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Inquiry Concerning Judge Shermela J. Williams

Filed September 22, 2026 · Docket S24Z1139, S25Z0722

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that former Fulton County Superior Court Judge Shermela J. Williams committed serious judicial misconduct that would have warranted removal, but ruled it cannot remove her because she resigned before the case was decided.

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The summaries below were written by an AI model (claude-sonnet-5) from the text of the opinion and are not part of it. Quote the opinion, not the summary.

In plain language

Shermela J. Williams was a Fulton County Superior Court judge accused by the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) of 32 violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including making secret phone calls to a party in a case before her, pressuring a young lawyer on behalf of her uncle, ordering a young woman handcuffed and locked in a holding cell without legal authority, and repeatedly failing to rule on cases on time. A JQC hearing panel found most of the charges proven and recommended she be removed from the bench. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia, Williams resigned as a judge. The court had to decide what to do since it cannot remove someone from a job they no longer hold. It agreed the violations were proven and would ordinarily justify removal, but it dismissed the case without prejudice, meaning the JQC can restart the proceedings if Williams ever becomes a judge or judicial candidate again.

What the court decided

The court held that Williams's proven misconduct would ordinarily justify removal from judicial office, but because she resigned she cannot be removed from an office she no longer holds. The court declined to use any inherent power to impose other discipline and instead dismissed the case without prejudice, allowing it to be revived if she seeks judicial office again.

Why it matters

The decision leaves a gap in judicial accountability: a Georgia judge facing serious misconduct findings can resign to avoid formal removal, at least for now. Future judicial candidates, the JQC, and lawmakers must grapple with whether resignation can shield a judge from discipline.

Outcome

Dismissed without prejudice

How the court got there

  1. The court reviewed the JQC hearing panel's factual findings for clear error, meaning it would only overturn them if the record could not support them, and found the panel's findings on 28 of 32 counts were supported by the evidence.
  2. Applying that standard, the court agreed Williams made a secret ('ex parte') phone call to a party in a pending divorce case, used her judicial title to advocate for her uncle in another case, and ordered a young woman handcuffed and locked in a holding cell without any legal authority to do so.
  3. The court concluded these actions amounted to 'willful misconduct in office' (bad-faith actions taken as a judge) or 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice' (actions that harm public confidence in courts even if not malicious), either of which the Georgia Constitution allows the court to punish.
  4. Because those violations would ordinarily justify removing a sitting judge from the bench, the court next asked whether it could still remove Williams even though she had already resigned, concluding that removal is impossible once someone no longer holds the office.
  5. The court considered but declined to use any 'inherent power' (authority courts have beyond what the Constitution explicitly grants) to impose a different penalty on a former judge, choosing instead to dismiss the case without prejudice so it can be reopened if Williams returns to judicial office.

From the opinion

“we conclude that she cannot be removed from that same office. So we must determine what, if anything, we can and should do next.”

Per Curiam · The court's framing of the central problem created by Williams's resignation during the disciplinary proceedings.

“our duty to administer, safeguard, and defend the judicial branch necessarily includes the power to discipline those whose actions pose an internal threat to the judiciary.”

Bethel · Justice Bethel's argument that the court has inherent power to discipline even a judge who has already resigned.

Topics

  • judicial misconduct
  • Fulton County judge
  • JQC proceedings
  • judge resignation
  • ex parte communications

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Inquiry Concerning Judge Shermela J. Williams | Georgia Commons