Bentley v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0805

Kevin Ponda Bentley

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County

No. CR170653

Decided: August 13, 2026

PINSON, Justice.

Kevin Bentley was convicted of malice murder for stran- gling and killing Altonise Jones. 1 On appeal, Bentley claims that

1 The crimes occurred in the early morning hours on March 21, 2016. Roughly one year later, Bentley was indicted by a Chatham County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). In August 2019, a jury found Bentley guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Bentley to life without parole on Count 1. Count 2 was vacated by operation of law and Count 3 merged with Count 1.

In September 2019, Bentley filed a motion for new trial and, among other things, a “Notice of Appeal Regarding 8/23/2019 Omnibus Order Ruling,” a “Notice of Appeal Regarding 8/30/2019 Final Disposition,” and a “Motion for Designation of Indigency to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauper[is].” Shortly after, Bentley filed an amended motion for new trial, amended notices of ap- peal, and another request to proceed in forma pauperis. A hearing was held in February 2020, but was continued at Bentley’s request. Then, in June 2023, Bentley filed another amended motion for new trial and a hearing was held in September 2024. In December 2024, Bentley filed a request for appointed coun- sel. The trial court denied Bentley’s motion for new trial in January 2025 but

the trial court erred by making a specific statement during his Faretta hearing and that Bentley’s trial counsel was constitution- ally ineffective for failing to object to that statement. But Bentley failed to preserve the first claim of error and his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the statement, so Bentley’s convictions are affirmed.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. Jones was found deceased after Savannah Police responded to a call report- ing her as a missing person. In response to the call, Officer War- ren Weir visited Jones’s residence and spoke with three women, including Jones’s grandmother, about where Jones might be or who she might be with. Shortly after leaving the house to start a missing-person report, Officer Weir was called back to the home, where Jones’s half-brother had discovered her in her upstairs bedroom, lying face down and wrapped in a blanket. The medical examiner classified Jones’s death as a homicide and concluded that her death was caused by strangulation.

According to the homicide detective, Eric Blaser, Bentley’s name came up “[a]lmost immediately” in his investigation. Detec- tive Blaser testified that everyone he spoke to, including Jones’s father, mentioned that Bentley had been living in the same house

didn’t address the request for counsel. Bentley appealed and counsel was ap- pointed in February 2025. This Court vacated and remanded the trial court’s denial of Bentley’s motion for new trial because the trial court hadn’t appointed post-conviction counsel or determined whether Bentley wanted post-conviction counsel and advised him of the dangers of self-representation, nor did the trial court rule on Bentley’s motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel. Bentley v. State, S25A0688 (Mar. 4, 2025).

In October 2025, a motion for new trial on remand was filed by counsel. Following a hearing, the motion was denied and Bentley timely appealed to this Court where his case was docketed to the April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

as Jones and had a key to the house, but had since left town. Bent- ley claimed that his wife had come to Savannah to celebrate their anniversary and they stayed at Bentley’s aunt’s house (also in Sa- vannah) for several days. But cell phone location data showed that in the early morning hours on the day Jones was found, Bent- ley’s phone moved from the area near his aunt’s house to the area near Jones’s house. This location data also showed that his phone stayed in that area for about two hours before Bentley placed a call to his wife. Bentley’s wife testified that he asked her to pick him up from a gas station, which was in the vicinity of Jones’s home. A few weeks after Jones’s death, Savannah police obtained a search warrant to collect a DNA sample from Bentley and to take photos of his body to see if there were any injuries that indi- cated he was involved in a struggle. Bentley’s DNA matched the DNA found under Jones’s fingernails on both hands and the DNA found on a cigarette pulled from a trash bag in Jones’s bedroom.

2. Bentley claims that the trial court erred by stating dur- ing his Faretta 2 hearing — a hearing in which a court warns a criminal defendant of the risks of self-representation and consid- ers whether to allow it — that if the court determined that Bent- ley was allowed to represent himself, it would not later “reverse” its decision. But this claim is not preserved for our review. Nei- ther Bentley nor his counsel (who was present at the hearing) ob- jected to any of the trial court’s statements that Bentley now claims were error. Notwithstanding Bentley’s argument that any request for counsel would have been futile given the trial court’s statement that it would not grant any such request, the trial court did not prohibit Bentley from making any post-waiver request for

2 Faretta v. California, 422 US 806, 835 (1975).

counsel. Because Bentley represented himself at trial, declined the offer for standby counsel, and never requested new counsel or otherwise objected to the trial court’s statement at the Faretta hearing, he has failed to preserve this claim of error for appeal. See Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204–07 (2009). 3

3. Bentley claims that his trial counsel rendered constitu- tionally ineffective assistance because counsel failed to object to the trial court’s statements that it would not “reverse” its decision if it allowed Bentley to represent himself.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a de- fendant generally must show that his attorney’s performance was professionally deficient and that this deficient performance caused him to suffer prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). Trial counsel is deficient if he performs “in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). And to estab- lish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a “reasona- ble probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).

Even if an objection to the trial court’s statements may have had merit, see Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204–05, Bentley has

3 Although we do not decide Bentley’s claim of error, as we have noted before, “the better practice would have been for the trial court simply to caution [the defendant] that, due to his assertion of the right to represent himself on the day of trial and the potential disruption of trial proceedings, the court would likely deny any mid-trial request for counsel,” which would “le[ave] the door open” for the court to “exercise its discretion if and when such a request was made.” Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204–05.

not established that his counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s statements was objectively unreasonable. At the hearing on Bentley’s motion for a new trial, trial counsel testified that he “didn’t see the need to object” to the trial court’s statements be- cause the court was telling Bentley how it would exercise its dis- cretion in the future to appoint post-waiver counsel and he “do[esn’t] usually object” because “that’s the [c]ourt’s preroga- tive.” Also, trial counsel testified that he chose not to object be- cause he understood the trial court’s statement as “a strong warn- ing” for defendant to “proceed at [his] own peril,” and he agreed with the State that the statement was “likely [to] benefit the de- fendant” by giving him “pause” to think about whether he wanted to proceed with counsel. This line of thinking was reasonable. A Faretta hearing is meant to impress on a defendant the benefits of counsel and the dangers of self-representation so that a defend- ant’s decision to proceed pro se is made “with eyes open.” Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 368 (2016) (quotation marks omitted); State v. Evans, 285 Ga, 67, 69 (2009). And a defendant who is warned that waiving his right to counsel would “have the consequence not just of requiring him to proceed without the benefit of a trained lawyer but to do so irrevocably—would make the defendant less likely to elect that even more difficult course.” Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 205 n.2. Because it is “undeniable” that most criminal defend- ants fare better with “counsel’s guidance than by their own un- skilled efforts,” Faretta, 422 US at 834, we cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to object to statements that would tend to en- courage a defendant to have counsel was a “patently unreasona- ble” strategic decision. Thompson v. State, 318 Ga. 760, 768 (2024). See also Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 783 (2022) (“[T]he matter of when and how to raise objections is generally a matter of trial strategy.” (cleaned up)). Thus, Bentley has not established that his counsel was deficient, and so his claim of ineffective as- sistance of counsel fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.