Culpepper v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0744

Marquel R. Culpepper

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Dougherty County

No. 2015R753

Decided: October 14, 2026

COLVIN, Justice.

Appellant Marquel Rashad Culpepper appeals his convic- tion for malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Kendrick Miller. 1 On appeal, Culpepper argues that the trial ev- idence was not constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction and that a new trial should be granted on the “general grounds.”

1 The shooting occurred on April 16, 2015. On October 7, 2015, a Dougherty County grand jury indicted Culpepper for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). A jury trial was held from January 14 through 17, 2019, and the jury found Culpepper guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Culpepper to life in prison with the pos- sibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1) and merged the aggravated as- sault charge (Count 3) with the malice murder count for sentencing purposes. Although the court purported to merge the felony murder charge (Count 2), that count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371–72 (1993). Culpepper timely filed a motion for new trial on March 15, 2019, and amended the motion through new counsel on December 16, 2021. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Culpepper’s motion for new trial on December 10, 2025. On January 2, 2026, Culpepper filed a notice of appeal directed to this Court. The case was docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

Culpepper also argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from presenting an alibi defense. Finally, Culpepper raises three ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Culpepper’s conviction.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. Miller was shot and killed at an extended-stay motel on the night of April 16, 2015. That month, both Culpepper and Miller had stayed at the motel, with Culpepper checking in around April 7, Miller check- ing in on April 12, and Culpepper checking out on April 14 (two days before the shooting).

During Culpepper’s motel stay, something was stolen from him, and he blamed Miller for the theft. 2 According to the motel manager, around the time of his checkout, Culpepper reported a theft, but motel staff took no action. And on the night of the shoot- ing, Culpepper referred to the theft again when speaking to a long-time motel resident, Jessica Alred. Alred testified that, about an hour before the shooting, she had a conversation with Culpepper in her motel room. 3 According to Alred, Culpepper told her that Miller had taken “his stuff,” that Miller “kept on telling people that Mr. Culpepper didn’t do anything about [Miller] tak- ing his stuff,” and that when Culpepper saw Miller again, she “would hear about it on the news.” Then Culpepper left Alred’s room. Shortly before the shooting, Miller went to the motel’s lobby to pay for his room. The record shows that the lobby’s glass doors were locked at night but that patrons could communicate with staff through a lobby window that was adjacent to the lobby

2 The record is silent on what was stolen from Culpepper. 3 The record is silent on what brought Culpepper to Alred’s motel room on the night of the shooting.

doors. According to Clarissa Hylick, a night-shift clerk at the mo- tel, just before the shooting, Miller came to the lobby window and made a payment. Hylick testified that she then saw “a shadow come past the window” of the lobby’s doors. When Hylick looked up to see what it was, she saw a man she knew as “Chad” — whom she later identified in court as Culpepper — approaching Miller with a gun in hand. Hylick said that Miller started backing away while saying, “Don’t shoot me.” And she then saw Culpepper fire the gun, at which point she ran away to hide in the bathroom, where she called 911.

Hylick testified that she remembered Culpepper because, when she first met him, “his behavior” made her feel “a little un- comfortable,” and, on a separate occasion, she had retrieved toilet paper for him at his request, and he “kind of grabbed [her] hand like he was trying to pull [her] through the [lobby] door.” Alt- hough Hylick admitted that she had told the 911 operator that she did not get a good look at the shooter, she explained that she had only said that because she “fear[ed]” Culpepper might “come after [her].” She further testified that she could clearly see Cul- pepper during the shooting, that she was “100 percent sure” Cul- pepper was the shooter, and that, based on her description of the shooter after the shooting, the motel manager “automatically knew who [she] was referring to” and was able to pull up a copy of Culpepper’s driver’s license, which was on file with the motel.

Responding officers found Miller lying dead outside the mo- tel’s lobby doors. And the medical examiner testified that Miller had been shot in the back and died from the gunshot wound.

2. On appeal, Culpepper argues that, because the trial evi- dence failed to show that he was the shooter, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his malice murder convic- tion. He also contends that he should be granted a new trial on the “general grounds.” We disagree.

“Evidence is sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process if a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 849 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the suffi- ciency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most fa- vorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 849–50 (cleaned up). Here, contrary to Culpepper’s argument, the trial evidence was constitutionally sufficient to identify him as the person who shot Miller. Alred testified that, about an hour before the shoot- ing, Culpepper made statements in her motel room indicating that he intended to harm Miller in a way that would be newswor- thy because Miller was disrespecting him. And Hylick testified both that she saw Culpepper shoot Miller outside the motel lobby and that she knew who Culpepper was because she had encoun- tered him on two prior occasions. Taken together, this evidence authorized a jury to find that Culpepper planned to shoot Miller, that he was in the general location of the crime shortly before the shooting, and that he carried out his plan by shooting Miller out- side the motel. Although Culpepper challenges the credibility of the witness testimony, credibility determinations are “within the exclusive province of the jury.” Hinton v. State, 312 Ga. 258, 261 (2021) (quotation marks omitted) (holding that it was for the jury to decide whether to credit a witness’s identification of the defend- ant as the gunman). See also Lewis v. State, 322 Ga. 683, 686–87 (2025) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the de- fendant’s malice murder conviction because “[t]he jury was au- thorized to credit [a witness’s] identifications of [the defendant] as the shooter and to reject [the witness’s] claims that she did not see who the shooter was”).

Further, to the extent that Culpepper argues that this Court should grant him a new trial on the “general grounds,” un- der OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5- 5-21, his cla im fails. 4 As we have ex- plained, a “general grounds” claim “presents nothing for us to re- view” because OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 “vest[ ] the decision to grant or refuse to grant a new trial solely in the trial court,” and Culpepper “has not asserted that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion.” Bryant v. State, 324 Ga. 273, 280–81 (2026) (cleaned up).

3. Culpepper next argues that the trial court abused its dis- cretion by precluding him from presenting alibi evidence. As ex- plained below, however, this argument rests on an incorrect premise — that the trial court excluded alibi evidence — and it therefore fails.

By way of background, six days before trial, Culpepper filed a notice of alibi defense, which identified Culpepper as the only alibi witness and stated that “Culpepper was in or near the State of New York” when the shooting incident occurred. The next day, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Culpepper from pre- senting an alibi defense under OCGA § 17-16-6, arguing that the alibi notice was untimely and that the notice, which referenced only a general region of the country, failed to provide the specific

4 OCGA § 5-5-20 provides that, “[i]n any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury.” And OCGA § 5-5-21 pro- vides that “[t]he presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.”

information required by OCGA § 17-16-5(a). 5 At a pretrial hear- ing, the trial court initially indicated that it would grant the mo- tion in limine. Defense counsel then asked for clarification about the scope of the court’s ruling, whether it prohibited the State from introducing evidence that Culpepper was in New York after the crime, and whether Culpepper could explain the circum- stances of his presence in New York. The State argued that it should be allowed to show that Culpepper went to New York City after committing the crime, but that because he filed an untimely and noncompliant alibi notice, “He cannot say, ‘At the time of the shooting, I was already in New York.’” The court expressed disa- greement, stating that “[h]e can say that,” that “he can say what- ever he wants to sa[y] pretty much,” and that he would “be subject to cross-examination.” But the court ultimately stated that it would reserve ruling on the matter, that it would like to see some specific case law on the issue, and that “we’ll go from there.” The issue of whether Culpepper could testify about being in New York at the time of the shooting, however, was never raised again or ruled on.

Here, Culpepper’s claim of trial court error fails. The prem- ise of Culpepper’s argument is that the trial court excluded alibi- defense evidence. But that premise is belied by the record. As de- scribed above, during the pretrial hearing on the State’s motion

5 OCGA § 17-16-5(a) provides in relevant part that, “ten days prior to trial,” a defendant must serve “upon the prosecuting attorney a written notice of the defendant’s intention to offer a defense of alibi,” and that the notice must “state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names … of the [alibi] witnesses.” OCGA § 17-16-6 provides remedies for a violation of OCGA § 17-16-5(a), which include, “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit[ing] the defendant from introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting the witness not dis- closed.”

in limine to exclude alibi-defense evidence, the trial court initially indicated that it would exclude such evidence. But the court then indicated that it would not exclude the only alibi-defense evidence that Culpepper’s notice of alibi indicated he wanted to admit (namely, Culpepper’s testimony that he was in New York). The court concluded its discussion of the State’s motion in limine by reserving any ruling on the matter until trial, but the matter was not raised again at trial. Thus, the record shows that the trial court did not rule that alibi-defense evidence was inadmissible. Just as “[w]e cannot review the admission of evidence for error if it was never admitted,” we cannot review the exclusion of evi- dence for error if it was never excluded. See Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 674–77 (2022). And to the extent that Culpepper claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the admissibility of alibi-defense evidence pretrial, that claim fails because a “trial court has an absolute right to refuse to decide” a motion in limine challenging “the admissibility of evidence … prior to trial.” Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439, 443 (2021) (quo- tation marks omitted).

4. On appeal, Culpepper asserts three ineffective-assis- tance-of-counsel claims. As explained below, these claims fail.

“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must prove both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice.” Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy the deficiency prong, a de- fendant must demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circum- stances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The law recognizes a strong pre- sumption that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To carry this burden, a defendant must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did[ ] or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (quota- tion marks omitted). And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Id. (quotation marks omit- ted). “To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the re- sult of the trial would have been different.” Washington v. State, 320 Ga. 839, 851 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “If the defend- ant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, this Court need not examine the other requirement.” Id.

(a) First, Culpepper claims that his trial counsel was con- stitutionally ineffective for failing to serve an alibi-defense notice that satisfied OCGA § 17-16-5’s requirements. According to Cul- pepper, the trial court excluded alibi-defense evidence based on trial counsel’s failure to properly serve an alibi-defense notice in accordance with the statute. And Culpepper contends that the re- sult of the trial would have been different if he had been able to present evidence that he was in New York at the time of the shoot- ing. Assuming without deciding that trial counsel was deficient for failing to properly file a notice of alibi defense, Culpepper has not shown prejudice. Because, as noted above, the trial court did not exclude alibi-defense evidence based on trial counsel’s failure to properly file a notice of alibi defense, Culpepper has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to properly file the notice had any im- pact on whether such evidence would have been admitted. See Dobbins v. State, 309 Ga. 163, 170 (2020) (holding that the de- fendant had not shown prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to provide adequate notice of a prior conviction because the defend- ant had not shown that adequate notice would have changed the trial court’s decision about whether to admit the evidence); Pro- thro v. State, 302 Ga. 769, 771–72 (2018) (rejecting an argument that trial counsel’s failure to timely file a motion for the assis- tance of a forensic psychologist caused prejudice because the de- fendant had “presented no evidence that the trial court would have ruled differently if the motion had been filed earlier”).

(b) Second, Culpepper argues that trial counsel was consti- tutionally ineffective for failing to object to Hylick’s testimony about the two instances in which she had interacted with Culpep- per before the shooting.

By way of background, defense counsel presented Culpep- per’s theory of the defense in opening statements, arguing that “[t]he evidence w[ould] show that Ms. [Hylick] mis-identified Mr. Culpepper, either intentionally or accidentally.” As noted above, Hylick then testified that she knew who Culpepper was because she had two encounters with him prior to the shooting. Specifi- cally, she testified that, during the first encounter, Culpepper’s “behavior” made her feel “a little uncomfortable,” and, during the second encounter, Culpepper “kind of grabbed [her] hand like he was trying to pull [her] through the [lobby] door.”

Culpepper argues that trial counsel should have objected to this testimony because it was improper character evidence, un- der OCGA § 24-4-404(b), 6 and because it was irrelevant, under

6 OCGA § 24-4-404(b) provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but that “[i]t may … be admissible for other purposes.”

OCGA § 24-4-402. 7 Both claims fail.

Contrary to Culpepper’s argument, Hylick’s testimony about her prior interactions with Culpepper was not inadmissible character evidence. It was not offered to prove, and did not sug- gest, that Culpepper had a propensity to commit acts of deadly force, like the shooting of Miller. Instead, Hylick’s testimony served to rebut Culpepper’s theory of the defense, namely, that Hylick misidentified Culpepper as the shooter. Specifically, Hylick’s testimony showed that she knew Culpepper before the shooting and therefore had a basis for identifying him as the shooter, despite only briefly seeing the perpetrator. See Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 846 (2019) (holding that OCGA § 24-4- 404(b) did not render witnesses’ statements about the defendant committing other murders inadmissible because the statements were not admitted “for any of the purposes listed in OCGA § 24- 4-404(b)” but instead “to rebut [the defendant’s] defense theory seeking to cast doubt on those witnesses’ identification of the shooter”).

Culpepper has also failed to show that Hylick’s testimony that Culpepper made her feel uncomfortable should have been ex- cluded as irrelevant under OCGA § 24-4-402. Hylick’s testimony was relevant under OCGA § 24-4-401 8 because it explained why Hylick remembered what Culpepper looked like, and that expla- nation provided a basis for the jury to assess whether she had correctly identified Culpepper as the shooter. Hylick’s testimony

7 OCGA § 24-4-402 provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.”

8 OCGA § 24-4-401 provides that “the term ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con- sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

that Culpepper made her feel uncomfortable was also inde- pendently admissible under OCGA § 24-6-622, which provides that “[t]he state of a witness’s feelings towards the parties and the witness’s relationship to the parties may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.” Cf. McNabb v. State, 313 Ga. 701, 715 (2022) (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to evidence showing “the nature of the relationships be- tween the witnesses” because such evidence was both relevant to “the jury’s assessment of the witness’s credibility” under OCGA § 24-4-401 and admissible under OCGA § 24-6-622).

Because Culpepper has not shown that an objection to Hylick’s testimony would have succeeded, he has not shown defi- cient performance. See Dickerson v. State, 323 Ga. 389, 401 (2026) (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to testimony about the defendant’s “other acts of physical violence” because it was “not introduced for improper propensity purposes as contemplated by Rule 404(b)” and was relevant for another purpose, namely “to show the witnesses’ feelings towards and re- lationships with [the defendant]”).

(c) Finally, Culpepper argues that trial counsel was consti- tutionally ineffective for failing to object to testimony from Inves- tigator Terrance Bryant about guests at the motel where the shooting occurred. By way of background, at trial, the prosecution asked Bryant questions about his investigation of the crime, in- cluding whether he knew the location of people whom officers had talked to while canvassing the area. In response, Bryant testified that “a lot of undesirables … frequented this [m]otel,” that some of the motel patrons “commit crimes,” including “drug traf- fic[king]” and “prostitution,” and that some of the motel patrons were considered “transient.” Bryant clarified, however, that “some good, law-abiding citizens [who] have fallen into bad situa- tions” were also patrons at the motel.

Culpepper argues that, because the record established that he had been a guest at the motel, Bryant’s testimony about motel guests being criminals was evidence of his character that was in- admissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(a) 9 and irrelevant under OCGA § 24-4-402. We conclude, however, that Culpepper has not shown deficient performance.

First, Culpepper has not shown that trial counsel was de- ficient for failing to object on character-evidence grounds because he has not shown that such an objection would have been sus- tained. As noted above, Bryant testified generally about the types of people who stayed at the motel and clarified that, while some of the patrons engaged in criminal conduct, others were “good, law-abiding citizens.” This generic testimony about motel pa- trons, which was not specifically about Culpepper, did not classify Culpepper as one of the motel patrons who engaged in criminal conduct. And as a result, contrary to Culpepper’s claim, Bryant’s testimony was not evidence of Culpepper’s “character or a trait of character,” much less evidence admitted “for the purpose of prov- ing” that Culpepper acted “in conformity [with a character trait] on a particular occasion.” OCGA § 24-4-404(a). Because an objec- tion under OCGA § 24-4-404(a) would have been meritless, Cul- pepper has not shown deficient performance on that ground. See Bennett v. State, 324 Ga. 252, 269 (2026) (rejecting an argument that trial counsel was deficient for failing to raise a character- evidence objection to officer testimony about gang members using slang terms also used by the defendant because it was clear in

9 OCGA § 24-4-404(a) provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”

context that not all people who used such terms were gang mem- bers). Second, as to Culpepper’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Bryant’s testimony on relevance grounds, Culpepper has not shown deficient performance because a reasonable attorney could have concluded that such an objection would have been unhelpful. See Momon v. State, 322 Ga. 848, 851 (2025) (“A competent attorney need not make every objection that would be sustained[.]”). Culpepper has not shown that Bryant’s testimony about the motel patrons was harmful to the defense because, as noted above, the testimony did not cast Culpepper’s character in a negative light. As a result, even if the testimony was inadmissible as irrelevant, reasonable counsel might have concluded that objecting was unnecessary because excluding the evidence would not help Culpepper’s defense. See Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 783 (2022) (no deficient performance for fail- ing to object to evidence where the evidence did not undercut the defense strategy); Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 769 (2020) (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to inadmis- sible evidence in part because the evidence was not going to have an impact on the jurors’ assessment of the evidence). Because Cul- pepper has not shown that the failure to object on relevance grounds was “patently unreasonable,” he has not carried his bur- den to show deficient performance. Momon, 322 Ga. at 851 (quo- tation marks omitted).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.