Wilson v. State

Andrew Wilson was convicted in Fulton County of murdering Gregory Harris, who was kidnapped, smothered, and burned in his car after his expensive watches and other belongings were stolen. At trial, prosecutors introduced evidence of a separate 2011 armed robbery Wilson committed against a man named John Taylor, arguing it showed Wilson's motive and a common robbery scheme. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia had to decide whether that prior-crime evidence was properly admitted and, if not, whether the mistake actually affected the verdict. The court concluded the evidence was not relevant to prove motive or a distinctive common scheme because the similarities between the two crimes were too generic, and that the mistake was not harmless given how heavily prosecutors relied on it. It reversed Wilson's convictions, ruled he cannot be retried for theft by receiving stolen property because the evidence was too thin, but said he can be retried on the murder, kidnapping, and arson charges, and upheld the denial of his motion to suppress cell phone records.

The trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Wilson's 2011 armed robbery to show motive or common scheme because the similarities between the two crimes were too generic to qualify as a unique signature crime, and this error was not harmless given the state's heavy reliance on it and the largely circumstantial evidence against Wilson.

The ruling limits how prosecutors can use a defendant's other alleged crimes to suggest guilt, requiring genuinely distinctive similarities rather than generic patterns. It also confirms that Georgia investigators could lawfully obtain historical cell phone location records by court order before the 2018 Carpenter decision changed the rules.

Reversed; retrial allowed on all counts except theft by receiving

1. Under Georgia's Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant's other crimes cannot be used to show he has a bad character or a general tendency to commit crimes, but can be admitted for other specific purposes like motive or a distinctive common plan, only if that evidence is actually relevant to one of those purposes.
2. The court found the prosecution's motive argument, that Wilson simply likes to rob wealthy people and take their things, was too generic; it amounted to an improper argument that Wilson has a general criminal tendency rather than a specific motive tied to Harris's murder.
3. Applying a stringent test borrowed from federal courts for evidence offered to show a common scheme, the court held the prosecution needed to show the two crimes shared a unique, signature-like modus operandi, not just commonplace similarities like meeting victims at a nightclub or stealing watches.
4. Comparing the 2011 robbery of John Taylor to Harris's killing, the court found real differences, including much greater violence, evidence of destroying proof in Harris's case, and different levels of prior familiarity with the victim, undermining any claim of a unique shared plan.
5. Because the wrongly admitted evidence was central to the prosecution's closing arguments branding Wilson a 'professional robber' and the remaining circumstantial evidence, while strong, was not overwhelming, the court could not say it was highly probable the mistake did not affect the verdict, so the error required reversal.
6. Reviewing the evidence independently for retrial purposes, the court found the proof insufficient to support the theft by receiving stolen property count but sufficient to allow retrial on the murder, kidnapping, and arson counts.

• murder conviction
• prior bad acts evidence
• cell phone location data
• Fourth Amendment
• retrial