Constitución del Estado de Georgia

Artículo VII. TAXATION AND FINANCE · Artículo VII. TAXATION AND FINANCE · Sección II. EXEMPTIONS FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION

Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV. Current property tax exemptions preserved.

Vigente

Actualizado hasta: Including Acts of the 2025 Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Una disposición constitucional que se muestra como vigente está vigente tal como está impresa en el volumen. Una decisión judicial puede hacer inaplicable una disposición impresa sin cambiar el volumen, y el volumen no registra eso.

El texto siguiente es la ley tal como la imprime el estado, en inglés.

Those types of exemptions from ad valorem taxation provided for by law on June 30, 1983, are hereby continued in effect as statutory law until otherwise provided for by law. Any law which reduces or repeals any homestead exemption in existence on June 30, 1983, or created thereafter must be approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote and by a majority of the qualified electors of the state or the affected local taxing jurisdiction voting in a referendum thereon. Any law which reduces or repeals exemptions granted to religious or burial grounds or institutions of purely public charity must be approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly.

Las notas siguientes se imprimen con la sección, pero no son ley promulgada (O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1(c)). Se muestran aparte del texto.

Editor's notes

In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV and antecedent provisions, relating to specific tax exemptions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. V and antecedent provisions, which provided: ‘‘All exemptions from taxation heretofore granted to corporate charters are declared to be henceforth null and void.’’, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. Effect of charter provision limiting In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV and antecedent provisions, relating to specific tax exemptions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. This paragraph is exclusive in the matter of exemptions from taxation and supersedes any other law. 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 708 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Cross references

Exemptions relating to agricultural products, § 48-8-5. Exemptions for revenue bonds issued for state, educational, or other nonprofit purposes, §§ 12-3-274, 20-2-558, 20-3-157, 20-3-170, 20-3-209, 20-3-341, 32-10-49, 32-10-109, 50-9-13, 50-9-33, and 50-26-9. Property exempt from taxation, § 48-5-41. Homestead exemptions, § 48-5-44 et seq. Exemptions from sales taxes, § 48-8-3. Exemptions for contractors of state projects, § 50-17-29. Specific continuation of homestead exemptions for certain individuals over age 65, § 48-5-47. Homestead and ad valorem exemptions for disabled veterans, §§ 48-5-48, 48-5-478.

Law reviews

For article, ‘‘Freedoms of the First Amendment in Georgia,’’ see 15 Ga. B.J. 405 (1953). For article discussing homestead rights as a means of protecting decedent’s surviving spouse and children, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 447 (1976). For article discussing tax exemptions and deductions as incentives for establishment of foreign business in Georgia, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (1976). For article surveying judicial decisions affecting Georgia’s state and local taxation laws, decided under former Code 1933, Titles 92 and 91A (now T. 48), see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 217 (1979). For article discussing ad valorem taxation and interest in real property in Georgia, prior to enactment of former Code 1933, T. 91A (now T. 48), see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 293 (1979). For survey article on local government law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1982). For survey article on recent developments in Georgia state and local taxation, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 400 (1982). For article, ‘‘Freeport Exemption from Property Taxes for Inventory Stored in Georgia But Destined for Shipment Out-of-State,’’ see 28 Ga. St. B.J. 108 (1991). For note discussing restrictions on the creation of public purpose corporations, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 680 (1974). For comment criticizing Elder v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 185 Ga. 258, 194 S.E. 745 (1938), holding § 48-6-91 contravenes this paragraph, see 2 Ga. B.J. 40 (1939). For comment on Thompson v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), see 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). For comment criticizing Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, Inc., 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949). For comment on Delta Airlines v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 131 S.E.2d 768 (1963), see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 201 (1963). For comment criticizing Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Simmons, 224 Ga. 483, 162 S.E.2d 342 (1968), see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 330 (1969). For comment as to tax exempt status of church administrative offices, in light of Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974).

Otras notas (116 entradas, tal como están impresas)

1976 Constitution.: Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV.
Constitution limits effect of legislative exemptions.: The constitutional provisions shall govern and, to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, shall limit the effect of legislative attempts to exempt religious, educational, and charitable institutions from taxation where such institutions act as trustees of intangible personal properties under agreement to pay income to donors or their designees. Salvation Army v. Strickland, 253 Ga. 758, 325 S.E.2d 147 (1985). Tax exemptions are to be strictly construed since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. Athens City Water-Works Co. v. Mayor of Athens, 74 Ga. 413 (1885); Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898); Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974). All grants of exemptions must be strictly construed in favor of the state, and nothing passes by implication, but this rule must not be pushed to unreasonableness. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943); Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944); Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1952). All grants of exemptions must be construed against the taxpayer. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972). Exemption from taxation must be strictly construed, and the exemption will not be held to be conferred unless the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the legislature. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974).
Narrowest possible meaning not required.: The rule of strict construction of tax exemptions does not require that the narrowest possible meaning be given to words descriptive of the exemption. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).
Ordinary rules of construction apply.: The strict construction rule does not relieve a court of the duty of interpreting the exemption by ordinary rules of construction in order to carry out the intention of the legislature, and does not apply where there is no language in an act justifying or requiring construction. A fair and reasonable construction of a statute or contract must always be adopted, giving the language used its ordinary meaning, and taking into consideration the purpose and spirit of the exemption as well as the public policy entertained at the time and the history of the times when the statute was passed. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).
Effect of doubt.: The rule that exemptions must be strictly construed in favor of the taxing power does not mean that if there is a possibility of doubt it is to be resolved against the exemption. It simply means that if, after the application of all rules of interpretation for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature, a well founded doubt exists, then an ambiguity occurs which may be settled by the strict rule of construction. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944). tion from taxation must be construed favorably to the state and against the taxpayer. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222 (1974). All property must be taxed and no property except that specifically mentioned in the Constitution can be exempted from taxation. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222 (1974).
Any ambiguity in an alleged exemp-Natural and ordinary meaning.: In interpreting a constitutional exemption, it is to be presumed that the words used were employed in their natural and ordinary meaning, and where a constitutional provision or statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, a court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943). Property not deemed tax until tax
levied.: Since ‘‘taxation’’ includes determination of rate of levy and imposition of levy, as an essential part of sovereign power and process, it follows that property will not be deemed as taxed until the tax has been levied. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943). Municipality cannot exempt a class
not enumerated in this paragraph.: Tarver v. Mayor of Dalton, 134 Ga. 462, 67 S.E. 929, 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 183, 20 Ann. Cas. 281 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Property, whatever its species, if simply exempt, pays nothing. Georgia Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Cedartown, 134 Ga. 87, 67 S.E. 410, 19 Ann. Cas. 954 (1910).
Contract cannot defeat government right to tax.: Aside from exemptions from taxation as exists in this paragraph, the parties cannot by contract defeat right of the government to collect taxes for which property would otherwise be liable. Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55, 169 S.E. 301 (1933); City of Leesburg v. Forrester, 59 Ga. App. 503, 1 S.E.2d 584 (1939) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). nue purposes are radically different from ad valorem taxes, and are not tion. Crestlawn Mem. Park v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975). State has not waived and cannot waive its right to tax private property on federal land and indeed the Constitution demands that it be taxed. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).
Special assessments not for revetaxes within meaning of the Constitu-Exemption not destroyed by incidental income derived from operation of charitable or educational institution.: The proviso that ‘‘the General Consideration (Cont’d) property so exempted be not used for purposes of private or corporate profit or income’’ was not intended to destroy the exemption already granted where incidental income was derived from the operation of the charitable or educational institution. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933). Property subject to taxation should
not be exempted.: Apart from permitted exemptions, the Constitution evinces an intention that no property which is subject to taxation in this state shall be relieved therefrom, and the statutes express with equal certainty an intention by the lawmakers to lay a tax upon all property of every kind or class which the State of Georgia has jurisdiction to tax, nothing excepted. Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942), later appeal, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946). tion which was used for provision of inflight meals was subject to taxation where provisions of lease did not preserve the public’s ‘‘rightful, equal, and uniform use’’ of the property as required by O.C.G.A. § 6-3-25. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982). Places of Religious Worship Test for charitable immunity from suit is not the use to which the income is put, but the nature of the source from which the income is derived. This is the same test applied in determining the taxability of property. The scheme of exemption as to other than public property seems to be this: to exempt all that is used immediately and directly as a part of the establishment in the conduct of the regular business, there carried on, but not such as may be devoted to other uses, such as farming, merchandising, manufacturing, etc., and from which profit or income is derived. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).
Airport property leased to corpora-Religious worship construed.: The words ‘‘religious worship’’ import a concept of a congregation assembling in a place open to the public to honor the Deity through reverance and homage. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), commented on in 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974). rized by this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), the court must look to the use of the property, not merely its ownership, and the court must also look to the primary use of the property to determine whether it was exempt from taxation. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), commented on in 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). If property is used primarily for poses, it is not exempt from taxes. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), commented on in 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974). Exemption applies to buildings
In applying the exemption authoeither profit or non-operational purwhere congregations gather for worship.: Exemptions from taxation of places of religious worship are intended to apply to buildings where congregations come together in a public forum for religious services. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass’n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), commented on in 26 Mercer L. Rev. 361 (1974). Property used to make a profit which will in turn be given or used by the church for church purposes does not confer tax exempt status. Church of God of Union Ass’y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961). Income-producing real estate, not used directly in charitable activities, is a noncharitable asset and defendant is liable to the extent of such noncharitable assets. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972). Property used to produce income for a charity is too remote from the
ultimate charitable object to be exempt.: If property is allowed to be used as taxed property it also is to be taxed. If it competes in the common business and occupations of life with the property of other owners, it must bear the tax which theirs bears, and it is a noncharitable asset, not immune from execution of a judgment. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972). Property subject to execution of
judgment if subject to taxation.: It has been held that since the public welfare is a dominant consideration as to both the exemption from taxation and immunity from suit, and that it is the prerogative of the legislature to declare the policy of the state touching the general welfare, the test as to whether property is subject to execution of a judgment is whether the property is subject to taxation. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972). Religious institutions are, for some purposes, considered to be matters of sidered such for all purposes, and the word ‘‘charity’’ itself is given a narrower meaning in tax exemption cases. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966). ated in exemption statute are exempt from taxes, and all references to income relate solely to such exempted property. Church of God of Union Ass’y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961). sidered charitable institutions for purpose of this exemption. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966). Facts sufficient to qualify church
charity, they are not necessarily con-Only church properties enumer-Legislature did not intend that religious groups or institutions be confor exemption of property.: In suit by church seeking equitable relief from tax execution, allegations that no dividends, income, or profits have been, or will be, distributable for the purpose of profit or personal gain, that the property upon which the execution has been levied is a place of religious worship, used in maintaining and operating a church, that the income derived therefrom is used exclusively for religious purposes, and that the primary purpose of such real estate is not that of securing an income thereon, but of providing a meeting place and quarters for members of affiliate churches placed the plaintiff squarely within the constitutional and statutory exemptions. Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1957).
Exemption must be clearly intended.: An exemption from taxation will not be held to be conferred unless terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the legislature. Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1957).
Words given ordinary meaning.: In determining whether or not exemption claimed has in fact been granted, the words in the constitutional exemption are to be given their ordinary meaning. Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1957).
Effect of §§ 48-5-41 and 48-6-22.: The exemptions applying to a charitable institution under this paragraph and Ga. L. 1946, p. 12 and Ga. L. 1955, p. 262 placed religious, educational, and charitable institutions on same basis with reference to income, in that any income from such property must be ‘‘used exclusively for religious, educational and charitable purposes, or for either one or more of such purposes and for the purpose of maintaining and operating such institutions.’’ Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Burial Places
Proper suit in equity.: Suit by cemetery corporation seeking declaratory judgment that its property was not properly subject to municipal property tax and for injunction to prevent levy of this tax stated a case in equity within the jurisdiction of the Georgia Supreme Court. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962). courage cemeteries arises out of the common wish of mankind to ensure a fitting resting place for the dead, especially in crowded areas, while at the same time giving consideration to the safety of the living and the saving of the public from the burden of maintaining them at its expense. Suttles v. Hill Crest Cem., 87 Ga. App. 343, 73 S.E.2d 760 (1952). Burial Places (Cont’d) Land deeded for cemetery use met
Public policy to protect and enexemption notwithstanding reservation for future use.: Under the constitutional and legislative provisions exempting ‘‘places of burial’’ from taxation, land acquired by cemetery corporation under a deed containing a restriction that it was to be used as a cemetery for human beings and for no other purpose, was, under the facts stipulated, exempt from taxation, despite the fact that the land in question was being reserved for future needs. Suttles v. Hill Crest Cem., 87 Ga. App. 343, 73 S.E.2d 760 (1952). Distinction between buildings used
in cemetery.: There is a distinction between those structures in which bodies are prepared for burial, and buildings necessary for administration of the cemetery and the maintenance of the burying grounds. The latter are exempt from taxation. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962). Exemption for portion of property
used for burial.: Where the plaintiff’s petition alleged the property was exempt from taxation under state law, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against a levy on that portion of its property used as a place of burial. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962). tery lands may extend to all property used or held exclusively for the burial of the dead or for the care, maintenance, or upkeep of such property, and ordinarily applies to a columbarium, a crematory, a mausoleum, or unsold lots, crypts or niches, and covers permanent improvements placed on the land and necessary to its use as a burying ground. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962).
The exemption accorded to ceme-Undeveloped cemetery area exempt.: Where the evidence indicated that the number of burials was increasing each year, and that the undeveloped area of cemetery tract was not disproportionate to the future needs of the area from which the burials were made, the trial judge did not err in holding that the undeveloped portion of the area was exempt from taxation. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962). Preservation of a historical site in a tract of land dedicated to burial purposes would not change its character as a place of burial. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962). Institutions of Purely Public Charity 1. In General empt all public property from ad valorem taxation, and may also exempt some portion of public property from taxation. City of Atlanta v. Spence, 242 Ga. 194, 249 S.E.2d 554 (1978). General Assembly may exempt some public property and refuse to exempt other public property, because the power to exempt from the burden of taxation necessarily implies the power to impose such taxes. City of Atlanta v. Spence, 242 Ga. 194, 249 S.E.2d 554 (1978). Private property not converted to public property and not relieved
Georgia General Assembly may exfrom ad valorem taxation.: While businesses which are privately owned, but used in the exercise of governmental functions on state-owned or state-controlled property for private gain, and in accordance with the rules and regulations imposed by the state, may be exempt from occupation taxes because of threatened impairment of the functions of the state thus performed, yet private property cannot thus be said to be converted into public property in order to relieve it from ad valorem taxation. Davis v. City of Atlanta, 206 Ga. 652, 58 S.E.2d 140 (1950). To qualify for ad valorem tax exemption as an ‘‘institution of purely public charity’’ the property itself must be dedicated to a purely public charitable use. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).
Tax exemption restriction.: The Constitution restricts tax exemption of institutions of charity to those and those only that are ‘‘purely’’ charity and also to those that are ‘‘public’’ charity. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962). Fact that an institution serves a sarily make it a ‘‘purely public charity.’’ Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971).
benevolent purpose does not neces-Test for purely public charity.: Test of whether property is within an exemption from taxation of institutions of purely public charity is whether the property itself is dedicated to charity and used exclusively as an institution of purely public charity, and not whether the organization owning it is one of purely public charity. It is not material, however, for the purpose of determining the public nature of a charity, through what particular forms the charity may be administered. If it is established and maintained for the use and benefit of the public, and so conducted that the public can make available use of it, that is all that is required to bring it within the meaning of a statute exempting from taxation institutions of purely public charity. Mu Beta Chapter Chi Omega House Corp. v. Davison, 192 Ga. 124, 14 S.E.2d 744 (1941); McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953).
Boy Scout included as charity.: The word ‘‘charity,’’ as used in paragraph (5) of former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40), and in this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution authorizing its enactment, was broad enough to include the use of the property by the Boy Scout organization. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Intent to dedicate to public use.: Whether express or implied, an intention on the part of the owner to dedicate the owner’s property to the public use must be shown in order to claim a tax exemption. When an implied dedication is claimed, the facts relied on must be such as to clearly indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon the owner’s personal dominion over the property and to devote it to a definite public use. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972). ‘‘Used for the operation of such institution’’ means that the charitable institution itself must be carrying on an operation on its real estate for benefit of the public or for some other legitimate charitable purpose. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972). Intent for public purpose must be
accepted by public.: Use of one’s property by a small portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, will not amount to a dedication of the property to a public use, unless it appears clearly that there was an intention to dedicate and that this dedication was accepted by the public for public use. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972). Because charitable institutions are public, if they are open ‘‘to the whole public, or the whole of the classes for whose relief they are intended or adapted’’ then the institution is exempt from taxation. It is sufficient that the property is open to the members of the organization without turning a profit. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938); Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969). Merely making real estate available tions for their use is not sufficient to qualify the property of a charitable institution for the tax exemption. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972). 2. Homes for Elderly For a nursing home to be tax exempt, it must be purely charitable and public. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969). To qualify as public it is not necessary that a nursing home be open to the entire public. It is sufficient that it be open to classes for whose relief it was intended. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).
to other public or charitable institu-Meaning of charity.: A familiar meaning of the word ‘‘charity’’ is almsgiving, but as used in the law it may include Institutions of Purely Public Charity (Cont’d) 2. Homes for Elderly (Cont’d) substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part of it. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969). ‘‘Charity,’’ as used in tax exemption statutes, is not restricted to the relief of the sick or indigent, but extends to other forms of philanthropy or public beneficence, such as practical enterprises for the good of humanity, operated at moderate cost to the beneficiaries, or enterprises operated for the general improvement and happiness of mankind. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969). Charity not limited to needy and
destitute.: Charity is not confined to relief of the needy and destitute, for aged people require care and attention apart from financial assistance, and the supply of this care and attention is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the relief of their financial wants. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).
Payment of rent.: Fact that residents are charged a rental toward expenses of operating an inn for the elderly does not necessarily destroy charitable nature of the institution especially if the payments made by the residents are insufficient to cover the direct operating expenses of the inn and all income is used for the operation, maintenance and enlarging the facilities with no part of its income being distributed to any person with an interest therein. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969). The fact that residents paid rent according to their ability would not destroy the charitable nature of the institution. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).
Property with a dual purpose.: Where an institution is a purely public charity and meets the requirements of Ga. L. 1946, p. 12 and Ga. L. 1955, p. 262, the portion of its property which is being used as a home for the aged is tax exempt. However, where part of the building consists of two retail stores which are leased, that part would not be tax exempt since the area where the stores are located is being used to gain rental and not for the primary purpose of operating the inn. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969). 3. Hospitals
Control by legislature.: A corporation created by the legislature and funded with state funds is a creature of the legislature and subject to the control of the legislature, while a corporation created by the legislature to be funded by private funds is not so subject to future legislative control. Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 175 S.E.2d 857 (1970).
Organization’s charter is not controlling factor.: That an organization is nonprofit and its charter as well as statute under which it is chartered declare it to be a charitable and benevolent institution exempt from taxation does not make it such. Nor does the fact that it serves a benevolent purpose make it a purely public charity. United Hosps. Serv. Ass’n v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 30, 114 S.E.2d 524 (1960).
Use of property controls.: It is the use to which the property is put rather than the declaration of purpose found in its owner’s charter that determines the question of exemption from taxation. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962). Charging patients based on ability
to pay.: Where a hospital is organized for charitable purposes, and its facilities are available alike to poor and unfortunate children, the fact that patients who are able to pay are charged for services rendered, according to their ability, does not alter its character as such, and where all of its income from all sources is used exclusively for maintenance, operation, enlarging its charitable facilities, and for furtherance of its charitable purposes, with no part of the same distributable to any one having an interest therein, it is exempt within the meaning of this paragraph, and interpretation of this paragraph which accords with the intention of the framers of that document as shown in the Records of the Constitutional Commission 1943-1944, Volume I, pages 138-141, 388-395, 397, 528-531; Volume II, pages 58-59. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949), commented on in 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Nothing provided in § 48-8-41 not
already in this paragraph.: Where, by enacting this paragraph, the General Assembly exempted from taxation all of the property enumerated in this paragraph, using the identical language herein employed, it fully exhausted its constitutional power to make exemptions, and Ga. L. 1947, p. 1183, which expressly exempted from taxation all hospitals of purely public charity added nothing to what the General Assembly had previously done by Ga. L. 1946, p. 12, § 1. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949) commented on in 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949), (decided under former Code 1933, § 2-5404; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Instance of no charitable exemption.: Where a hospital receives charitable patients without pay but it also charges for patients able to pay (the proportion being vastly in favor of the latter) the property in question is used for ‘‘corporate income,’’ and is not exempted from taxation. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933). Public property embraces only such property as is owned by the state, or some political division thereof, and title to which is vested directly in the state, or one of its subordinate political divisions, or in some person holding exclusively for the benefit of the state or subordinate public corporation. Culbreth v. Southwest Ga. Regional Hous. Auth., 199 Ga. 183, 33 S.E.2d 684 (1945); Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958); Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 175 S.E.2d 857 (1970). Cases involving trusts give the word ‘‘charity’’ a broader meaning than the tax exemption cases. United Hosps. Serv. Ass’n v. Fulton County, 216 Ga. 30, 114 S.E.2d 524 (1960). 4. Public Authorities Property may be public property so as to come within exemption from taxation although legal title is not in the state, the county, or a municipality. Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958). Qualities rendering authority’s
property exempt from taxation.: Where no private interest exists in the property of port authority, and the members thereof may not use it for private gain or income, and the authority holds title only for the benefit of the state and the public and the authority is an instrumentality of the state or a subordinate public authority or corporation of the state, the property and revenue bonds of the authority may be exempted from taxation. Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958); Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 175 S.E.2d 857 (1970). Property used for purpose of public convenience and welfare in matters of public travel and transportation and to facilitate public transportation and as a dock or port operation, to provide buildings which the users of the port may lease, and in which to store and process commodities transported by water, is in the aid of commerce, and is for the promotion of public transportation, public commerce and general welfare, and may properly be classified as public property and is therefore exempt from taxation. Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958).
Gratuity not constituted by exemption section.: Former Code 1933, § 95A-1230 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-10-49), expressly exempting the property of the authority, its revenue bonds and income therefrom from all taxation within the state, does not constitute a donation or a gratuity in violation of Ga. Institutions of Purely Public Charity (Cont’d) 4. Public Authorities (Cont’d) Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI), or offend this paragraph, which declares that all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property therein enumerated are void. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). State Tollway Authority sufficient beneficent purpose to constitute
purely public charity.: The property of the Bridge Building Authority (now State Tollway Authority) is not public property, but, in view of the beneficent purpose for which it was created by the legislature, coupled with the fact that it has no shareholders or other owners of any character to which its corporate profit or income is distributable, it is an institution of purely public charity. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953). Exemption from taxation of the property of the Housing Authority, and its bonds, is not forbidden by the Constitution of this state, because the project involved is for public purposes, and affects the general public. Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938). thority of Georgia is public property and exempt from taxation. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).
Property of municipal electric au-Teachers Retirement System.: Exception to the exemption from taxation in the Georgia Constitution is not applicable to public property, all of which the General Assembly is authorized to exempt from taxation and a teacher’s retirement system may hold tax-exempt real property for income purposes. Teachers Retirement Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 249 Ga. 196, 288 S.E.2d 200 (1982). Dwelling house built by electric
membership corporation.: Where the dominant consideration of the corporation in building and maintaining the dwelling house near its office to be occupied as a residence for its manager was to promote efficient and prompt service, day and night, to its members rather than merely to furnish a place of habitation for its employee, the building should thereby be considered as being used by it in supplying rural electrification to its members. The property is therefore exempt from taxation. The fact that the manager paid the corporation rent and the dwelling house was not located on the premises of its home office does not require a different result. Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Adams, 214 Ga. 280, 104 S.E.2d 431 (1958). Effect of construing ‘‘profit’’ in pari materia with § 46-1-2 and Art. 2, Ch. 3,
T. 46.: The word ‘‘profit’’ as employed in the Constitution did not, when construed in pari materia with former Code 1933, §§ 93-413, 94-1101 and the former provisions on nonprofit rural electrification membership corporations (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-1-2) exclude the electric corporations created under the former statutory provisions from the class of electric companies engaged in the business of generating and transmitting electricity. Lamar Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carroll, 89 Ga. App. 440, 79 S.E.2d 832 (1953). 5. Miscellaneous Institutions Bonds issued by the state or its ities, and thus, properly exempted from taxation under this paragraph. Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). License fee not revenue raising
institutions are public instrumentalmeasure.: The license fee provided for in the motor vehicle registration law is nothing more than a license fee and is not in essence a revenue-raising measure, and therefore does not amount to the levying of a tax against public property. Burkett v. State, 198 Ga. 747, 32 S.E.2d 797 (1945). College, Academy, and Seminary Buildings
Fraternity houses tax exempt.: The fraternity houses are buildings erected for and used as a college, and not used for the purpose of making either private or corporate income or profit for the university, and they shall be exempt from taxes. Alford v. Emory Univ., 216 Ga. 391, 116 S.E.2d 596 (1960).
Seminary not intended as charitable institution.: Since this paragraph exempts certain specified property owned by a seminary of learning and then exempts ‘‘all institutions of purely public charity,’’ it appears that it was the intention of the drafters of the Constitution that a seminary of learning not be considered as a charitable institution for the purpose of this exemption. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). A university-owned radio station, casting station, is not exempt from payment of city business license fee under this paragraph authorizing the exemption from taxation of educational institutions, notwithstanding the fact that its purpose of operation was said to be educational. City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe Univ., 178 Ga. 379, 173 S.E. 110 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). It is the use of the property which renders it exempt or nonexempt, not the use of the income derived from it. Elder v. Atlanta-Southern Dental College, 183 Ga. 634, 189 S.E. 254 (1936). Evidence authorized findings that dental college, chartered as purely educational institution, was not used for purpose of making either private or corporate income or profit to the corporation or owners, so as to make it liable for municipal taxes. Elder v. Atlanta-Southern Dental College, 183 Ga. 634, 189 S.E. 254 (1936). Exemption for School Purposes
operated as any commercial broad-Use of property controls.: It is the use to which property of an educational institution is put, rather than the declaration of the purpose of the institution found in its charter, that determines the question of exemption from taxation. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971). It is the use of the property which renders it exempt or nonexempt, not the use of the income derived from it. Property used to produce income to be expended in charity is too remote from the ultimate charitable object to be exempt. If property competes in the common business and occupations of life with the property of other owners, it must bear the tax which theirs bears. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971). Homestead exemption for school
purposes.: This paragraph on homestead is to be construed as exempting personal property from taxation for all purposes, from and after January 1, 1938. This would include exemption from ad valorem taxation for payment of principal and interest on a proposed bonded indebtedness of a consolidated school district, a political division of the state, incurred for the purpose of building a schoolhouse. Campbell v. Red Bud Consol. Sch. Dist., 186 Ga. 541, 198 S.E. 225 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The homestead exemption from taxation for ‘‘school purposes’’ should not be construed to include exemption for purpose of building a schoolhouse. Campbell v. Red Bud Consol. Sch. Dist., 186 Ga. 541, 198 S.E. 225 (1938). Taxation for school purposes in
Clarke County.: In 1964 and in 1968 the people of the state did not authorize an additional homestead exemption for certain persons 65 years of age or over, but an increase in amount of the homestead granted other persons. Since the people of Clarke County had already expressly waived the homestead exemption as to ‘‘school purposes,’’ the later constitutional amendments, which expressly created an additional increase in the old age homestead exemption amount and clarified persons who might claim it, were not intended to apply to taxation for school purposes in Clarke County. Logan v. Davison, 225 Ga. 575, 170 S.E.2d 297 (1969).
Property devoted to public purposes not always tax exempt.: Although the State School Building Authority (now Georgia Education Authority (Schools)) is empowered to own and use properties for public school purposes, it is, nevertheless, the owner of that property and the authority is not ‘‘the state, or a Exemption for School Purposes (Cont’d) part of the state, or an agency of the state.’’ Therefore, the property exempt is not public property as contemplated by the Constitution. The fact that the property is devoted exclusively to public purposes would not make it public property and authorize the legislature to exempt it from taxation. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952). The properties of the State School ucation Authority (Schools)) are devoted exclusively to public charity as contemplated by the Constitution. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952). Section 20-2-571 does not constitute gratuity or donation in violation of
Building Authority (now Georgia Ed-this paragraph.: Ga. L. 1951, p. 241, § 21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-571), which expressly exempts the property of the authority from all taxation, does not constitute a donation or a gratuity in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI), nor offend the last sentence of this paragraph, which declares that all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property therein enumerated are void. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Homestead Exemption The purpose of this paragraph is to exempt the homestead of each bona fide resident of the state from taxation to the extent provided. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Intent.: The reasonable intent of the homestead exemption provisions of the Constitution and statutes is to include in rural homesteads the entire tract of land upon which the house is situated, regardless of whether the land surrounding the dwelling is used simply as an extended approach to the building or put to agricultural uses. Jones v. Johnson, 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949). There is no limitation as to the size erty to be embraced within the homestead provision, and the purpose of the constitutional provision and statute pursuant thereto in fixing a maximum valuation was by so doing to equalize the exemption as between applicants on the basis of value, regardless of the extent of the tract involved. Jones v. Johnson, 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949).
or physical proportions of the prop-Actual occupancy construed.: The provisions for actual occupancy by the owner, in this paragraph, enter into the definition of bona fide homestead, and do not mean in everyday life that the owner must occupy the property in person every day in the year, or a majority of the days of a year, but that there must be such occupancy by the owner as is not inconsistent with ownership and maintenance of the dwelling as the owner’s homestead and place of abode. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). One may actually occupy a home through the agency of others so long as it is maintained as a home, and the control is not changed in character, since the emphasis in the words used in this paragraph is not on the actual occupancy, but on the provision as a whole, the actual occupancy primarily as a residence or homestead. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).
Effect of § 48-5-40.: The provisions in former Code 1933, § 92-233 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40), that exempted homestead shall be the legal residence and domicile of such person for all purposes, meant no more than was required by this paragraph, which required actual occupancy primarily as a residence or homestead. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Rules and regulations of constitutional amendment.: The rules and regulations contained in this paragraph providing the manner in which the taxing officials should determine the eligibility of a resident to receive the exemption are not violative of the constitutional amendment upon which Ga. L. Ex. Sess. 1937-38, p. 145 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49) was based. Duncan v. Proctor, 195 Ga. 499, 24 S.E.2d 791 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The Constitution requires that property claimed as a homestead be reasonably separated and separately valued, instead of being commingled with other property under a gross valuation. Harper v. Davis, 197 Ga. 762, 30 S.E.2d 481 (1944).
Applicant not entitled to an exemption.: Fact that applicant’s entire property on which were located several buildings, was assessed at only $1,550.00, which is less than the maximum exemption allowable under the Constitution, did not entitle the applicant to an exemption where the applicant did not show the separate value of the property actually occupied by the applicant as a residence, nor give any data by which it could be ascertained. Harper v. Davis, 197 Ga. 762, 30 S.E.2d 481 (1944). Farm Products Exemption
Intent.: The obvious intent of exemption for farm products is to relieve the farmer by giving the farmer a year after harvest in which to sell the farmer’s products; therefore, during that period until the farmer sells the farmer’s products, the farmer is exempt from ad valorem taxation thereupon. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974).
Section 48-5-41.: Language of this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41) did not contemplate an exemption for farm products either after an outright sale, or when placed in the hands of another for future sale or processing with advance payment to the producer. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Amendment of § 48-5-41.: Georgia Law 1913, p. 122, which amended former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), was passed for the express purpose of putting ‘‘in force’’ the constitutional amendment of 1912, amending this paragraph, and the descriptive words were the same as in the constitutional amendment. Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Lumber not classed as farm product.: Since according to its usual signification, the term ‘‘lumber’’ would not ordinarily be classified as a farm product; it would be presumed prima facie that it was not such a product, and in the circumstances, it was not sufficient to allege in general terms that this lumber was a farm product and as such exempt from taxation. Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944). Tax Exemption Not Applicable
Debts evidenced by notes not exempt.: Debts evidenced by notes are not embraced in the properties which the Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to exempt from taxation. It follows that since former Code 1933, § 92-2407 (see § 48-6-81) exempted from taxation property made subject to taxes by O.C.G.A. § 48-1-2 and since such property was not embraced in that which the Constitution authorized to be exempted from taxation, the statute offended the Constitution and was void. Elder v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 188 Ga. 113, 3 S.E.2d 75 (1939).
Noncharitable hospital.: Where a hospital operated generally for profit, and while there was some evidence that it did on occasion treat indigent patients, the general practice of the institution was to collect all that it could from its patients, and only charge off as charity those bills it was unable to collect, the hospital is engaged principally for noncharitable purposes and apparently chiefly for benefit of its staff, and not exempt from taxation. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962). Where a hospital is not chartered as a purely public charity, the use of its property is not put to purely public charity, and neither its income nor its surplus is used exclusively for purely public charity, it does not bring itself within the strict requirements for the ad valorem tax exemption sought. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Bohler, 229 Ga. 577, 193 S.E.2d 603 (1972). Tax Exemption Not Applicable (Cont’d)
Nonexempt property.: Property owned for profit by church such as: (1) apartment buildings leased for rent by church; (2) property formerly used as a dining hall but now as an apartment rented to a widow who sometimes pays rent; and (3) lot and dwelling house rented sometimes to a widow who pays rent when the widow can is not exempt from taxation. Church of God of Union Ass’y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961). Interpreting private or corporate
income.: Interpreting ‘‘private or corporate income’’ to mean any income which is not public, productive property used as capital to raise money to expend in charity is used for private income when the owner is a private individual, and for corporate income when the owner is a corporation. It is no more allowable under the Constitution for a charitable association to accumulate money by the use of exempt property, to be disbursed in charity, than it is for a common citizen to do it. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933). The terms ‘‘private or corporate’’ are employed in contradistinction to
public.: Public property is not taxed, whether income is derived from it or not; but private or corporate property, though it may be connected with the external, visible ‘‘institution,’’ is not exempt if used for income, since the income from such property must, by reason of its ownership, be either private or corporate; these terms being comprehensive enough to include all income whatsoever that is not public. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933). Acquisition of moneys or gains for
disbursal not tax-exempt.: Insofar as charitable organizations are administrators and disbursers of purely public charity, their property permanently in use for that purpose is exempt from taxation; but, insofar as they are capitalists or proprietors engaged in acquiring money or effects to be so disbursed, property of any and every kind from which their income is derived is subject to be taxed the same as property generally. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933). Property purchased by contractor for eventual purchase by city not tax
exempt.: A contractor who contracts with a municipality to construct a waterworks system, and who purchased property within and without the state to use in such construction, is a ‘‘user’’ and a ‘‘consumer’’ of such property and is liable to the state for use and sales tax on the sale of such property, even though the title to such property finally vests in the city, and the city would have been exempt from taxation had it purchased the property directly. J.W. Meadors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga. App. 583, 80 S.E.2d 86 (1954).
Effect of local authorities actions.: — Where law of this state as applied to facts required taxation of credits in question, no interpretation or practice to the contrary by local authorities could properly be adopted by the court in determining their taxability. Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942), later appeal, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946). Former Code 1933, § 41A-813 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) did not violate this paragraph; even though the section fixes the priority of other claims relative to taxes. Baggett v. Mobley, 171 Ga. 268, 155 S.E. 334 (1930) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Former Code 1933, § 41A-813 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) may render the execution issued by a tax collector unfruitful, in view of the fact that claims which are given priority may exhaust the property classed among assets of the bank; but no attempt was made by the section to exempt the property from taxation even though the statute fixed the priority of other claims relative to taxes. Baggett v. Mobley, 171 Ga. 268, 155 S.E. 334 (1930). Order of distribution of insolvent
bank not unconstitutional.: The order of distribution of assets upon the insolvency of a bank which grant payments of debts due to depositors prior to payment of state taxes pursuant to Ga. L. 1927, p. 195, § 5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) is not an unconstitutional violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I and III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Paras. I and III). Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465, 160 S.E. 419 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Paragraph not applicable to insolvent bank property.: The last sentence of this paragraph provides that ‘‘all laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property herein enumerated, shall be void.’’ The above exceptions do not include taxes of the character accruing against the property or assets of a bank after it has been taken over by the Superintendent of Banks for liquidation. Tharpe v. Gormley, 48 Ga. App. 731, 173 S.E. 212 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Assets in bank’s possession for liquidation.: The property and assets of a bank which are in the possession of the Superintendent of Banks, for the purpose of liquidation, are not exempt from taxation. Tharpe v. Gormley, 184 Ga. 605, 192 S.E. 211 (1937). Uniform Application of Tax Exemption Exemption uniformly applicable to
state and foreign corporations alike.: — To so construe this constitutional and statutory exemption of property owned by a Georgia corporation and to deny its application to the same class or species of property when owned by a domesticated foreign corporation would violate state constitutional requirements which require that protection to person and property be impartial and complete, and that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and would also violate that provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Redwine v. Southern Co., 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194 (1950). Business tax exemption applicable
to foreign corporation.: Constitutional and statutory provisions exempting from ad valorem intangible taxes common voting stock of a subsidiary corporation not doing business in this state, if at least 90 percent of such common voting stock is owned by a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business located in this state and was acquired or is held for the purpose of enabling the parent company to carry on some part of its established line of business through such subsidiary, applies to a domesticated foreign corporation as fully and as completely as it does to a corporation created under the laws of Georgia. Redwine v. Southern Co., 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194 (1950).
Tax exemption applicable to cooperative, nonprofit corporation.: There is no merit in the contention that a cooperative, nonprofit, membership corporation, which has been incorporated in a sister state for the purpose of engaging in a rural electrification, and which has been subsequently domesticated in Georgia for the conduct of its corporate purpose here, is not entitled to tax immunity. After being duly domesticated in Georgia such a corporation and its stockholders have the same powers, privileges, and immunities as a similar corporation created under the laws of Georgia, and it, and its stockholders, are subject to the same obligations, duties, liabilities, and disabilities as that of a corporation originally created in Georgia. City of McCaysville v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 211 Ga. 5, 83 S.E.2d 598 (1954). ing to compensation for granting franchises was not impliedly repealed by ratification of the Constitution of 1945 or by enactment of Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 46, since the charter provision does not per se relate to electric membership corporations, but to the right of the city to grant easements for the use of its streets by whatever kind of public service corporation. Tri-State Elec. Coop. v. City of Blue Ridge, 88 Ga. App. 717, 77 S.E.2d 547 (1953).
Provision of the city charter relat-Claim barred by laches.: In this suit by citizens of Savannah, in which plaintiffs sought, among other things to enjoin enforcement of tax executions, upon grounds that city tax assessors from 1932 through 1937 intentionally and systematically discriminated against real estate and in favor of personal property in fixing the basis of value for taxation, the petition showed upon its face that the Uniform Application of Tax Exemption (Cont’d) plaintiffs were guilty of such laches as to bar their claim for injunction to restrain the proposed tax sales because of alleged discrimination. Mayor of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132, 197 S.E. 253 (1938). Exemptions Granted by Corporate Charters
tax on stock of corporation.: Where a charter provision limits the tax on the ‘‘stock’’ of the corporation to 1/2 of 1 percent ‘‘on the net proceeds of their investments,’’ it is a property tax and constitutes no bar to collection by the state under Ga. L. 1931, Ex. Sess., p. 24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-7-50), of an income tax from a lessee of the corporation on its net income derived from the use of the corporate property on which the charter thus limits the property tax. Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977 (1947) commented on in 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). claratory judgment and injunction against collection of ad valorem taxes is in substance and effect an action against the state and it is not maintainable, unless the state has consented to be sued. Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26 (1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 900, 69 S. Ct. 407, 93 L. Ed. 435 (1949). Suits to restrain state officials from
Suit by railroad company for deexecuting an unconstitutional statute.: It is a well recognized general rule that a suit to restrain a state official from executing an unconstitutional statute in violation of plaintiff’s rights and to plaintiff’s irreparable damage is not a suit against the state, for in such a case the officer is stripped of official or representative character and is subject in the officer’s person to the consequences of the officer’s individual conduct. Seemingly, the same principle would apply where the officer claims to act under a provision of the state Constitution, provided such provision is void as being in violation of the United States Constitution, and is duly challenged. It has no application where the suit is by a railroad company against the state revenue commissioner for declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent assessment of ad valorem taxes in violation of a company’s charter. Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26 (1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 900, 69 S. Ct. 407, 93 L. Ed. 435 (1949).
Legislative intent in enacting exemption clause construed.: Where there existed in Georgia at the time the corporation charter exemption was enacted no general law which would subject the corporation to payment of an income tax, and in the exemption clause it was expressly stated that the limitation provided was upon the taxation of stock of the corporation, hence, the General Assembly of Georgia, in enacting this exemption clause, did not intend to include an income tax. Such limitation or exemption was not necessary, because in the absence of the same, no income tax, under the law as it then existed, would have been exacted of the corporation. Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977 (1947) commented on in 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). This provision does not purport to be retroactive; and even if it was expressly made retroactive, it would nevertheless be completely ineffective insofar as the fixed and established rights of the party are concerned. Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977 (1947) commented on in 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). A perpetual corporate charter granted by the legislature conferring tax exemption upon the corporation is irrevocable. Accordingly, this paragraph purporting to revoke such charter provisions, is void and of no effect. Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977 (1947) commented on in 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946). State cannot impair its contractual
obligations.: This state is powerless by legislative enactment or constitutional provision to nullify or impair in any respect whatsoever its existing contractual obligations. Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 Ga. 856, 38 S.E.2d 774 (1946), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 67 S. Ct. 1584, 91 L. Ed. 1977 (1947) commented on in 9 Ga. B.J. 207 (1946).
Items not included in gross income.: — The General Assembly did not intend to exclude from computation for income tax purposes those items not included in gross income; otherwise, the words ‘‘from all sources’’ would not have been used nor would reference have been made to certain benefits not included in gross income; to construe the amendment as requiring that only income which is included in gross income for income tax purposes be considered in determining whether a person is entitled to the increased exemption would render the words ‘‘from all sources’’ surplusage. 1972 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 72-28. Ga. L. 1946, p. 12, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-42 and 48-5-44) was authorized by this paragraph. 1952-53 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 439 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Land owned by an organization, which is normally tax exempt, is subject to taxation when leased for commercial purposes. 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 716. Responsibility and authority of tax
administrators limited.: Tax administrators have from time to time the responsibility to determine whether or not a particular piece of property is exempt property under the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes lawfully enacted thereunder; they do not have the authority to create any special exemption. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-457. Public Property ation and motor vehicles owned by polit-Public Property (Cont’d) ical subdivisions of the state, such as a public school system, are exempt from taxation as public property. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-237. Properties of Religious Groups zation is exempt from taxation so long as it is used for religious worship or as a recreational park for purely public charity. 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 716. A single family residence owned by a church is exempt from ad valorem taxes as long as no income is derived therefrom; the same rule applies where the church owns two or more residences. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-172. Residences of pastor and minister
Public property is exempt from tax-Land owned by a religious organiof education are tax exempt.: Two single family residences owned by a church, one of which is occupied rent free by the pastor as the pastor’s residence, and the other of which is occupied rent free by the minister of education as the minister’s residence, are both exempt from ad valorem taxes. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-94. Motor vehicles owned by churches are not exempt from taxation. 1957 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 287. Automobiles are not exempt from ad valorem tax because they are owned by and registered in name of a church organization. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-47. Burial Places erty taxation, even land not yet sold as burial lots. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 474.
Cemeteries are exempt from prop-Ownership of property.: Property utilized as a cemetery or place of burial is exempt from taxation without regard for fact that the property is owned by either a public or private corporation or by individuals, collectively or severally. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U75-15. Institutions of Purely Public Charity sonal, is taxable except that which is exempt under this paragraph; there is no classification under the property tax exemptions enumerated in the Constitution that could include the property of the legion post, even though it is a nonprofit organization being operated solely for the benefit of its membership and the American Legion and its property was fully acquired through the donations of the citizens of the community and the membership of the post. 1948-49 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 668 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). tution is charitable is not necessarily controlling; institution’s tangible personal property is taxable where it appears proceeds may inure to benefit of private person. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 523. Georgia Warm Springs Foundation
All property, both real and per-Description in charter that an instiand comparable organizations.: Any property used by an institution of the character of Georgia Warm Springs Foundation in its operation and any operation necessary thereto is exempted from taxation; however, any real estate owned by such an institution that is not necessary to the direct operation but is merely owned by them is subject to taxation. 1948-49 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 576. Camp grounds owned and operated tists are exempt from taxation as institution of purely public charity. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 499. come derived from pay patients is not entitled to an exemption on its intangible personal property since it cannot be classified as an institution of ‘‘purely public charity.’’ 1945-47 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 574. A Veterans of Foreign Wars post is
by Conference of Seventh-day Adven-A hospital supported largely by innot exempt from ad valorem taxation.: 1957 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 291. Colleges, Academies, and Seminaries For discussion of what educational and religious institution property is exempt from taxation. See 1952-53 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 181. sonalty subject to exemption from ad valorem taxes. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 499. If a motel owned by a college is held or used as an endowment, such property is not exempt from ad valorem taxation because it is invested in real estate. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-362. Motor vehicles owned and used by private educational institutions are
Law libraries not included in pernot exempt from ad valorem taxation.: 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-237. Homestead Exemption The purpose of this paragraph was to exempt the homestead of each bona fide resident to the extent provided. 1945-47 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 563 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The homestead exemption exempts only real property. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-1. Homestead exemption relates to state and county taxes; if a city wished to extend this or a similar exemption to municipal taxes, a constitutional amendment would be needed. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U71-98. plied to only one house. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-3. It is necessary that the applicant manent residence on property owned by the applicant to receive an exemption. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U77-6.
Homestead exemption can be apseeking exemption must have a per-Federal old-age, survivor, or disability benefits not included in determining to increase exemption.: Prior to the 1972 amendment to this paragraph, all income including federal old-age, survivor, or disability benefits was included in income in determining whether a person met the income requirements for the increased homestead exemption; the change made by the 1972 amendment, insofar as the income requirements are concerned, was to provide specifically that federal old-age, survivor, or disability benefits would not be included in income for such purposes. 1973 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 73-38.
Ordinance exempting parcels exceeding five acres.: Any city ordinance exempting parcels of property exceeding five acres in area from ad valorem taxes until the parcel is subdivided violates this paragraph and is void. 1972 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U72-100 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Exemption extended to administrator, executor, or trustee.: The 1970 amendment to this paragraph, dealing with exemptions granted to homesteads, extends the homestead exemption to property in which title is vested in an administrator, executor, or trustee where an heir or cestui que use resides on the property and claims the exemption. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Section 48-5-40.: The 1970 amendment to this paragraph was intended to clarify former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) by making it clear that in instances of multiple, undivided interests, qualified applicants could properly seek a proportionate exemption. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The 1970 amendment to this paragraph extends, as former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) did in part, the homestead exemption to owner-occupants holding an undivided interest in property. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The 1970 amendment to this paragraph made it clear, which former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) did not do, that an individual can apply for exemption if the individual was the only owner actually occupying the property. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Joint ownership.: Where there is joint ownership of the homestead property, each owner may only assert the owner’s claim as an applicant for an exemption based upon the interest the owner holds in the property. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7. Joint property owners entitled to claim interest proportion to interest
in property.: Where title to real estate is vested in two or more owners, or in an administrator, executor, or trustee, and one of the joint owners, or an heir or cestui que use, who resides on the property meets the criteria for one of the applicable homestead exemptions and applies for the Homestead Exemption (Cont’d) homestead exemption, the applicant is only entitled to claim a proportionate exemption of the amount allowed by law in proportion to which the applicant’s interest bears to the total interest of the property. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-7.
Invoking benefits triggers limitation clause of benefit.: If a taxpayer is qualified for and chooses to invoke benefits of any one of the exemptions from any one of the types of ad valorem taxes, the taxpayer necessarily triggers the limitation clause of that exemption; any attempt to take two or more similar exemptions would violate the limitation clause of each of the exemptions and cannot be done. 1974 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U74-83.
Amount of exemption qualified taxpayer entitled to.: A taxpayer who meets the qualifications of both the 1964 and 1974 exemptions would be entitled to an exemption of no more than $4,000.00 from state ad valorem taxes, $4,000.00 from county ad valorem taxes excluding those taxes levied for educational purposes, and $10,000.00 from ad valorem taxes levied for educational purposes. 1974 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U74-83. tion with the occupancy of one building except in the case of duplex or double occupancy dwellings when the line of division follows a natural and bona fide plan as to both land and buildings and the two units thus formed are separately owned and occupied. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U71-138. Where nonprofit housing facilities are made available to members of public whose incomes are insufficient to enable them to acquire adequate table property, and exempt from ad valorem tax; the fact that some charge is made for accommodations will not alter this, provided no profit is made, and no income therefrom can inure to any private person. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-186.
Not more than one homestead exemption may be claimed in connechousing, such facilities may be chari-Life tenant with remainderman responsible for ad valorem taxes.: A covenant contained in a deed conveying a life estate which makes the remainder interest responsible for paying the ad valorem taxes does not alter the ownership interests in the property for purposes of eligibility to claim the homestead exemptions allowed for the elderly. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U83-71. The board of assessors may raise a taxpayer’s homestead exemption and should do so, as the taxpayer has not waived any part of the full exemption provided in this paragraph. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 142 (see Ga. Const. 1983,Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Veterans Exemption
Method for construction of paragraph.: The amendment to this paragraph, granting an exemption of $10,000.00 to a disabled veteran, is to be read in pari materia with the original homestead provision in this paragraph, and the statutory provisions (see now O.C.G.A. Part 1, Art. 2, Ch. 5, T. 48), passed to carry the original provision into effect, should be applied also to this paragraph. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 492 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40 is applicable to disabled veterans and a disabled veteran is entitled to an exemption of $5,000.00 where the disabled veteran has a 50 percent interest in the property. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 492. Amount of exemption available to
disabled veteran and spouse.: A disabled veteran was entitled to a homestead exemption under this paragraph upon property owned jointly by the veteran and the veteran’s spouse would, under former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40), be entitled to claim only half the amount prescribed by this paragraph; the veteran’s spouse could claim an exemption of $1,000.00 on the spouse’s half of the property. 1958-59 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 340 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Veterans exemption in lieu of general exemption.: The special $25,000 homestead exemption granted to disabled veterans is in lieu of and not in addition to the $2,000.00 homestead exemption available to the general citizenry of this state. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-3. ceived by World War I veterans must be considered in determining whether a person meets income requirements for increased homestead exemption. 1972 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 72-28.
Nonservice connected pensions re-Automobiles.: Disabled veteran is not exempt from payment of ad valorem taxes on the disabled’s veteran’s automobile. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 487. Disabled veteran’s $25,000 homestead exemption is limited to real property and does not include an automobile. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 494. The language of the exemption makes it clear that unless the vehicle is owned by the disabled veteran, the exemption may not be granted. 1979 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 79-19. PERSONS AGE 65 AND OVER =cd. Homestead exemption allowed to persons 65 years of age or over is a personal right of those individuals where the income limitation is met; where there is joint ownership of the homestead property, each owner may assert the owner’s claim as an applicant for an exemption based upon the interest the owner holds in the property. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-60. stead exemptions from school taxes for certain elderly persons, is not self-executing, as demonstrated by the change in the words ‘‘shall be exempt’’ to ‘‘may be exempt,’’ the decision of whether or not to grant exemptions having been left to the discretion of the legislature. 1973 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 73-2 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). ment must be implemented on
This paragraph, authorizing home-Exemption enacted by 1972 amendstate-wide application.: The 1972 amendments to this paragraph, relating to exemptions from ad valorem taxes for educational purposes for certain persons over 62 years of age, cannot be implemented on a district by district basis but must be implemented, if at all, so as to have state-wide application. 1973 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 73-52 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Does not apply to municipalities.: This paragraph, granting a homestead exemption of $4,000.00 to certain persons 65 years of age and over, grants direct constitutional exemption from all state and county ad valorem taxes, including taxes levied for school purposes and for purposes of paying interest on and retiring bonded indebtedness, but grants no exemption from ad valorem taxes levied by municipalities. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 733 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Income limitation.: To be entitled to the homestead exemption for persons over 65 years of age, income must not exceed $4,000.00 after subtracting all deductions allowed by law from gross income. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-17. General Assembly did not intend for Ga. L. 1969, p. 960, § 1(see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-20) to apply to perstead exemption; the provisions of Ga. L. 1969, p. 960, § 1 do not eliminate the requirement that persons claiming the increased homestead exemption of $4,000.00 file an annual application for such exemption. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-236. Social security benefits must be included in computation in determining whether or not a person over 65 and that person’s spouse has met income requirements for increased homestead exemption. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-112.
sons claiming the increased home-Pension and retirement benefits.: Although this paragraph first refers to ‘‘net income,’’ which would not include certain retirement or pension payments, these pension and retirement payments must be included. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U71-53 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Personal exemptions and credits are not considered in arriving at net income. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-17. ‘‘From all sources.’’ — That something more than ‘‘taxable net income’’ was intended by the framers of this paragraph is indicated by the insertion of the words ‘‘from all sources’’ in the term ‘‘income from all sources.’’ 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 749 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV).
Responsible for city property tax.: — A home having a value of less than $4,000.00 which is owned and occupied by a 75-year-old person having an income of less than $4,000.00 per year, is subject to city property tax, but is exempt from state and county property tax; all personal clothing and furniture owned by a taxpayer are exempted from all state, county, city, and school district ad valorem tax in an amount not to exceed $300.00. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-198. Farm Products
Interpretation of farm products exemption clause.: This paragraph states: ‘‘The General Assembly shall further have power to exempt from taxation, farm products, including baled cotton grown in this state and remaining in the hands of the producer, but not longer than for the year next after their production’’; this constitutional exemption simply means that agricultural products in the hands of the producer or the farmer are exempted for a year after their production; any other exemption of agricultural products would be void. 1948-49 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 658 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). The term ‘‘farm products’’ is not limited to products of the soil, but also encompasses livestock and poultry, including laying hens, which are commonly regarded as agricultural products; such products are exempt from taxation so long as they meet other statutory criteria. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-359. Chickens remaining in hands of the producer are ‘‘farm products’’ exempt from ad valorem taxation for the next year after their production. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-359.
Effect of federal ownership.: As farm products within the hands of the producer, within the year next after their production, and all property within the scope of federal ownership are exempt from taxation, farm products owned by the producer and stored by the federal government are not within the classification of properties taxable by a municipal corporation. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 238.
Instance of ineligibility for exemption.: A person owning and operating a farm, working on the farm and being on the farm practically all day year round, but eating and sleeping in a home not owned by that person about two miles from the person’s property in the same county, would not be eligible for an exemption. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 153. A person who only lived on the person’s property a few days out of the year would not be entitled to the exemption; this would not be the case if the person was away from the person’s home serving in the armed forces. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 153. Farm products in the hands of ers are not exempt from property taxation. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-283. tal garden shrubs are not farm products as that term is used in this paragraph and are subject to property taxation. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-407 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Industry and Business Exemption In view of this paragraph, towns and counties are prohibited from tries or businesses. 1950-51 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 114 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Provision in city charter which
warehousemen who are not produc-Nursery products such as ornamengranting tax exemptions to induswould exempt corporations from taxation of realty is unconstitutional.: 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 487. opment purposes is prohibited by the Constitution and can only be allowed with respect to specific localities by constitutional amendment. 1962 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 504. Board of commissioners of a county cannot grant any exemptions from ad valorem taxation; the General Assembly may, by law, grant exemptions from ad valorem taxation but only on property enumerated in this paragraph. 1967 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 67-328 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). Exemptions to promote business
Exemption of property from ad valorem taxation for industrial develgrowth prohibited.: County commissioners cannot exempt new businesses or industries from ad valorem taxation for a given period in order to induce them to move into the county; even though the General Assembly has some authority to exempt certain property from taxation, only property specifically enumerated in this paragraph may be exempted. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-174 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art VII, Sec. II, Para. IV). If a city is located within a county, its gas facility located in the county is not subject to ad valorem taxation by the county. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-191. Property returned for taxation on January first and later sold to a municipality is not subject to be levied on for taxes in the hands of the municipality. 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 680. An electric cooperative organized under foreign state law and doing business in this state is not exempt from payment of state ad valorem taxes. 1952-53 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 183.
Property owned by a mutual fund.: — Neither former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41) nor the Constitution exempt from ad valorem taxation taxable property owned by a mutual fund. 1968 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 68-195.
Am. Jur. 2d.: 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 232 et seq.
C.J.S.: 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 252 et seq.
ALR.: Constitutionality of exemption of particular educational, religious, or charitable institution from taxation, 2 ALR 471. Taxation of property owned by public body but not devoted to public use, 3 ALR 1439; 23 ALR 248; 101 ALR 787; 129 ALR 480; 54 ALR3d 402. Constitutional enumeration of subjects of tax exemption as affecting power of Legislature to free government securities or property from taxation, 9 ALR 436. Taxation: exemption of parsonage or residence of minister or priest, 13 ALR 1196. Construction of exemption of religious body or society from taxation or special assessment, 17 ALR 1027. Tax on automobile or on its use for cost of road or street construction, improvement, or maintenance, 24 ALR 937; 68 ALR 200. Tombstone and funeral expenses as deductible items in computation of inheritance or succession tax, 28 ALR 671; 83 ALR 931. Bond or warrant of governmental subdivision as subject of taxation or exemption, 44 ALR 510. Tax on automobile, or on its use, for cost of road or street construction, improvement, or maintenance, 68 ALR 200. Exemption from taxation of property of fraternal or relief associations, 83 ALR 773. Enumeration in constitutional provision of subjects of tax as exclusive of power of Legislature to add other subjects, 100 ALR 859. What amounts to ‘‘obligation to pay money’’ within tax law, 100 ALR 871. Who is within tax or license exemption extended to mechanics or persons engaged in mechanical pursuits, 100 ALR 1033. Taxation of property owned by public body but not devoted to public use, 101 ALR 787; 129 ALR 480. Constitutional or statutory tax exemption as applied to tax for purpose of refunding bonds issued after the exemption, to retire indebtedness incurred before the exemption, 102 ALR 672. Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 108 ALR 284. What is a municipal corporation within constitutional or statutory tax exemption provisions, 108 ALR 577. Tax exemption as unconstitutionally impairing public obligations antedating the exemption, 109 ALR 817. Tax exemption as affected by failure to claim or delay in claiming it for past years, 115 ALR 1484. Exemption of property or bonds of housing authority from taxation, 133 ALR 365; 152 ALR 239. Tax exemption in respect of property held subject to an express trust by a charitable, religious, or similar body generally within benefits of exemption, 138 ALR 116. Constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion as applied to license taxes or regulations, 141 ALR 538; 146 ALR 109; 152 ALR 322. Tax exemption of educational institutions as extending to athletic fields or property used for social or recreation purposes, 143 ALR 274. ‘‘Business situs’’ for purposes of property taxation of intangibles in state other than domicile of owner, 143 ALR 361. Hospital as within tax exemption provision not specifically naming hospitals, 144 ALR 1483. Exemption of property or bonds of housing authority from taxation, 152 ALR 239. Tax exemption of property of religious, educational, or charitable body as extending to property or income thereof used in publication or sale of literature, 154 ALR 895. Equitable title under executory contract for purchase of real property as sustaining exemption from taxation, 156 ALR 1301 Property acquired by a taxing unit for delinquent taxes as exempt from taxation by another taxing unit, 162 ALR 1119. Scope and application of exemption of cemeteries from taxation, 168 ALR 283. Consent to state taxation of federal property or instrumentalities as affecting exemption thereof under provision of State Enabling Act, Constitution, or statute, 168 ALR 547. Construction of exemption of religious body or society from taxation or special assessment, 168 ALR 1222. Exemption from taxation of property of labor organization, 172 ALR 1070. Tax exemptions and the contract clause, 173 ALR 15. Constitutional exemption from taxation as subject to legislative regulation respecting conditions of its assertion, 4 ALR2d 744. Property used by personnel as living quarters or for recreation purposes as within contemplation of tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 15 ALR2d 1064; 55 ALR3d 356; 55 ALR3d 485; 61 ALR4th 1105. State taxation of motor carriers as affected by commerce clause, 17 ALR2d 421. What is a ‘‘scientific institution’’ within property tax exemption provisions, 34 ALR2d 1221. Tax exemption of real property as affected by time of acquisition of title by private owner entitled to exemption, 54 ALR2d 996. What state exemption law, in point of time, governs bankrupt’s exemption rights, 61 ALR2d 748. Legislative power to exempt from taxation property, purposes, or uses additional to those specified in Constitution, 61 ALR2d 1031. Exemption from taxation of college fraternity or sorority house, 66 ALR2d 904. Property used as dining rooms or restaurants as within tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 72 ALR2d 521. Church parking lots as entitled to tax exemptions, 75 ALR2d 1106. Tax exemption of Blue Cross, Blue Shield, or other hospital or medical service corporation, 88 ALR2d 1414. Exemption from taxation of property of agricultural fair society or association, 89 ALR2d 1104. Charitable, educational, or religious tax exemption of property held in trust for tax-exempt organization, 94 ALR2d 626. Succession and estate tax; construction of statute or regulation exempting gifts to foreign charitable, educational, or religious body on reciprocal basis, 12 ALR3d 918. Exemption of public school property from assessments for local improvements, 15 ALR3d 847. Homes for the aged as exempt from property taxation, 37 ALR3d 565. Receipt of pay from beneficiaries as affecting tax exemption of charitable institutions, 37 ALR3d 1191. Availability of tax exemption to property held on lease from exempt owner, 54 ALR3d 402. Taxation: Exemption of parsonage or residence of minister, priest, rabbi, or other church personnel, 55 ALR3d 356. Property tax: Exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55 ALR3d 430. Tax exemption of property of educational body as extending to property used by personnel as living quarters, 55 ALR3d 485. Validity of municipal admission tax for college football games or other college sponsored public events, 60 ALR3d 1027. Validity and construction of statute or ordinance allowing tax exemption for property used in pollution control, 65 ALR3d 434. Property taxation of computer software, 82 ALR3d 606. Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes affording preferential property tax treatment to land used for agricultural purposes, 98 ALR3d 916. What are educational institutions or schools within state property tax exemption provisions, 34 ALR4th 698. Exemption from real-property taxation of residential facilities maintained by hospital for patients, staff, or others, 61 ALR4th 1105. Nursing homes as exempt from property taxation, 34 ALR5th 529. Computer software or printout transactions as subject to state sales or use tax, 36 ALR5th 133.

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