Alcaraz v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0874

Efren Alcaraz

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County

No. 18SC162839

Decided: October 14, 2026

PINSON, Justice.

The evidence at Efren Alcaraz’s jury trial showed that he stabbed his wife, Rosaura Bautista, multiple times with a kitchen knife. Two of their teenaged children heard Bautista scream and tried to intervene, and Alcaraz stabbed them, too. Bautista died from her stab wounds, and the two children were taken to the hospital and received surgery and stitches, respectively, for their stab wounds. After trial, Alcaraz was convicted of malice murder, two counts of aggravated battery, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. 1

1 Bautista died on July 28, 2018. On October 26, 2018, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging Alcaraz with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault of Bautista and each child (Counts 3 to 5), aggravated battery of each child (Counts 6 and 7), and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 8). After a jury trial from April 11 to 15, 2022, the jury found him guilty of all counts, and the court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder (Count 1) plus 20 years in prison for each of the aggravated batteries (Counts 6 and 7) and 5

On appeal, Alcaraz claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his objection and denied his motion for a mistrial after a witness testified that Alcaraz had committed violence against “too many different ladies.” He also claims that his conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony must be vacated because the indictment alleged that he possessed a knife during the commission of multiple crimes, but the verdict form did not require the jury to select a specific pred- icate offense, so it was not clear that the jury reached a unani- mous verdict on that count. For the reasons that follow, these claims fail, and Alcaraz’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

1. Mistrial Ruling

(a) Before trial, the State noticed its intent to introduce ev- idence of prior difficulties between Alcaraz and Bautista. The par- ties agreed that Alcaraz’s 35-year-old son from a previous rela- tionship, Miguel Alcaraz, would be allowed to testify about two 2011 incidents where he witnessed a physical altercation between Alcaraz and Bautista.

At trial, Miguel testified about an incident where Alcaraz put Bautista in a headlock and Miguel and his siblings had to

years in prison for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 8). The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and each of the aggravated assault counts merged with other counts. Alcaraz filed a timely motion for new trial through his trial counsel on May 2, 2022. Alcaraz changed counsel twice, in November 2024 and January 2025, and he filed his first amended motion for new trial on June 6, 2025, and his second amended motion for new trial on September 2, 2025. After a hearing on September 3, 2025, the trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended on September 29, 2025. Alcaraz timely filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 2025. His appeal was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

separate them. He then testified about another incident between Alcaraz and Bautista a week later where “the police showed up.” Miguel said that he lived with Alcaraz and Bautista at the time, and they came home from a party and “were fighting.” Ten or 15 minutes later, Bautista “storm[ed] out screaming” that she was “tired of getting attacked by him.” Miguel said he had “no idea what happened that night” and went upstairs to talk to Alcaraz. Miguel wanted to “try to make [Alcaraz] stop and understand what he was doing and what he had done too many other times.” Alcaraz and Miguel got into a fight. Miguel testified that he tried to talk to Alcaraz to “get him to understand [he] can’t keep doing this” and that he was “doing it to too many different ladies.” Al- caraz objected and asked to approach the bench.

During the bench conference, Alcaraz noted that his agree- ment with the State was that Miguel would testify about prior difficulties between the parties in 2011 but that instead Miguel had just testified that Alcaraz had “done it too many times to mul- tiple women or other women and that nature.” The State re- sponded that it had directed Miguel to testify about only the two incidents between Alcaraz and Bautista. The trial court sug- gested a curative instruction, and defense counsel helped craft one that both parties agreed to.

Outside the presence of the jury, Miguel was told “not to mention any other incidents other than the two incidents in 2011” and to “not mention anything about any other women or ladies or any other incidents dealing with this defendant and any other person.” Miguel confirmed that he understood.

Before the jury returned, the trial court read the curative instruction to counsel for both parties and asked whether it was the instruction they had agreed to. The State said yes, and Al- caraz said yes and “move[d] for a mistrial due to the agreement that was made between the State and the defense as far as this witness mentioning other women being prejudicial enough that it’s like a skunk in the room.” The trial court reserved ruling on the motion to first give the curative instruction to the jury and then take a recess to give counsel an opportunity to conduct addi- tional research before hearing argument on the motion.

When the jury returned, the trial court gave the agreed- upon curative instruction: “Ladies and Gentlemen, you are only to consider this witness’s testimony regarding two prior incidents of difficulties between the decedent Rosaura Bautista and the de- fendant. You are not to consider anything else.”

The jury was then sent back out, and after a recess the trial court considered the mistrial motion. Alcaraz explained that the motion was based on the witness exceeding the scope of the prior agreement about his testimony and the testimony given being im- proper character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b). The State responded that the challenged testimony was unprompted by the question but agreed that the testimony about “other ladies” should not have come in. The trial court denied the motion.

Before the jury returned, Miguel returned to the witness stand and the State again reminded him that he was to testify about only the 2011 incidents he witnessed between Alcaraz and Bautista and “[n]obody else outside of that.”

In front of the jury, Miguel continued his testimony as fol- lows. A week after the first incident he had testified about, Bau- tista came to Miguel for help with Alcaraz again. Miguel con- fronted Alcaraz, who pushed Miguel. Miguel and Alcaraz then got into a physical altercation and the police were called. Miguel did not know if Alcaraz was charged with any crime based on that incident.

(b) On appeal, Alcaraz contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. 2 A trial court’s denial of a mis- trial “based on a prejudicial comment” is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and we “will not interfere with that discretion on ap- peal in the absence of a manifest abuse.” Golden v. State, 310 Ga. 538, 546 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). To assess the denial of a motion for mistrial based on improper character evidence, we look to the “nature of the statement, the other evidence in the case, and the action taken by the court and counsel concerning the impropriety.” Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524, 533 (2023) (quota- tion marks omitted). One action a trial court can take to “negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence,” other than granting a motion for mistrial, is to give a “prompt curative instruction[ ],” which we assume a jury follows absent proof otherwise. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Unless it is “clear that the trial court’s curative instruction failed to eliminate the effect of the prejudicial comment” made by the witness about the defendant, a new trial is not warranted. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Assuming without deciding that the issue of the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial was preserved for appellate re- view, Alcaraz has not shown that the trial court’s denial of his

2 Read generously, Alcaraz’s brief on appeal might also be read to make a passing argument that the trial court should have sustained his objection and gave an inadequate curative instruction. But even assuming he makes such an argument, he has failed to meet his burden with respect to these claims. The State’s concession and the trial court’s curative instruction show that the objection was sustained, so there is nothing for this Court to review with respect to the sustained objection. And Alcaraz has failed to cite any au- thority or make any specific argument as to why the curative instruction was legally inadequate.

motion for mistrial was a “manifest abuse” of the court’s discre- tion, or that the curative instruction failed to “eliminate the ef- fect” of Miguel’s passing (and nonresponsive) comment that Al- caraz had been violent toward “too many different ladies.” Alcaraz objected to this testimony immediately and asked to approach the bench, and after the bench conference, the jury was sent out so the court could hear additional argument from the parties. And as soon as the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court in- structed the jury that it was “only to consider this witness’s testi- mony regarding two prior incidents of difficulties between the de- cedent Rosaura Bautista and the defendant,” and “not to consider anything else.” Miguel went on to testify without giving any other testimony along the lines of his “too many different ladies” com- ment. That curative instruction told the jury in clear and direct terms not to consider that comment, nothing about the nature of that brief comment suggests to us that a jury would not be able to follow that instruction, and Alcaraz has not shown us any evi- dence that would rebut the presumption that the jury in fact fol- lowed the curative instruction. So Alcaraz has not showed that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mis- trial and giving a curative instruction instead. See Allen, 315 Ga. at 533; Golden, 310 Ga. at 546.

2. Unanimous Verdict Claim

(a) Count 8 of the indictment charged Alcaraz with the pos- session of a knife during the commission of “at least one of the following felonies . . . Murder, Felony Murder, Aggravated As- sault and Aggravated Battery.”

Alcaraz requested and the trial court gave the following in- struction on unanimous verdicts: “Whatever your verdict is, it must be unanimous (that is, agreed to by all). The verdict must be in writing and signed by one of your members as foreperson, dated, and returned to be published in open court.” The verdict form read:

As to Count 8: Possession of a Knife During Commis- sion of a Felony we the jury find the Defendant:

___ Not Guilty

___ Guilty

The verdict form did not list the predicate felonies or ask the jury to select one.

The jury found Alcaraz guilty of all counts: malice murder, felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of battery, and possession of a knife during the commission of a fel- ony. (b) On appeal, Alcaraz claims that the trial court’s general unanimity instruction and the fact that the verdict form did not require the jury to select a specific predicate felony for Count 8 created uncertainty as to whether the jury reached a unanimous verdict as to which felony supported a guilty verdict on Count 8. Because Alcaraz did not object to the jury instruction or verdict form on unanimity grounds at trial, this claim is reviewed for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (requiring specific objections to jury instructions, which state the grounds for the objection, and limiting review of unobjected-to jury instructions to plain error review); Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 682–83 (2012) (pre- printed verdict forms are part of the jury instructions and OCGA § 17-8-58 applies). To establish plain error, the defendant must show that the trial court committed an error that was not “affirm- atively waived,” was “clear and obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute,” and “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 683 (quotation marks omitted). If the defendant makes that showing, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to remedy the error if it “seriously af- fects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial pro- ceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Even assuming that there was some defect in the jury in- struction or verdict form, Alcaraz has failed to show that any er- ror affected the outcome of his trial because the record shows that the jury reached a unanimous verdict. See Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 685 (to be plain, “the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court pro- ceedings”). In Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730 (2002), this Court re- jected an argument with respect to a felony murder charge that was materially identical to Alcaraz’s here. There, we explained that the defendant’s non-unanimous verdict claim failed because the jury had found him guilty of both felonies that were charged as predicate offenses and either one could have independently supported the jury’s guilty verdict for felony murder. See Miller, 275 Ga. at 738. Just so here, where the jury found Alcaraz guilty of all the felonies that served as predicate offenses to the charge of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony — mean- ing that multiple independent felonies for which the jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts supported the jury’s guilty verdict for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. See id.

In support of his argument, Alcaraz cites Thompson v. State, 271 Ga. 105, 108–09 (1999). But Thompson is distinguish- able. There, we reversed the defendant’s felony murder conviction because there was not sufficient evidence to support one of the predicate felonies, the verdict form did not indicate which felony the jury found to be the predicate offense for the felony murder, and it was impossible to determine whether the felony murder was based on the vacated predicate felony or one of the other pred- icate felonies. See Thompson, 271 Ga. at 108. By contrast, Alcaraz has not established, or even argued, that the State failed to pre- sent sufficient evidence to support one or more of the predicate felonies. So he has not shown that any error in the jury charge or verdict form affected the outcome of his trial, and his plain error claim thus fails. See Miller, 275 Ga. at 738 (“[A]ppellant’s felony murder conviction is not deficient for being predicated upon mul- tiple felonies without specification.”); Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 685. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.