In the Matter of Stanley J. Kakol, Jr.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

No. S26Y1842

In the Matter of Stanely J. Kakol, Jr.

Decided: October 14, 2026

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary surrender of license filed by Stanley J. Kakol, Jr. (Bar No. 406060) after the filing of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227(c)(2). Kakol, who has been a member of the State Bar since 1985, admits, for purposes of this petition only, that in con- nection with three matters he has violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102(d). The maximum penalty for a violation of each of these Rules is disbarment.

In regard to State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) number 7987, Kakol admits the following. A homeowner’s resi- dence was scheduled for a foreclosure sale. The homeowner’s wife passed away the previous year, the home was titled solely in her name, and her death caused a default in the reverse mortgage, leading to foreclosure proceedings. Having received numerous mailings and calls regarding the impending foreclosure, the homeowner met with a third-party company to discuss his desire to remain in his home. The third party informed the homeowner that it could save his home and had him execute paperwork, which the homeowner believed would stop the foreclosure. The documents required the homeowner to file for bankruptcy and probate his wife’s estate. The third party reached out to Kakol’s firm, explained its relationship with the homeowner, and re- tained Kakol’s services for the homeowner’s representation. Dur- ing the conversation, the third party informed Kakol it would pay for the representation and that it had a contract to purchase the home. Kakol, the third party, and the homeowner then had a tel- ephone conversation. The homeowner expressed his goal of bank- ruptcy to stop the foreclosure so he could remain in his home.

On December 4, 2022, Kakol filed the Chapter 13 bank- ruptcy petition. Due to deficiencies in the filing, the court gave a deadline to correct the filings. However, Kakol failed to file any corrective filings and the bankruptcy case was dismissed. After the home was again scheduled for foreclosure, Kakol, the third party, and the homeowner had another teleconference to discuss the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The third party paid Kakol for the homeowner’s second petition, and that same day, Kakol filed a “skeletal” petition in bankruptcy court. The court again set a deadline for Kakol to cure all deficiencies, but he failed to do so, and on March 20, 2023, the second bankruptcy filing was dismissed. For purposes of this petition, Kakol admits that based on his misconduct, he violated Rules 1.1,1 1.2,2 1.3,3 and 1.7.4

Next, with regard to SDBD No. 7988, Kakol admits the fol- lowing. On December 5, 2022, a client retained Kakol in hopes of delaying the foreclosure of his home. That same day, Kakol filed the bankruptcy petition. On December 16, 2022, Kakol filed a Mo-

1 Prov iding that, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

2 Prov iding that, “[s]ubject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representa- tion and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. … (c) [a] lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. (d) … a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.”

3 Prov iding that, “[a] lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a cli- ent despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedi- cation to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.”

4 Prov iding that, “[a] lawyer shall not represent or continue to repre- sent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materi- ally and adversely affect the representation of the client.”

tion to Impose Stay, which was granted. However, the client con- tinued to receive harassing phone calls from his mortgage lender in violation of the automatic stay. The mortgage lender filed a motion for relief and a hearing was set but then later continued. Kakol failed to respond to the motion for relief. At the scheduled hearing, both Kakol and his client appeared and testified. Follow- ing the hearing, the bankruptcy court scheduled a show-cause hearing, and during that hearing, the court determined that Kakol violated the bankruptcy court’s General Order 42-2020, re- garding specific requirements for attorney-client communication in a bankruptcy proceeding. Kakol admits that, by the foregoing, he violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3.

Finally, with regard to SDBD No. 7989, Kakol admits the following. A couple hired Kakol to represent them in 2023 in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to stop the foreclosure of their home. The same day as being retained, Kakol filed a skeletal Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. An order was filed setting deadlines for the couple to correct filing deficiencies. However, Kakol failed to make any corrective filings. The bankruptcy case was dismissed due to filing deficiencies not being corrected. Upon learning of the dismissal, Kakol filed a motion to reconsider and a hearing was scheduled for November 9, 2023. However, the couple’s lender served notice of a new foreclosure date for Tuesday, November 7, 2023, the couple’s home was subsequently foreclosed upon, and Kakol then withdrew his motion to reconsider. Kakol admits, by the foregoing, that he violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3.

The State Bar has responded – addressing the matter within the context of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, see In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (1996) – and asks this Court to accept the petition. The State Bar contends that Kakol’s petition contains admissions of fact and conduct sufficient to authorize the imposition of the discipline he has requested and meets the objectives set forth by this Court in In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (1981) (holding that the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary matter serves as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to others, and as an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession”). The State Bar also notes that Kakol has been disciplined four times in the past, including a public reprimand in 1994,5 a three-year suspension in 1998, a letter of admonition in 2007, and a Review Panel reprimand in 2010 for admitted vio- lations of Rules 1.15(II) and 8.4(a)(4). See In the Matter of Kakol, 286 Ga. 469, 470 (2010).

Having reviewed the petition and the State Bar’s response, we accept Kakol’s Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License, which is tantamount to disbarment. See Ru le 1.0(u). This resolu- tion is consistent with prior similar cases. See, e.g., In the Matter of Fleming, 317 Ga. 720, 724 (2023) (accepting petition for volun- tary surrender of license from attorney who, among other things, violated Rule 1.7(a) by representing client at the behest of client’s employer and colluding with employer to steal client’s settlement funds); In the Matter of Farnham, 313 Ga. 801, 802 (2022) (accept- ing petition for voluntary surrender of license where attorney ad- mitted, among other things, to violating Rules 1.2 and 1.3 in fail- ing to pursue client’s personal injury claim by failing to file peti- tion in probate court); In the Matter of Grable, 310 Ga. 861, 861 (2021) (accepting petition for voluntary surrender of license where attorney admitted, among other things, to violating Rules

5 In it s response, the State Bar notes an apparent typographical error in In the Matter of Kakol, 286 Ga. 469, 470 (2010), which incorrectly states that Kakol received a public reprimand in 1984, which was one year before he was admitted to the Bar.

1.2 and 1.3 in failing to complete the filing of a lawsuit on client’s behalf). Accordingly, the name Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., shall be re- moved from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Kakol is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.