In the Matter of Richard Linwood Parsons

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26Y0667

In the Matter of Richard Linwood Parsons

Decided: July 7, 2026

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and recommendation of Special Master Adam Hames, filed pur- suant to Bar Rule 4-106(e). In the report, the Special Master rec- ommends that the Court disbar Respondent Richard Linwood Parsons (State Bar No. 882961), who has been a member of the Bar since 2012, for his violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (GRPC). Rule 8.4(a)(2), which is found in Bar Rule 4-102(d), provides that it is a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to be convicted of a felony. The maximum pen- alty for a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) is disbarment. Neither Par- sons nor the Bar has sought review by the Review Board or filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report, so the matter is now ripe for this Court’s review. Based on the record before this Court, we conclude that disbarment is appropriate in this case.

On August 4, 2025, in a New Jersey court, Parsons pleaded guilty to one count of endangering the welfare of children in the third degree in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1); three other counts were dismissed.1 See State of New Jersey v. Richard Par- sons, No. 24-04-0279-I (Mercer County Superior Court). New Jer- sey’s statutes authorize a sentence of between three and five years for the crime for which Parsons was convicted. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(3). Shortly after, the State Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings under Bar Rule 4-106 on the basis that Parsons’s con- viction would be a felony in Georgia. See OCGA § 16-1-3(5) (felony in Georgia includes any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 months). This Court appointed a Special Master, and Parsons acknowledged service of the petition and the order of appointment of the Special Master.

The Special Master held a hearing at which Parsons stipu- lated to his guilty plea in New Jersey; to having been sentenced to time served, followed by life on parole, with sex offender regis- tration requirements; and to violating Rule 8.4(a)(2) by virtue of his conviction. Although Parsons declined the opportunity to pre- sent argument or evidence as to aggravating or mitigating factors, his attorney represented that Parsons had taken steps to wrap up his law practice, including withdrawing from his cases and dis- bursing funds from his IOLTA account. The Bar noted that Par- sons had no prior disciplinary history.

The Special Master then issued his report and recommen- dation, relaying the above facts and applying the framework set out in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”). See ABA Standard 3.0 (when imposing a sanction, “a court should consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or

1 The cou nt to which he pleaded guilty accused him of engaging in sex- ually explicit conversations that would “impair or debauch the morals of a child” whom he believed to be fourteen years old.

actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the ex- istence of aggravating or mitigating factors”). Noting that all par- ties agreed that this disciplinary matter implicated ABA Stand- ard 5.1 (Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity), the Special Mas- ter concluded that the crime to which Parsons pleaded guilty was a felony involving “serious criminal conduct”; required proof that Parsons acted knowingly; and by its very “nature ha[d] the poten- tial for incredible injury.”

The Special Master then addressed aggravating and miti- gating factors, concluding, in mitigation, that Parsons lacked a disciplinary history and that he had been cooperative in this dis- ciplinary matter, see ABA Standard 9.32(a) and (e), and, in ag- gravation, that Parsons’s criminal actions were fueled by a selfish motive and that Parsons engaged in illegal conduct, ABA Stand- ard 9.22(b) and (k).

Although the Special Master noted that most attorneys who have been disbarred under Rule 8.4(a)(2) engaged in crimes of violence, drugs, or financial misdeeds, he reasoned that Par- sons’s crime was still serious, and he noted that the public would quickly lose confidence in the legal system if a person who was convicted of a sex crime directed at a child, real or perceived, was allowed to continue practicing law. See In the Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (2011) (while the “primary purpose of a discipli- nary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to incompetence or unprofessional conduct,” the Court is also concerned about protecting the public’s confidence in the legal system). Ultimately, the Special Master recommended disbarment as the appropriate discipline for Par- sons’s violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2). See In the Matter of Madison, 300 Ga. 637, 639 (2017) (disbarring attorney who violated Bar Rule 4-102(a)(2) by virtue of his felony child molestation convic- tion; rejecting attorney’s argument that disbarment was inappro- priate because his conviction “in no way implicated his relation- ship with clients”); see also In the Matter of Jones, 320 Ga. 448, 448 (2024) (accepting voluntary surrender of license from attor- ney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(2) by virtue of his guilty plea convic- tion to two felony charges of possession of child pornography); In the Matter of Smith, 282 Ga. 626, 626 (2007) (accepting voluntary surrender of license from attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(2) by virtue of his guilty plea conviction to five counts of felony child molestation). Parsons filed no exceptions to the Special Master’s report. We have reviewed the record in this case and agree that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accord- ingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Richard Linwood Par- sons be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Parsons is reminded of his duties pur- suant to Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.