Constitución del Estado de Georgia

Artículo VII. TAXATION AND FINANCE · Artículo VII. TAXATION AND FINANCE · Sección I. POWER OF TAXATION

Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I. Taxation; limitations on grants of tax powers.

Vigente

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Una disposición constitucional que se muestra como vigente está vigente tal como está impresa en el volumen. Una decisión judicial puede hacer inaplicable una disposición impresa sin cambiar el volumen, y el volumen no registra eso.

El texto siguiente es la ley tal como la imprime el estado, en inglés.

The state may not suspend or irrevocably give, grant, limit, or restrain the right of taxation and all laws, grants, contracts, and other acts to effect any of these purposes are null and void. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the right of taxation shall always be under the complete control of the state.

Las notas siguientes se imprimen con la sección, pero no son ley promulgada (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). Se muestran aparte del texto.

Editor's notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I and antecedent provisions, providing for ‘‘The right of taxation is a sovereign right...of the State,’’ are included in the annotations for this paragraph. Right of taxation in the legislature is without limit, except as provided in

Cross references

Laws impairing contract obligations or granting irrevocable privileges or immunities, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Laws affecting prior corporate charters, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V. Tax powers of counties and municipalities, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I. Power of Governor to suspend collection of taxes, § 45-12-22. Taxation, T. 48. Taxing of corporations, §§ 48-7-21 and 48-13-72.

Law reviews

For article discussing taxation of foreign businesses in Georgia, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (1976). For note discussing taxation of shares of stock, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 41 (1927). For comment on Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), as to the constitutionality of Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969).

Otras notas (20 entradas, tal como están impresas)

1976 Constitution.: Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I.
Inherent power of taxation.: The power of the legislature to impose taxes is inherent and is only circumscribed by the organic law. Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930). General Assembly does not need constitutional authorization to levy a tax or to authorize the levy of a tax by a county. Board of Comm’rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980). This paragraph changed the prior law. Augusta Factory v. City Council, 83 Ga. 734, 10 S.E. 359 (1889) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). ject to exemption is required under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III), and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Atlanta Nat’l Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S.E. 73 (1900). De facto government has inherent power to tax. O’Byrne v. Mayor of Savannah, 41 Ga. 331, 5 Am. R. 532 (1870). State may not grant irrevocable tax exemptions, whether statutory or constitutional. Because the Constitution prohibits irrevocable restraints on the state’s taxing powers, the state may amend the Constitution to repeal any tax exemption. Collins v. City of Dalton ex rel. Bd. of Water, Light & Sinking Fund Comm’rs, 261 Ga. 584, 408 S.E.2d 106 (1991). This paragraph says nothing of the time when a tax execution must be issued or enforced. Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S.E. 251 (1906) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). This paragraph has no relation to the right of the legislature to give legislative sanction to bar orders, and make them applicable to the state. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. Mayor of City of Carrollton, 249 Ga. 173, 288 S.E.2d 565 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). Municipality’s power to tax must be conferred directly by Constitution or
Taxation of all properties not substatute.: Basic power to tax belongs to state; for a municipality to possess this power it must be conferred upon it either directly in the Constitution or by statute and it must be conferred in plain and unmistakable terms. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of St. Marys, 247 Ga. 687, 279 S.E.2d 200 (1981). Authority of municipality to collect
occupation tax.: First city lacked authority to collect an occupation tax on professional or business activities within a second city’s limits because the first city did not identify any constitutional provision or general law that authorized the first city to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax on businesses and practitioners that were not located in that city’s limits, and to the extent an agreement between the cities purported to vest in the first city the authority to collect an occupation tax on businesses located within the second city’s limits, the contract was unenforceable; a contract between municipalities, however, is not a general law. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).
Sanitation assessments.: Sanitation assessments were not taxes within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution but rather charges for services rendered by a county, which was authorized to enforce by ordinance the collection of fees for solid waste collection services in the same manner as authorized by law for the enforcement of the collection and payment of state taxes, fees, or assessments; thus, the county’s solid waste collection fee did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I. Strykr v. Long County Bd. of Comm’rs, 277 Ga. 624, 593 S.E.2d 348 (2004). Cited in Harrison v. Southern Ry., 44 Ga. App. 49, 160 S.E. 656 (1931); Jones v. Darby, 174 Ga. 71, 161 S.E. 835 (1931); City of Moultrie v. Moultrie Banking Co., 175 Ga. 738, 165 S.E. 814 (1932); Barwick v. Roberts, 192 Ga. 783, 16 S.E.2d 867 (1941); State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); Sams v. General Consideration (Cont’d) Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239, 201 S.E.2d 138 (1973). Sovereign Right of Taxation
the Georgia Constitution.: The right of taxation is not a power specially granted; it is assumed to exist, and is limited by special clauses. Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930). Georgia Constitution denies to the legislature power to surrender the sovereign right of the state to tax. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957). Provisions of former Code 1933, § 92-5712 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-25) were not violative of this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution pertaining to the sovereign right of the state to tax. Aldridge v. Federal Land Bank, 203 Ga. 285, 46 S.E.2d 578 (1948) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). graph is to prohibit exemptions from taxation, and to void all limitations of every kind and character upon the taxing power of the state. It is not the purpose of this paragraph to prohibit the legislature from prescribing the priority by which debts of an insolvent bank should be paid as in Ga. L. 1931, p. 7, § 91 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202). Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465, 160 S.E. 419 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202 not violative of
The main purpose of this parathis paragraph and other constitutional provisions.: The order of distribution of assets upon the insolvency of a bank which grant payments of debts due to depositors prior to payment of state taxes (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) is not an unconstitutional violation of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Paras. III and IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III and Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I). Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465, 160 S.E. 419 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I).
Restraint on state’s taxing power.: — In the field of direct taxation, the power of the sovereign state is supreme, except when exercise of that supreme right brings it into collision with the operation of a government instrumentality necessary to the existence of the federal government and the exercise of its powers upon a subject as to which exclusive jurisdiction was delegated to Congress. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932). ment war power by state taxation
Interference with federal governprohibited.: Even though power of a state to tax is supreme, that power may not be used to hamper, hinder, annoy, harass, and impede the federal government in the exercise of its unlimited power to carry on war. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932).
State taxation of veterans benefits.: — Where Congress enacts legislation declaring that certain compensation for war veterans shall be exempt from taxation, Congress is acting within its war powers and the exemption applies to state taxation, including taxation of property purchased by veterans with funds declared tax exempt by Congress. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932). Exercise of taxing power for local
improvements.: Though assessments for local improvements are not taxes, within the meaning of the requirement of the Constitution that taxes must be ad valorem and uniform, nevertheless assessments for local improvements, such as street paving and sewerage, are an exercise of the taxing power. Steele v. City of Waycross, 190 Ga. 816, 10 S.E.2d 867 (1940). Income Taxation Right to impose an income tax is an
inherent right of the people.: The grant of this power is not necessary to enable the legislature to exercise it. There is nothing in the Constitution of Georgia which denies to the legislature the power to impose an income tax, if it is levied without infringing some provision of that instrument. Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930).
Exemption.: Allowing a tax exemption for retirement benefits paid to teachers and state employees bestowed an irrevocable tax exemption upon the retirees in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I. Parrish v. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 260 Ga. 613, 398 S.E.2d 353 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 353, 111 S. Ct. 2016, 114 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1991). Payment of Gratuity by State Payment of claim was forbidden
gratuity.: A payment of plaintiff’s claim, with or without a judgment against a school board, in settlement of a supposed tort liability of the board is a gratuity which is forbidden. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 132 Ga. App. 314, 208 S.E.2d 126 (1974), cert. dismissed, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975). Taxation of Corporations and Corporate Property Corporation doing business in a city is taxable, although its principal office is elsewhere. Georgia Ins. Co. v. City of Cedartown, 134 Ga. 87, 67 S.E. 410, 19 Ann. Cas. 954 (1910). tain property is void. Tarver v. Mayor of Dalton, 134 Ga. 462, 67 S.E. 929, 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 183, 20 Ann. Cas. 281 (1910). For case purporting to exempt from ‘‘all state, county, and municipal taxation’’ lands ceded to United States government, see IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957). mer Code 1933, §§ 15-301, 15-302, and 15-303 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22, 50-2-23 and 50-2-24) was void as being offensive to this paragraph, see IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). The state has not waived and cannot waive its right to tax private property on federal land and indeed the Constitution demands that it be taxed. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).
Contract limiting the taxes on cer-For case purportedly holding for-Taxing private property not interfering with government business.: Former Code 1933, §§ 15-301, 15-302, and 15-303 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22, 50-2-23 and 50-2-24) must be construed in pari materia with this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution. When thus construed, they mean that taxation cannot be prevented so long as such taxation in no wise interferes with the business of the United States. Taxing private property could not conceivably interfere with the government’s business. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). Legislature cannot violate this
paragraph.: Nothing legislature does, no matter how unambiguously it is expressed, can have validity if it offends this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I).
Classification of business.: The General Assembly may classify different businesses for purpose of taxation and may make subclassifications within one type of business. These classifications have been held constitutional where there was a business tax involved as opposed to a property tax. A tax on gross insurance premiums is a business tax. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966). Does not apply to O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8. — Neither Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X), nor this paragraph is applicable to Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8) because the constitutional provisions contain the words ‘‘irrevocable’’ and ‘‘irrevocably.’’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘‘irrevocable’’ as ‘‘incapable of being recalled or revoked.’’ Statutes passed by the General Assembly such as Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, § 2 are clearly revocable at the will of the legislature. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).
Am. Jur. 2d.: 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 57 et seq.
C.J.S.: 84 C.J.S., Taxation, §§ 7 et seq., 122.
ALR.: Validity of statutes imposing license tax on automobiles as affected by constitutional provisions in relation to taxation, 5 ALR 759; 126 ALR 1419. Constitutional enumeration of subjects of tax exemption as affecting power of Legislature to free government securities or property from taxation, 9 ALR 436. Appropriation or raising of public funds for distribution by chamber of commerce, 31 ALR 495. Constitutionality of taxing statute which refuses to corporation deduction of credits allowed to individual taxpayer, 42 ALR 1049. Constitutionality of statute impairing or postponing lien for taxes, 53 ALR 1134; 136 ALR 328. Constitutionality of statute which extinguishes or impairs lien of special assessments on sale of property for taxes, 53 ALR 1140. State income tax on resident in respect of income earned outside the state, 87 ALR 380. Constitutionality of statute permitting payment of taxes in installments, 101 ALR 1335. Constitutionality of chain store tax, 112 ALR 305. Tax on corporations as affected by fact that corporation is not actually engaged in or carrying on business for which it was incorporated, 124 ALR 1109. Constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion as applied to license taxes or regulations, 141 ALR 538; 146 ALR 109; 152 ALR 322. Sales or use tax: deduction or exemption of discount or premium in computing amount of sales, 90 ALR2d 338. Validity, construction, and application of state statutes forbidding possession, transportation, or sale of unstamped or unlicensed cigarettes or other tobacco products, 46 ALR3d 1342.

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Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

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