Grace v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26A0619

Lashon Grace

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County

No. 21CR17017

Decided: September 9, 2026

LAND, Justice.

Lashon Grace challenges his 2022 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Holder. 1 Grace argues that the evidence was insufficient

1 Holder was killed on February 27, 2021. On June 1, 2021, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Grace for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5).

At a trial from September 19 to 22, 2022, the jury found Grace guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Grace to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, a consecutive term of 5 years in prison for Count 4, and a consecutive term of 10 years in prison for Count 5. Count 2 was vacated by operation of law, and Count 3 merged with Count 1 for sentencing purposes. On October 14, 2022, Grace filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel on April 7, 2025, and again on April 28, 2025. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on August 4, 2025, and entered a written order denying Grace’s amended motion for new trial on August 12, 2025. On September 2, 2025, Grace filed a notice of appeal. The case was dock- eted to this Court’s April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

because it did not disprove the theory that an unknown person shot Holder and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assis- tance of counsel by failing to move to strike a juror and for with- drawing her request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. Christal Toussaint, James McCarver, and Antonio Holder were employees at a furniture and tire store in DeKalb County. On the evening of February 27, 2021, Toussaint asked McCarver and Holder not to leave to make a delivery in their box truck until she was ready to leave work because she did not want to be alone at the store. As McCarver and Holder waited in their truck in the parking lot for Toussaint, they observed a car “r[u]n over” the neighboring business’s retaining wall next to the furniture store. As Toussaint finished her shift and left the store, she noticed a car’s headlights shining into the store and saw that a car had gone over a ledge of a retaining wall between the parking lot for the store and a neighboring business. There were two men in the stranded car: a larger male in the driver’s seat, later identified as Grace, and a smaller male in the passenger seat, who was never identified. 2

Holder went to speak to the driver of the car and then pulled the box truck behind the car; McCarver tied a strap be- tween the box truck and the car to help free up the car. Mean- while, Toussaint spoke to the driver of the car for “[a]bout five, ten minutes.” During Holder and McCarver’s attempts to dislodge the car, a spring on the car popped off. The driver of the car be- came “upset” and “got mad,” and his passenger stated, “he done tore your car up.” Holder told the driver that he could fix the

2 Law enforcement later determined that the car had been rented by Grace’s wife.

spring, but that he would need tools that were inside the tire shop, which he had already locked up for the evening.

As they waited for the owner of the tire shop to arrive and unlock the store, 3 McCarver stated, “[W]e’ll be right back … I got to go.” The driver of the car then told Holder, “You ain’t going no d**n where,” to which McCarver responded, “[T]he h*ll with this man. Let’s go, man.” The driver of the car pulled out a pistol, stated again that Holder was not “going nowhere,” and cocked the pistol. Holder told the driver, “[I]t ain’t got to be like that,” and reassured him that he would fix his car. McCarver then grabbed Holder and told him, “Let’s go, man.” As McCarver tried to pull Holder away, the driver put the pistol to Holder’s chin and fired. 4 The driver and passenger of the car then “took off” on foot in dif- ferent directions, and McCarver ran to a nearby police car and pointed out the man who had just shot Holder. Toussaint, who by then was inside her car, heard McCarver scream her name and saw him run to a nearby police car. When Toussaint asked where Holder was, McCarver told her, “over there.” Toussaint found Holder on the ground near the stuck car; Holder died at the scene.

At the time of Holder’s murder, two police officers were per- forming an unrelated traffic stop when a man approached them screaming that someone had just been shot by a “big man.” The man told the officers that the shooter had walked away and pointed at the suspect. Another officer arrived, and the officers stopped the suspect, later identified as Grace, less than half a

3 The furniture shop and tire shop were owned by the same person. 4 Toussaint testified that although she did not witness the shooting and never saw Grace with a gun, when Grace “walked by [her] car, he had something in his hand and [she] heard a click[.]” Toussaint testified that she did not see anything in the passenger’s hands and that he “just had a … back- pack.”

mile from the crime scene and placed him under arrest. A maga- zine containing 10mm rounds was found on Grace’s person when he was arrested. One of the officers observed Grace throw a gun on the sidewalk as he ran from the scene; this gun, along with its magazine containing 10mm rounds, was later recovered. Law en- forcement also recovered a 10mm shell casing from the crime scene, and a firearms examiner testified that the recovered weapon fired the shell casing.

Grace was taken to Atlanta Police Department headquar- ters, and a gunshot residue (“GSR”) evidence kit was collected, sent to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”), and revealed more than five particles characteristic of GSR—the highest amount that GBI reports.

The medical examiner who performed Holder’s autopsy de- termined that Holder’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to his head. The medical examiner found soot in the entrance wound to Holder’s face, as well as abrasions and lacerations consistent with the gun touching Holder’s skin when it was fired.

In the days following the murder, Toussaint and McCarver were shown photo lineups by police; Toussaint selected a photo- graph of Grace as the driver of the car, and McCarver selected a photograph of Grace as the person who shot Holder. The parties stipulated that Grace had a prior felony conviction and therefore was a convicted felon.

2. Grace argues that the evidence was insufficient to sup- port his convictions. 5 We disagree.

5 Although Grace appears to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions, his convictions for felony murder and aggra-

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was con- victed. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979); Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2022). “We leave to the jury the reso- lution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Perkins, 313 Ga. at 891 (cleaned up).

Although Grace’s appellate briefing cites to the constitu- tional sufficiency standard of Jackson, 443 US at 307, he appears to be making a statutory sufficiency argument: that the evidence was insufficient to disprove his alternative theory that another person shot and killed Holder. “Under [OCGA § 24-14-6], to sup- port a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Montgomery v. State, 323 Ga. 188, 191 (2025) (punctuation omitted). However, OCGA § 24-14-6 “only applies when the State’s case against the defendant is wholly circumstantial” and does not apply if “there is any direct evidence presented by the State.” Green v. State, 322 Ga. 617, 620

vated assault were vacated or merged for sentencing purposes, so his chal- lenges to those convictions are moot. See Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 340 (2022) (“To the extent [the defendant] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to counts that were merged for sentencing purposes or vacated by op- eration of law … such challenges are moot by virtue of those convictions being merged or vacated for purposes of sentencing.”). Grace makes no argument as to his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, instead conceding that he “at some point, obtained the firearm” used to shoot Holder “and attempted to leave the scene while carrying the firearm.”

(2025) (citation omitted). Here, to the extent Grace makes a claim under OCGA § 24-14-6, that claim fails because the State pre- sented direct evidence: eyewitness testimony that Grace pointed the gun at Holder and shot him. See Montgomery, 323 Ga. at 191 (OCGA § 24-14-6 did not apply where the State presented direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony that the defendant shot the victim).

To the extent Grace also argues that the evidence was con- stitutionally insufficient under Jackson, that claim fails because there was sufficient evidence to support Grace’s convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. McCarver testified that he was right next to Holder when Grace shot Holder in the face, Toussaint testified that Grace was the driver of the vehicle and had “something” in his hand and that she heard a click moments before the shooting, law enforce- ment witnessed Grace throw a gun later identified as the murder weapon during their pursuit of him, and GSR results showed that Grace either held or was very near the gun when it was fired. This evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process. See Dillard v. State, 321 Ga. 171, 174–75 (2025) (evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support ap- pellant’s conviction for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and other crimes, where eye- witness testified at trial that appellant shot the victim in the side of the face after the victim resisted appellant’s efforts to take his belongings).

3. Grace argues that his trial counsel rendered constitu- tionally ineffective assistance in two respects. These claims fail.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that his attorney performed his duties in an objectively un- reasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687–88. The law rec- ognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed reasona- bly, which the defendant bears the burden of overcoming. Id. at 689. And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2014) (citation omitted).

Even when a defendant has proved that his counsel’s per- formance was constitutionally deficient, the defendant also must prove resulting prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assis- tance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 US at 694. To do so, the de- fendant must establish that but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 US 86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 US at 693). Rather, the defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” of a different result, which is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 US at 694. “If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (2018). In all, the burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a heavy one. See Har- rington, 562 US at 105.

(a) Grace first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a juror during trial.

Towards the end of the second day of trial, in anticipation of jury deliberations the next day, the trial court suggested to the parties that it might be helpful to let the jurors know they should make arrangements to stay late the next day. Specifically, the trial court noted that Juror No. 10 had mentioned potential issues with making childcare arrangements.

The next morning, the trial court informed the parties that, after contacting the jurors, it had determined that if the jury was still deliberating at 5:30 p.m. that afternoon, the jurors would stop and return the following morning to continue deliberations. The trial court noted that, when asked whether she could stay past 6:30 p.m., Juror No. 10 had given the following “very long” response:

When questioned I made it aware [that] I am a sin- gle mother with no child care after 6 pm. There is no other parent for my 5 month old. Also when ques- tioned I did not mention that my father committed suicide by being shot in the neck. I did not see him dead so I did not take into account that I would be seeing gunshots to the head. Last Friday I went to the open casket viewing of a student[’]s brother who was shot in the head.

When asked by the trial court whether she could arrange for childcare so that she could stay until 6:30 or 8:00 p.m., the juror responded that she could not.

After the close of evidence, but before the jury was charged, Grace’s trial counsel asked to question Juror No. 10 outside the presence of other jurors. Trial counsel then asked Juror No. 10 to “give [her] an idea of why you were thinking it was necessary to give the court that information[?]” to which Juror No. 10 re- sponded:

And so when … you guys asked did I have a violent crime, no, because my father committed suicide, so I didn’t consider it a crime. And I never saw him dead, so I didn’t know what it looked like when a bullet enters your body and exits. And then this past week, my student’s brother was also murdered, and I … chose to go to the viewing, which was an … open cas- ket. … I just realized what both of those people went through when they were shot in the face, and it was just a lot.

Juror No. 10 also expressed concerns about childcare arrange- ments as a single mother but stated that “[i]t doesn’t change [her] opinion on the case at all.” When asked by Grace’s trial counsel whether she felt “that some of the things that [she had] expressed that [she had] experienced in the past and more recently with [her] student would affect [her] ability to analyze the evidence in this case,” Juror No. 10 answered, “[n]o, it does not.” When asked by Grace’s trial counsel whether there was “anything else that [she] wanted to share on that topic in particular,” Juror No. 10 stated that she had “also been raped” but had not mentioned it because “there was no gun involved,” that she had “see[n] a lot of trauma” in her profession, and that she was “pissed off” about the request from the court regarding childcare, but that “it doesn’t affect [her] opinion on the evidence in this case.”

The State did not ask Juror No. 10 any additional ques- tions, and Grace’s trial counsel reassured the juror that “there’s nothing wrong with the fact that [she] didn’t share that with [her] before” as voir dire is “not a normal environment to get to know someone.” After the examination of Juror No. 10 concluded, no additional action was taken by the State, Grace’s trial counsel, or the trial court regarding Juror No. 10’s continued service on the jury. During the hearing on Grace’s motion for new trial, Grace’s trial counsel testified that she remembered a “very emotional” ju- ror with a “scheduling issue.” When asked why she did not move to strike the juror, trial counsel testified that it “would make com- plete sense to have someone like that struck,” but did not remem- ber why she chose not to move to strike the juror.

In its order on Grace’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that the juror was “primarily expressing her frustration with the Court’s inquiry about being able to stay late,” that the juror “clearly stated that she could look at the evidence in the case and her concerns would not affect her opinion on the evidence,” and that the court would not have granted any motion to strike the juror.

Grace has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to move to strike Juror No. 10 constituted deficient performance. A trial court may replace a juror with an alternate when, as relevant here, the juror “upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform h[er] duty.” OCGA § 15-12-172. “Whether to strike a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be set aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Malcolm v. State, 324 Ga. 103, 112 (2026) (citation omitted). “[A] trial judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate whether a juror can render an impartial verdict, considering that the trial judge can observe a prospective juror in person and take account of her demeanor and countenance, not just the words that she speaks.” Murdock v. State, 299 Ga. 177, 179 (2016) (cleaned up).

Here, Juror No. 10 repeatedly affirmed her ability to act as a fair and impartial juror, and Grace has provided no evidence to the contrary. The trial court was able to “take account of her de- meanor and countenance,” rather than just verbal responses, put- ting the trial court in a unique position to evaluate whether Juror No. 10 was able to render an impartial verdict. See id. And in its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court expressly stated that it would not have granted a motion to strike had one been filed. Therefore, “we cannot say that trial counsel’s perfor- mance was objectively unreasonable, and therefore deficient, in this regard.” See Pounds v. State, 320 Ga. 288, 298–99 (2024) (holding that appellant failed to establish deficient performance where the “juror at issue … made specific statements to the trial court expressing her intention to make an impartial decision … and the trial court was authorized to conclude that the juror could be fair and impartial.”). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(b) Grace argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing her request for a voluntary manslaughter instruc- tion. In Grace’s requests to charge filed prior to trial, trial coun- sel requested the following charge on “Lesser Offense” 6 :

If you do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of (indicted crime), but do be- lieve beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of _____, then you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of _____, and the form of your verdict in that event would be, “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of _____.” State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 (1976).

6 Neither the State nor Grace requested a jury charge on the definition of voluntary manslaughter.

During the preliminary charge conference, the trial court stated that it “assume[d]” that the requested charge “would say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of malice murder, felony murder, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter. But I don’t know that we’ve heard the evidence here. So I thought that’s what you were saying reserve.” When the prosecutor asked to reserve the issue, the trial court also stated that it did not know whether it had “heard any slight evidence, but we can reserve.” Grace’s trial counsel then asked to reserve the issue. The next day, trial counsel withdrew the requested charge on voluntary manslaugh- ter. During the hearing on Grace’s motion for new trial, Grace’s trial counsel testified that she did not recall why she made the decision not to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter.

Here, Grace cannot show that his trial counsel was defi- cient. The shooting was precipitated by a verbal argument over a damaged car. No evidence supported a finding that Holder’s ac- tions (accidentally damaging Grace’s car as he tried to dislodge it from the retaining wall) rose to the level of provocation necessary to support a voluntary manslaughter charge. 7 Moreover, evidence that Holder and Grace had an argument, even a heated one, does not warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge. See Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. 698, 700 (2022) (voluntary manslaughter charge

7 A person commits voluntary manslaughter if he or she: acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such a passion in a reasonable person; however, if there should have been an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.

OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).

was not authorized where victim and defendant had a heated ar- gument). Because there was not even slight evidence to support a charge on voluntary manslaughter, trial counsel was not deficient for withdrawing the request. See Powell v. State, 307 Ga. 96, 105 (2019) (“Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence to support the charge.”). This claim therefore fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.