Green v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0743

Antonio Green

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Clayton County

No. 2021CR021249

Decided: September 9, 2026

LAND, Justice.

Appellant Antonio Green challenges his 2024 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Mehul Vashi. 1 On appeal, Green argues that the trial court

1 Vashi was killed on January 3, 2021. On June 30, 2021, a Clayton County grand jury indicted Green for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2, 4, and 6), false imprisonment (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 5), and robbery by force (Count 7). Prior to trial, the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi on Counts 6 and 7.

During a trial from April 22 to April 25, 2024, the jury found Green guilty of all the other charges. The trial court sentenced Green to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1. Counts 2 and 4 were va- cated by operation of law, and Count 5 merged with Count 1 for sentencing purposes. Although the sentencing order incorrectly indicates that the false imprisonment verdict (Count 3) merged with the malice murder conviction (Count 1), we do not address this sentencing error as the State has not filed a cross-appeal. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017) (“when a merger error ben- efits a defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we henceforth will exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional circumstances”).

erred when it admitted hearsay evidence over his objection and declined to instruct the jury on grave suspicion. Green also argues that the trial court plainly erred when it failed to charge the jury that any out-of-court statement made by Green must be corrobo- rated, failed to charge the jury that it could consider certain fac- tors in determining whether Green’s custodial statement was freely and voluntarily made, and admitted State’s Exhibit 46 without proper foundation or authentication. Finally, Green ar- gues that the cumulative harm of these errors necessitates a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. Vashi worked as a night shift manager at a motel in Clayton County. In January of 2021, the motel was shut down for renovations and open only to motel staff and renovation construction crew.

On January 3, 2021, Elizabeth Herrin was working in the laundry room of the motel when an unknown man approached her and repeatedly asked her to come to his room to clean it. The man, who wore his hair in “br[aid]s or [dread]locks”, was “agitated” and “fidgety.” Herrin refused to go with the man but told him that she would let her manager know that his room needed to be cleaned. Herrin then went to the motel office, told Vashi that someone needed his room cleaned, and Vashi told Herrin that he would take care of it.

A housekeeper at the motel, Torianno Hardnett, testified

On April 30, 2024, Green filed a motion for new trial, which was amended on October 11, 2024. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on April 14, 2025, and the parties requested that the motion be decided on the briefs. The trial court entered a written order denying Green’s motion for new trial on June 30, 2025. On July 9, 2025, Green filed a notice of appeal. The case was docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

that later that morning, he was waiting for Vashi to come to the front office of the motel when an unknown man with “dreads” who was wearing black pants with red stripes approached him and asked him for a ride. Hardnett declined, and the man asked some construction workers at the motel for a ride; they declined and the man walked away. When the motel owner called Hardnett and instructed him to look for Vashi, Hardnett and the day shift man- ager went looking for Vashi. Hardnett and the day shift manager found Vashi’s body inside room 153of the motel. Vashi’s body was wrapped inside a blanket and partially blocked the door to the room; his shoes had been removed and placed in a trashcan. Hard- nett called 911, and a “be on the lookout” (“BOLO”) order was is- sued for a man “with dreads wearing … black pants with a red stripe.” As Morrow Police Officer Christopher Glover responded to the motel, he encountered a man, who matched the BOLO order’s description and was later identified as Green, approximately a minute’s drive away from the motel. Officer Glover stopped and handcuffed Green, placed him in the back of his patrol car, and continued driving to the motel. Video recordings from Officer Glover’s dashboard and body cameras captured the encounter be- tween Officer Glover and Green and were played for the jury at trial. In the recordings, Green told Officer Glover that he was coming from the motel. When Officer Glover arrived at the motel, Hardnett identified Green as the man who had asked him for a ride. When Officer Glover entered motel room 153, where Vashi’s body was found, he observed that Vashi’s body was wrapped in bed sheets, had a wire wrapped around his neck, and was “smeared” with blood. Officer Glover also found shards of glass throughout the back of the motel room and other evidence of a struggle in the room. Emergency responders to the scene con- firmed that Vashi was deceased.

Officer Glover testified that, while he was on the scene, he reviewed surveillance footage depicting an interaction between Vashi and Green outside room 153. 2 Officer Glover testified that, in the video, Green was wearing the same pants he was wearing when he was apprehended, as well as a sweatshirt that Officer Glover later found in the motel room with Vashi’s body. Morrow Police Lieutenant Xavier Todd used his cell phone camera to rec- ord a video of the motel’s surveillance footage. This video of the surveillance footage was later admitted without objection at trial as State’s Exhibit 46 and played for the jury. One video in State’s Exhibit 46 depicted Green standing outside of room 153 at ap- proximately 10:39 a.m., interacting with Vashi, and then shutting the door to the motel room, leaving Vashi outside. Vashi can be seen trying to open the door to the motel room; Green then opened the door and dragged Vashi inside. Approximately 30 minutes later, at 11:19 a.m., the surveillance footage showed Green leave room 153, use his foot to push an object inside the room and close the door shut, and walk away. Five minutes later, the surveil- lance footage showed Hardnett and another man knock on the door to room 153 and use a key card to unlock the door.

Green was arrested for Vashi’s murder, given Miranda 3 warnings, and agreed to speak with police without a lawyer. Dur-

2 Another responding officer, Captain William Skelton, testified that he also reviewed the surveillance footage while he was on the scene. Captain Skelton testified that the surveillance footage, which showed an interaction between Green and Vashi, was consistent with what Green admitted to in his custodial interview.

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

ing a custodial interview at the crime scene on the day of the mur- der, Green gave conflicting stories about Vashi’s death, including telling police that he had gotten into an altercation in room 153 after a person matching Vashi’s description confronted Green be- cause he was not supposed to be in the motel room. Green told police that the person picked up a corded phone and began to call someone, but that Green took the phone away. Green explained that he and the person began arguing and pushing each other, that the person fell to the floor and began bleeding from his head, and that he got “real scared”; he denied knowing anything about a cord wrapped around the man’s neck. At another point in the interview, Green told investigators that he used a gun in the al- tercation, although one was never found.

Investigators collected Vashi’s shoes from the trashcan in the motel room, as well as a sweatshirt found on the bed, and the shoes Green was wearing when he was detained. Both the sweat- shirt and Green’s shoes were submitted to the GBI for DNA test- ing, and blood found on both items was a match for Vashi’s DNA.

The medical examiner who performed Vashi’s autopsy tes- tified that Vashi suffered ligature injuries to his neck, bruising in the deep muscles of his tongue, and a fractured hyoid bone “con- sistent with a ligature strangulation.” The medical examiner also testified that Vashi suffered hemorrhage in his eyelids, which is usually seen with neck compression and consistent with strangu- lation, and that he also had bruising on his right shoulder, right forearm, and the backs of each hand. The medical examiner con- cluded that Vashi’s cause of death was ligature strangulation, and that blunt force trauma of the head was a contributing cause of death. 2. Green argues that the trial court erred in permitting Of- ficer Glover to testify at trial regarding the motel’s surveillance footage because such testimony was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

Officer Glover testified at trial that he watched surveil- lance footage of “an interaction between [Vashi] and … Mr. Green outside” room 153. When the State asked Glover: “Was the person you saw in that surveillance video the same person that you de- tained earlier?” Glover answered: “Yes, sir” and explained that it showed the same person he “placed under arrest.” The following then took place:

PROSECUTOR: Is there anything else physically about what you saw on the person in the surveil- lance video—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor I’m going to ob- ject to him continuing to ask him about a video that they won’t play. This video is not evidence, so he’s asking him … to comment basically about something that’s not in evidence and is largely hearsay. He’s asking him, tell me about something you saw some- place else in time, and [that] is hearsay. And, with- out the video it’s hearsay.

PROSECUTOR: Judge, we have the video, however I’m asking him about what he observed. I didn’t ask him what somebody told him what he saw [in] the video, this is something he observed himself. He can testify to what he observed, what he saw, what he heard, what he smelled, what he touched.

TRIAL COURT: He may not be able to testify to what he heard, it depends on what he heard, but— DEFENSE COUNSEL: He’s asking him to testify to … a document, because it is largely what a video is, it’s a document, that is not in evidence. He’s asking him [to] tell us what you saw without showing us what you saw.

PROSECUTOR: Judge, I haven’t finished my exam- ination.

TRIAL COURT: That’s enough. I overrule the objec- tion.

PROSECUTOR: Agent Glover, was there any physi- cal manifestations you observed on the individual and the surveillance video that made you believe it was the defendant?

OFFICER GLOVER: The clothing and the physical description of the person I took into custody.

“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound dis- cretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 335 (2017). Green’s only challenge to Glover’s testimony was that it was hear- say. But it is not hearsay when a witness describes what he per- sonally has seen, even if he saw it in a video. Hearsay is “a state- ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801(c). It might be hearsay if Glover had testified about what someone else said about the video, because that other person’s statement would be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Compare Anglin, 302 Ga. at 340 (where officer’s “testimony about the contents of the security video was not based on his personal knowledge, but based on what a different officer, who reviewed the video, told him,” such testi- mony was hearsay). But that is not what happened here. Glover’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge of the contents of the surveillance footage that he reviewed and did not recount the out of court statements of anyone, it was not hearsay, and this claim fails. 4

3. Green argues that the trial court erred by failing to give his requested jury instruction on “grave suspicion.” We disagree.

At trial, Green requested the following jury instruction: Facts and circumstances that merely place upon the defendant a grave suspicion of the crime charged or that merely raise a speculation or conjecture of the defendant’s guilt are not sufficient to authorize a conviction of the defendant.

The trial court declined to give the instruction, stating that the charge was:

not necessary and honestly [the court] do[es]n’t think it adds much to the case, [and] it may often confuse jurors. After [the court] speak[s] at length about reasonable doubt and then … start[s] using some other random, that’s not fair, it’s not random, it’s some other burden of proof that [the court] think[s] is confusing to them; so, [the court] do[es]n’t

4 Because Green argues only that Officer Glover’s testimony about the video was inadmissible hearsay, we do not consider whether Officer Glover’s

testimony could have been excluded on any other ground.

give grave suspicion.

Green objected to the trial court’s refusal to give the re- quested charge before and after the jury charges were given.

“In evaluating a claim that the trial court was required to give certain jury instructions, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed.” Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 802 (2024). Here, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt, presumption of inno- cence, no presumption of criminal intent, and identification. Those instructions fully informed the jury that it was not author- ized to find Green guilty if the evidence presented at trial raised only a grave suspicion or a speculation or conjecture of his guilt. See id. at 802. Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on grave suspicion. See Sauder, 318 Ga. at 802 (trial court did not err in declining to give the pattern jury in- struction on grave suspicion). 5

4. Green argues that the trial court plainly erred in its in- structions to the jury and in admitting certain evidence. These claims fail.

Green concedes that he did not preserve these claims for ordinary appellate review, so we review them only for plain error. See Simmons v. State, 314 Ga. 883, 888 (2022). To establish plain error, Green “must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, and that error must have been clear and not open to rea- sonable dispute, must have affected [his] substantial rights, and

5 Although we conclude that in this case, there was no error in the trial court’s decision not to charge the jury on “grave suspicion,” “we caution against a blanket policy of never giving such a charge, which is in tension with the duty to give jury charges that are tailored to the evidence of each case.” Adkins v. State, 314 Ga. 477, 483 (2022).

must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public rep- utation of judicial proceedings.” Middlebrooks v. State, 315 Ga. 671, 687 (2023) (cleaned up). “The Court need not analyze all of the elements of the plain error test when the appellant fails to establish one of them.” Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (2020). And “[s]atisfying this high standard is difficult, as it should be.” Mont- gomery v. State, 323 Ga. 119, 123 (2025) (citation omitted).

(a) Green first argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that any out-of-court statement made by Green must be corroborated. Specifically, Green argues that the trial court should have given the jury the pattern instruction on corroboration of a defendant’s confession, 6 as well as the in- struction that “[a]ll admissions shall be scanned with care, and

6 Citing to the 2024 pattern jury instructions to support his position, Green argues that the trial court should have given the following jury instruc- tion on corroboration of a defendant’s confession:

You should consider with great care and caution the evidence of any out-of-court statement allegedly made by the defendant offered by the state. The jury may believe any such statement in whole or in part, believing that which you find to be true and rejecting that which you find to be untrue. You alone have the duty to apply the general rules for testing the believability of witnesses and to decide what weight should be given to all or any part of such evidence. A defendant’s out-of-court statement that is not supported by any other evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction, even if you believe the unsupported state- ment. However, proof by other evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime alleged has been committed may consti- tute supporting evidence of a defendant’s statement, if any, should you so find. The law does not fix the amount of support- ing evidence necessary. You must determine whether or not other evidence sufficiently supports a defendant’s statement so confessions of guilt shall be received with great caution. A confes- sion alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.” 7 OCGA § 24-8-823.

In its final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that “the testimony of a single witness, if believed, is suffi- cient to establish a fact. [G]enerally there is no legal requirement of corroboration of a witness provided that you, the jury, find the evidence to be sufficient.”

Here, Green has not shown plain error because it is not clear and obvious under controlling law that the State admitted any confession made by Green. “[A] confession, for the purposes of the corroboration requirement of OCGA § 24-8-823, is an ad- mission of guilt in which the entire criminal act is confessed.” Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 760 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). On the other hand, “[a]n incriminating admission, un- like a confession, does not require corroboration un- der OCGA § 24-8-823.” Id. “A mere incriminating statement is made where the accused, though admitting to damaging circum- stances, nonetheless attempts to deny responsibility for the crime charged by putting forward exculpatory or legally justifying facts.” Thomas v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 30 (2020) (citation and punc- tuation omitted).

Here, the State never admitted any statement by Green

as to justify a conviction. If you find that there was a statement made by the defendant that was supported by other evidence, the degree of proof necessary to convict is that you be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 Green concedes that he did not request a confession-corroboration charge, so we review this Falleged instructional error for plain error only. See Montgomery, 323 Ga. at 123.

where he admitted his guilt or confessed to the entire criminal act underlying any of his charges. Green told police that he had got- ten into an argument in the motel room with a person matching Vashi’s description, that the person picked up a corded phone and began to call someone, but that Green took the phone away and they pushed each other, and that the person fell to the floor dur- ing the altercation and began bleeding from his head. These state- ments were certainly incriminating. But Green did not admit to killing Vashi, or to wrapping a cord around his neck. It is there- fore at least arguable that his statement was not a “confession” because he did not admit to the whole crime being charged. Be- cause the statement was not clearly a confession, it was not clear and obvious error not to give the corroboration instruction. See Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 34 (distinguishing confessions, where entire criminal act is admitted, from admissions, where less than all the “facts entering into the criminal act” are admit- ted (citation and punctuation omitted)).

(b) Green argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider the duration and condi- tions of detention as factors relevant to the question of whether his custodial statements to investigators were freely and volun- tarily made. This claim fails.

Green filed a pretrial Jackson-Denno 8 motion to suppress his custodial statements in which he argued that his statements were involuntary. After a hearing, the trial court deemed the statements admissible, finding, among other things, that Green was advised of and understood his Miranda rights, and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights when he gave his statements.

8 Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (1964).

During trial, trial counsel requested pattern jury instruc- tion 1.32.18, which states that the jury “may consider the dura- tion and conditions of detention as factors relevant to the question of whether or not a statement was freely and voluntarily made.” After Green requested the charge, the trial court stated it “guess[es] there’s some evidence about the time, because there’s evidence about, in the video, perhaps about whe[n] they took him into custody versus when he was questioned by [police], if the jury caught all of that I don’t know. But, I will leave it to you to argue that as opposed to my adding that as a factor.” Trial counsel ob- jected to the trial court not giving the requested charge. In its final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury as fol- lows regarding the voluntariness of Green’s statement to law en- forcement:

Ladies and gentlemen, a statement that the defend- ant allegedly made while in custody has been offered for your consideration. Before you may consider this as evidence for any purpose you must determine whether the defendant’s statement was voluntary, and if the statement was given in custody whether the defendant was properly advised of his constitu- tional rights. To be voluntary a statement must be freely and willingly given and without coercion, du- ress, threats, use of violence, fear of injury or any suggestions or promises of leniency or reward. A Statement induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury is not voluntary. To be voluntary a Statement must be a product of the free will and not under compulsion or any necessity im- posed by others.

In determining voluntariness you may also consider to what extent the defendant was informed of his rights – as I will discuss shortly if applicable. The burden of proof is upon the State to establish that the statement was voluntary, that is freely and will- ingly made. If you did not find that the statement was voluntary you may not consider it for any pur- pose.

Trial counsel did not renew the objection after the final charge was given to the jury.

Again, Green cannot show clear and obvious error. “[I]t is not enough in the plain-error context for an appellant to demon- strate that a trial court committed actual legal error in charging the jury; rather, the jury instruction in question must have an obvious defect rather than a merely arguable defect.” Montgom- ery, 323 Ga. at 123 (citation omitted). In other words, “to show clear and obvious error, an appellant must cite to controlling au- thority or to the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establish that the trial court erred.” Id. “To evaluate whether a trial court plainly erred in giving the jury instructions, we read and consider the instructions as a whole.” Id. at 124 (ci- tation and punctuation omitted).

Here, when viewed as a whole, the jury instructions were sufficient to instruct the jury on the principles of voluntariness that were relevant to this case, including that the burden of proof was on the State to show that Green’s custodial statement was made voluntarily and that the jury should disregard Green’s statement if it found he did not make it voluntarily. Other than pointing to the statement made by the trial court, Green has not cited any evidence in the record that his detention was prolonged or that it affected his decision to talk to police. Thus, even if there was slight evidence that could have supported giving Green’s re- quested charge, the trial court did not plainly err when it did not give a separate charge on the duration and conditions of detention as factors relevant to that question, and this claim fails. See Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 804 (2024) (concluding that, “when evaluated in the context of the jury charge as a whole, the trial court’s failure to expressly instruct” using the language the appellant suggests “was not a clear and obvious error beyond rea- sonable dispute”).

(c) Green argues that the trial court plainly erred in admit- ting State’s Exhibit 46 without proper foundation or authentica- tion. 9 At trial, Lieutenant Todd testified that, after he arrived at the scene, he spoke with a manager about obtaining surveillance footage of the incident and that the manager gave him a copy of the surveillance footage, which he then reviewed. Lieutenant Todd testified that he “personally record[ed]” the surveillance footage with his camera. State’s Exhibit 46 contained multiple la- beled video files of these recordings, and Lieutenant Todd testi- fied as to the timestamp of several, but not all, of the files. When the State attempted to admit the video, Green’s trial counsel re- quested to voir dire Lieutenant Todd and asked him several ques- tions about his receipt of the video and its contents. After voir dire was complete, the trial court asked trial counsel whether he had “any objection to the admission” of the video, to which trial coun- sel responded, “[n]o.”

Because Green did not object to the admission of the video,

9 State’s Exhibit 46 is a CD “contain[ing] a series of captured videos” of a computer screen playing a recording of the surveillance footage from the motel.

we review his claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). See also Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (2019) (plain error review under OCGA § 24-1-103(d) is available for unpreserved chal- lenges to evidentiary rulings). Here Green’s claim fails because Green has not shown that any alleged error in the admission of Exhibit 46 likely affected the outcome of his trial. Any harmful effect that the video or Lieutenant Todd’s accompanying testi- mony may have had was diminished because its pertinent con- tents—placing Green in room 153 when Vashi was killed—were cumulative of testimony from other witnesses about what they saw on the motel’s surveillance footage, as well as Green’s own admission that he argued with Vashi in room 153. Given that there was no dispute about Green having an altercation with Vashi in room 153, we fail to see how the admission of this evi- dence from Lieutenant Todd affected the outcome of the trial. See Jackson v. State, 929 SE2d 785, 800 (2026) (appellant failed to show that admission of gang-related document and gang expert’s accompanying testimony affected his substantial rights, as re- quired for plain error, because the “pertinent contents” of the al- legedly inadmissible evidence was cumulative of other testi- mony); Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 245 (2022) (“Appellant has not met his burden under the plain error standard to show a reason- able probability that the outcome would have been different, as the improperly admitted [evidence] was merely duplicative of other properly admitted evidence.”).

5. Finally, citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (2020), Green argues that the cumulative harm of the trial court’s alleged errors necessitates a new trial. But because we only assumed one in- stance of trial court error (the admission of State’s Exhibit 46), there is no cumulative harm to consider. See Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 607–08 (2023) (to establish cumulative error necessitat- ing a new trial, “an appellant must show that (1) at least two er- rors were committed in the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so in- fected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the appellant a fun- damentally fair trial.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.