2d 1422. What state exemption law, in point of time, governs bankrupt’s exemption rights, 61 ALR2d 748. Wife as head of family within homestead or other property exemption provision, 67 ALR2d 779. What is ‘‘necessary’’ furniture entitled to exemption from seizure for debt, 41 ALR3d 607.

Leer la página oficial (el PDF del estado, abierto en la página de la que se leyó este texto).

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Texto leído de 2ga-const-(v2)-2016-pdf.pdf, Volumen V2, edición 2016, páginas 661 a 663; acción de fusión: carried; SHA-256 del archivo 1b27199d8655.