Título 47. RETIREMENT AND PENSIONS · Capítulo 20. PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS STANDARDS · Artículo 7. PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS INVESTMENT AUTHORITY LAW
47-20-83.1. Definitions; identification of scrutinized companies where public funds held; Scrutinized Companies with Activities in the Iran Petroleum Energy Sector List; reporting.
Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.
El texto siguiente es la ley tal como la imprime el estado, en inglés.
El volumen no imprime texto legal para esta sección (estado: repealed).
History
Code 1981, § 47-20-83.1, enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 1022, § 3/SB 451; Ga. L. 2010, p. 863, § 3/SB 296; repealed by Ga. L. 2008, p. 1022, § 3.1/SB 451, effective July 1, 2015.
Effective date
This Code section became effective July 1, 2008. The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, substituted ‘‘state treasurer’’ for ‘‘director of the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services’’ in the first sentence of subsection (n).
Editor's notes
Ga. L. 2008, p. 1022, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: ‘‘This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Protecting Georgia’s Investments Act.’’’ Ga. L. 2008, p. 1022, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: ‘‘The General Assembly finds that: ‘‘(1) In 2001, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission determined that companies with business operations in terrorist-sponsored states are exposed to a special risk category known as global security risk: the risk to share value and corporate reputation stemming from the intersection of a publicly traded company’s international business activities and security-related concerns, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation; ‘‘(2) In response to the financial risk posed by investments in companies doing business with a state that sponsors terrorists, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission established its Office of Global Security Risk to provide for enhanced disclosure of material information regarding such companies; ‘‘(3) According to the former chair of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission Laura Unger, the fact that a foreign company is doing material business with a country, government, or entity on OFAC’s sanctions list is, in the view of the staff of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable investor’s decision about whether to invest in that company; ‘‘(4) A 2006 report by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations states that ‘a company’s association with sponsors of terrorism and human rights abuses, no matter how large or small, can have a materially adverse result on a public company’s activities, financial condition, earnings, and stock prices, all of which can negatively affect the value of an investment’; ‘‘(5) Iran tops the United States State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, funding such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad, as well as fueling the insurgency in Iraq via its Al-Quds force; ‘‘(6) The United States imposed sanctions on Iran by designating the Islamic Revolu-tionary Guard Corps, its Al-Quds Force, and three state-owned banks as weapons proliferators and supporters of terrorism; ‘‘(7) The United Nations Security Council has twice voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Iran for its failure to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities calling for an additional embargo on Iranian arms exports, which is a freeze on assets abroad of an expanded list of individuals and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and calls for nations and institutions to bar new grants or loans to Iran except for humanitarian and developmental purposes; ‘‘(8) Foreign entities have invested in Iran’s petroleum energy sector despite United States and United Nations sanctions against Iran; ‘‘(9) All entities that have invested more than $20 million in any given year in Iran’s petroleum sector since August 5, 1996, are subject to sanctions under United States law pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; ‘‘(10) The United States renewed the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 in 2001 and 2006; ‘‘(11) It is a fundamental responsibility of the State of Georgia to decide where, how, and by whom financial resources in its control should be invested, taking into account numerous pertinent factors; ‘‘(12) While divestiture should be considered with the intent to improve investment performance, by the rules of prudence, fiduciaries must take into account all relevant substantive factors in arriving at an investment decision; ‘‘(13) The State of Georgia is deeply concerned about investments in publicly traded companies that have investments in Iran’s petroleum sector as a financial risk to the shareholders; ‘‘(14) By investing in publicly traded companies having investments in Iran’s petroleum sector, public retirement systems are putting their funds at substantial financial risk; ‘‘(15) Divestiture from markets that are vulnerable to embargo, loan restrictions, and sanctions from the United States and the international community, including the United Nations Security Council, is in accordance with the rules of prudence; ‘‘(16) This Act should remain in effect only insofar as it continues to be consistent with and does not unduly interfere with the foreign policy of the United States as determined by the federal government; ‘‘(17) To protect Georgia’s assets, it is in the best interest of the state to enact a statutory prohibition regarding the investments managed by public retirement systems doing business in Iran’s petroleum-energy sector; ‘‘(18) Nevertheless, the members of this body have serious concerns regarding the efficacy of requiring the divestment of Georgia’s retirement funds in large companies with fiscally sound histories and enviable histories of returns, and whether any effect on world-wide business activities might be too insubstantial as to warrant the cost to the state and to public retirees of divestment; ‘‘(19) Further, the members of this body are concerned about the cost of compliance, both in terms of the necessity of employing additional administrative staff to ferret certain companies out of the investment pool and in the potential for lost investment revenue caused by a possibly ineffective but costly investment policy; and ‘‘(20) The members of this body have faith that the boards of trustees and investment managers of our public retirement systems are patriotic Americans who would not aid or assist terrorism in any manner, and that restrictive and potentially costly micro-managing by this body is unnecessary.’’ Ga. L. 2008, p. 1022, § 3.1, provides for the repeal of this Code section effective July 1, 2015.
Leer la página oficial (el PDF del estado, abierto en la página de la que se leyó este texto).
Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.
Texto leído de t47-(v35)-2010-pdf.pdf, Volumen V35, edición 2010, páginas 670 a 675; acción de fusión: status changed; SHA-256 del archivo 670b44b1738a.