Kennedy v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0576

Malik Kennedy

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Gwinnett County

No. 24B004759

Decided: September 9, 2026

LAND, Justice.

Malik Kennedy appeals his convictions for malice murder and related charges stemming from the death of Trinity Kyles. 1 Kennedy argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the execution of two search war- rants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1 The crimes occurred on May 2, 2021. On January 31, 2024, a Gwin- nett County grand jury indicted Kennedy for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated battery (Count 4), and cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 5). At a trial held from April 22 to May 3, 2024, the jury found Kennedy guilty on all counts. Kennedy was sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1. Counts 2 and 3 were vacated by operation of law, and Counts 4 and 5 were merged with Count 1 for sentencing purposes.

Kennedy filed a timely motion for new trial on May 6, 2024, and amended that motion through new counsel on March 8, 2025. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on November 3, 2025, and Kennedy filed a timely notice of appeal. Kennedy’s appeal was dock- eted to the April 2026 term of this Court.

1. The evidence presented at trial shows as follows. Rosie Kyles and Kennedy met online and began dating in December 2020, after which they moved into a room at a motel with Kyles’s two-year-old daughter, Trinity. On the morning of May 2, 2021, Kyles asked Kennedy to watch Trinity while Kyles was at work, as he often did. Kyles testified that Trinity was healthy and did not have any injuries other than a bruise on her forehead from a fall earlier that week. At around 10:00 a.m., Kyles took Trinity with her to the motel office to renew her room reservation before returning to the motel room to get ready for work. Kyles left for work around 10:50 a.m. and called Kennedy around 1:00 p.m. to “check up on them” and “see if they ate for the day.” Kyles testified that she did not hear Trinity on that phone call and that “nothing was wrong at that point.”

At 1:52 p.m., Kennedy texted Kyles that “[Trinity] is off the f**king chain” and that she was “screaming at the top of her lungs.” At approximately 2:00 p.m., Kennedy texted Kyles that he “pinched [Trinity],” “it’s a bruise she had me blown,” and that Trinity “started hollering and screaming and then went to sleep.” He then texted Kyles at 2:09 p.m. that he did not think “with the issues [he had] and how [he is] that [he] should be watching her by [himself] as much as [he did].”

Kyles returned to the motel room around 5:20 p.m. and went to wake up Trinity after Kennedy told her she had been nap- ping for “a couple hours.” She found Trinity in bed with “bruises on her” and felt that Trinity was “cold in a way, but like warm.” Kyles saw “blood coming out [of Trinity’s] nose,” “wiped it a little bit” with the bedsheets, and called 911. Kyles put her “head to [Trinity] to see if she was breathing” and “felt like she wasn’t.” Kyles attempted CPR until police arrived. Kennedy told Kyles that he had given Trinity children’s melatonin. An officer who re- sponded to the scene testified that, when police arrived, Kennedy was “pacing,” appeared nervous, and that his “reactions did not seem consistent with somebody whose child was possibly dead or dying in the motel room under [his] charge.” The officer testified that he heard Kennedy tell Kyles that he had “pinch[ed] [Trinity] in the face” and given her melatonin. Kennedy and Kyles were both detained in a responding officer’s car, and after officers in- terviewed both individuals, Kennedy was placed under arrest.

A paramedic who responded to the scene testified that, upon arrival, he noticed “bruising to [Trinity’s] face,” and “a little bit of blood in [Trinity’s] mouth and coming out her nose.” During resuscitation efforts, the paramedic also noticed what looked “like a nail mark” and bruising on Trinity’s mouth, as well as swelling on both sides of her throat, which “was kind of a red flag” because “[i]t’s not typical in a cardiac arrest for a child.” 2 Paramedics ul- timately were unable to resuscitate Trinity.

The medical examiner who performed Trinity’s autopsy testified that she had swelling and bleeding around her brain, ret- inal hemorrhages in both eyes, various “bruises and abrasions” throughout her body, healing rib fractures on the left side of her chest, and “healing injuries that involved her upper and lower lips.” These bruises were located on the left, right, and center of Trinity’s chest, and “more extensive” bruising was located on Trinity’s “face extending below [her] chin.” Trinity also had bruis- ing on her left upper arm that was “consistent with being grabbed,” bruises on her right leg and thigh, and “multiple areas of blunt force impact to her … scalp on each side.”

2 Paramedics initially treated Trinity for a cardiac arrest because Trin- ity “did not have a heartbeat” when they arrived on the scene.

The medical examiner determined that the brain swelling was likely caused by “rotational forces or shaking-type injuries” and that her head injuries were not “consistent with a simple fall onto cement.” 3 The medical examiner opined that, when a child receives head injuries such as those suffered by Trinity, there is “something that’s immediately wrong about the child” and that the child is “either having difficulty maintaining wakefulness, seizures, you know, goes limp.” The medical examiner further opined that it was “consistent” with her findings that Trinity died between 1:52 and 3:38 p.m. According to the medical examiner, “based on the injuries that [she] saw to the brain,” even if Trinity’s caregiver had “called for help immediately,” Trinity would not have survived. The medical examiner concluded that Trinity died from her head trauma and that her manner of death was homi- cide. Trinity’s pediatrician, who last saw her in October 2020 for her 18-month checkup, testified that Trinity’s medical records did not include any documentation for marks or bruises and that she did not treat Trinity for anything that was “unusual for a baby of that age.” The pediatrician testified that she did not see Trinity in April 2021 for her two-year-old checkup.

The State also called Dr. Lori Frasier as an expert in child- abuse pediatrics. Dr. Frasier reviewed Trinity’s autopsy report, as well as reports from the paramedics and the detective, body- worn camera footage from the police officers who responded to the 911 call, an interview with Kyles, and Trinity’s medical records and concluded that, prior to Trinity’s death, she was a “normal, healthy, two-year-old child” with “[n]o underlying medical condi-

3 Kyles testified that Trinity fell and “hit her head on the ground” out- side the motel several days before her death.

tions.” At the time of Trinity’s death, however, Dr. Frasier con- cluded that Trinity “had bruises in every plane of her body” with “evidence of repeated abuse in the healing rib fractures.” Dr. Fra- sier testified that Trinity’s injuries were not consistent with Ken- nedy’s statement that he “pinched” her and that there was “no accidental medical mechanism that could account for all of [Trin- ity’s injuries].” Dr. Frasier ultimately concluded that Trinity was a “battered child” and that she died as a result of her head inju- ries. Kennedy testified in his own defense at trial. Kennedy tes- tified that, before Kyles left for work that morning, Trinity started crying, and he picked her up and put her back down. He testified that, as he laid her back down, he accidentally “made her hit her head on the headboard” and Kyles came back in the room and told him to be more careful. Kennedy testified that Trinity then went to sleep and he played video games, drank, and smoked marijuana while Trinity slept.

Kennedy testified that after Trinity woke up “at some point” and started crying, Kennedy gave her juice, and Trinity “dumped it on the bed.” That made him “frustrated” so he “pinch[ed] her” on both cheeks. When Trinity did not stop crying, he testified that he “picked her up” and “shook her” as “discipline.” Kennedy testified that Trinity then went to sleep, and when he checked on her again sometime between 3:00 and 5:30 p.m., her eyes were open, she was “[b]iting her lip and her mouth,” and she was bleeding from her mouth. He testified that she was “wail[ing]” in a way that “wasn’t normal” and that he wiped the blood from her mouth with a towel. Kennedy then returned to playing video games and did not check on Trinity again. He did not call 911 because he “didn’t think anything was wrong with Trinity.” He denied being responsible for the bruises on Trinity’s body and testified that he did not intend to hurt her.

In response to Kennedy’s testimony, the State called Dr. Frasier as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Frasier testified that the lip- biting behavior Kennedy described in his testimony was “a reflex that [was] happening because [her] brain [was] deteriorating.” Dr. Frasier opined that although Trinity was likely concussed af- ter “the headboard incident,” the “shaking incident is what killed her.” Dr. Frasier testified that after a child has experienced vio- lent shaking, they “develop some seizure-like activity,” which would include the lip biting and “unusual moaning” described by Kennedy.

2. Kennedy argues that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his malice murder conviction. 4 We disa- gree. When considering whether the evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s convictions as a matter of constitutional due process, we ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In assessing these claims, “this Court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicting testimony.” Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 452 (2017). “A person commits the offense

4 Kennedy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his other convictions, but because those convictions were vacated or merged for sentenc- ing purposes, his challenges to those convictions are moot. See Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 340 (2022) (“To the extent [the defendant] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to counts that were merged for sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law … such challenges are moot by virtue of those convictions being merged or vacated for purposes of sentencing.”).

of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, ei- ther express or implied, causes the death of another human be- ing.” OCGA § 16-5-1(a). “Malice shall be implied where no consid- erable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” OCGA § 16-5- 1(b). At trial, the medical examiner and Dr. Frasier testified about the extent of Trinity’s injuries, observing that Trinity would have had to endure violent shaking to suffer the head injuries that caused her death. Trinity was under the sole care of Kennedy when she suffered these injuries, and Kennedy admitted that he shook her while Kyles was at work. Additionally, there was evi- dence presented from Trinity’s pediatrician that, prior to Kyles’s relationship with Kennedy, Trinity was apparently healthy with no abnormal injuries. And, although Kennedy testified that he did not intend to hurt Trinity, a jury was authorized to disbelieve his self-serving testimony, particularly given the evidence of the ex- tensive nature of Trinity’s injuries. This evidence supported the State’s contention that Kennedy shook Trinity violently enough to cause swelling and bleeding around her brain, that Trinity “had bruises in every plane of her body,” that there was “evidence of repeated abuse,” and that Kennedy did not call for help despite acknowledging Trinity’s bleeding and strange moaning. This evi- dence, combined with the fact that Kennedy was the sole care- giver during the time that Trinity suffered her fatal injuries, is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict on the charge of mal- ice murder. See Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 497 (2023) (“The jury was free to disbelieve [the defendant’s] testimony in favor of the State’s witnesses.”); Bailey v. State, 299 Ga. 807, 810-11 (2016) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for malice mur- der where child was in defendant’s sole control when he suffered the fatal injuries and the child suffered “21 impact injuries” and died of head trauma consistent with “Shaken Baby Syndrome”).

3. Kennedy next argues that the trial court erred in deny- ing his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone as a result of the execution of two search warrants, specifically text messages between him and Kyles, photographs Kennedy took of Trinity, and metadata associated with these photographs. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, even assuming the trial court erred by failing to suppress this evidence, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(a) On May 2, 2021, the trial court authorized search war- rant No. 21X00592 (the “Seizure Warrant”), which allowed offic- ers to search the motel room and seize

medications (prescribed or over the counter), illegal substances, blood, DNA, corpse of the deceased child, clothing and bedding, and electronic devices in room #206 at 3500 Venture Parkway, Duluth, GA 30096.

Officers executed the search warrant and retrieved items from the motel room including Kennedy’s cell phone.

After Kyles told officers about Kennedy’s text messages to her on the day of Trinity’s death, officers sought a second search warrant to authorize the search of Kennedy’s phone. This war- rant, No. 21X00681 (the “Extraction Warrant”), was issued on May 24, 2021, and sought

a forensic examination of the mobile device to be completed in order to obtain any and all stored elec- tronic information, including but not limited to; user account information, stored phone information, im- ages, text messages, videos, documents, e-mails, in- ternet activity, call logs, contact information, phone- book information, or any deleted data.

Officers collected the text messages between Kyles’s cell phone and Kennedy’s cell phone as well as two pictures (and related metadata) Kennedy took of Trinity around 3:38 p.m. the day of Trinity’s death which showed Trinity with bruising on her face lying face down on the bed. Kennedy never sent the pictures to Kyles. Kennedy’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the evi- dence that was gathered pursuant to the search warrants, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion on April 16, 2024. Kennedy argued that the search warrants lacked probable cause, were overly broad, and failed to sufficiently particularize the items to be seized. The trial court denied Kennedy’s motion.

In its order denying Kennedy’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that the Seizure Warrant – which allowed law enforcement to seize Kennedy’s cell phone – had “sufficient prob- able cause and particularity.” Moreover, the court found that, not- withstanding whether the Extraction Warrant – which allowed law enforcement to search Kennedy’s cell phone – was sufficiently particularized, any error in admitting the evidence obtained through the extraction was harmless. The trial court reasoned that the evidence was largely cumulative of evidence that law en- forcement obtained through other methods. The trial court also held that the inevitable discovery doctrine allowed admission of evidence pursuant to both warrants and that the independent source doctrine allowed admission of the text messages between Kennedy and Kyles. 5

(b) Kennedy argues that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants should have been suppressed because the warrants did not describe the evidence to be seized with particu- larity. Specifically, Kennedy argues that the Seizure Warrant vi- olated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it authorized the seizure of “electronic devices” and not specifically Kennedy’s cell phone. He contends that the Extraction Warrant was likewise unconstitutional because it authorized ex- traction of all data from Kennedy’s cell phone without limitation. 6 Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the challenged cell phone evidence seized pursuant to the war- rants, we conclude that any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

“An error of constitutional magnitude may be deemed harmless if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

5 The “inevitable discovery” doctrine provides for the admission of evi- dence if “there [is] a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, and the prosecution [demonstrates] that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 76 (2019).The “independent source” doc- trine “applies to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.” Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 191 (2024).

6 Although Kennedy summarily asserts that the warrants were overly broad, lacked probable cause (pursuant to both the Fourth Amendment and OCGA § 17-5-21), and did not describe the items to be seized with particularity, his argument with respect to the warrants focuses on the particularity require- ment required by the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Wilson, 315 Ga. 613, 614 (2023) (“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution re- quires that a search warrant particularly describe the article or articles sought.” (cleaned up)).

the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Williams v. State, 318 Ga. 83, 87 (2024) (cleaned up). Here, despite Kennedy’s denial of an intention to harm Trinity and the fact that much of the evi- dence against him was circumstantial, the State’s evidence of his guilt was very strong. Absent the evidence extracted from Ken- nedy’s phone, the jury heard evidence that Trinity died from vio- lent shaking while under Kennedy’s care and that she had exten- sive injuries throughout her body. Kennedy admitted to shaking her on the day of her death, and while he attempted to minimize the harm he caused, the evidence of her injuries told a different story. Moreover, Trinity suffered the injuries that led to her death when Kennedy was her only caregiver, and there was no evidence that she ever suffered any injuries indicative of abuse until after her mother started dating Kennedy.

In contrast, the evidence extracted pursuant to the war- rants was of minimal additional value to the State and was largely duplicative of other admissible evidence. See Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 537–38 (2020) (any error in admitting a pho- tograph of the defendant holding a gun was harmless given the strength of evidence against the defendant and because the pho- tograph was cumulative of other evidence). With respect to the text messages between Kennedy’s cell phone and Kyles’s cell phone on the date of Trinity’s death, the State obtained these same text messages from Kyles’s phone and admitted them as ev- idence at trial. With respect to the photographs of Trinity that were obtained from Kennedy’s phone (which appear to show the bruising that was present on the day of her death), this same bruising was depicted in the photographs the medical examiner took of Trinity that same day. Because this evidence was duplica- tive of other admissible evidence, any error from its admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Young, 309 Ga. at 537- 38.

Finally, the photographs obtained from Kennedy’s phone contained metadata indicating they were taken at 3:38 p.m. on the day of Trinity’s death, and the State used this information to place Trinity’s time of death between 1:52 p.m. and 3:38 p.m. However, Kennedy’s own testimony and the testimony of the State’s medical experts established that Kennedy was Trinity’s only caregiver while Kyles was at work, that Kennedy shook, pinched, and bruised Trinity during this time, and that this abuse would have swiftly resulted in Trinity’s death. In short, there was no real dispute in this case concerning the fact that Kennedy was Trinity’s sole caregiver during the time that she suffered her fatal injuries. Under these circumstances, the evidence supporting the precise time range during which Trinity’s death occurred was, at best, only of marginal value to the State’s case.

Based on the above, the State has carried its burden of showing that any error the trial court made in admitting the evi- dence seized pursuant to the warrants was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The value of the challenged evidence was mar- ginal as compared to the strength of the State’s evidence against Kennedy, and the challenged evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. We thus “see no reasonable possibil- ity that this evidence may have contributed to the verdict.” Wil- liams, 318 Ga. at 88. See id. at 87 (“Even assuming that [the de- fendant] preserved all of his arguments about the seizure and search of his cell phone, the strength of the State’s case against [the defendant] and the limited value of the evidence extracted from the cell phone render any error harmless.”); Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 799, 806 (2023) (concluding that an assumed constitu- tional error was harmless where the evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence). Kennedy’s contention there- fore fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.