Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. V. Suits against maker, endorser, etc.

Negotiable instruments generally, Art. 3, T. 11.

For article discussing aspects of third party practice (impleader) under the Georgia Civil Practice Act (Ch. 11, T. 9), see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 355 (1968). For article, ‘‘Current Problems With Venue in Georgia,’’ see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 71 (1975). For annual survey of commercial law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 119 (1991). For note discussing some complications of filing suit against a nonresident in a multiparty action or against a resident who might implead a nonresident under the venue rules, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976). For note advocating modification of constitutional venue provisions so as to avoid limitations on applicability of joinder and impleader provisions of Civil Practice Act (Ch. 11, T. 9), see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 546 (1977).

1976 Constitution.

Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. V.

Jurisdiction and venue distinguished.

Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979). sions may not be altered or changed by the legislature or the courts and the adoption of procedural devices for adjudicating claims of various parties in the same action, does not effect a change in the venue requirements of the Constitution. Pemberton v. Purifoy, 128 Ga. App. 892, 198 S.E.2d 356 (1973); Haley v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 13, 232 S.E.2d 362 (1977). Venue needs clear proof beyond

The constitutional venue provireasonable doubt.

Jury instructions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c) violated the habeas petitioner’s due process rights when Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. V made venue an essential element of malice murder, and the instruction’s mandate that jurors had to consider the cause of death to have occurred where the body was found improperly shifted the burden of proving otherwise onto the defendant. Owens v. McLaughlin, 733 F.3d 320 (11th Cir. 2013). ers thereon are residents of different counties, joint suit against drawer and endorsers must be brought in county of drawer’s residence, in the absence of a waiver by the drawer of jurisdiction over the drawer’s person. Pioneer Prods., Inc. v. Sinclair, 92 Ga. App. 95, 88 S.E.2d 43 (1955). Suit instituted against drawer of check in county other than place of

Where drawer of check and endorsbusiness or incorporation lacked requisite jurisdiction.

Where check was drawn by defendant corporation incorporated in one county and having and maintaining an office and place of business in another county, payable to the order of the endorsers, a partnership composed of partners resident in a third county, and plaintiff instituted suit upon the check against the drawer and the endorsers in a city court in the third county, that court was without jurisdiction of the defendant drawer. Pioneer Prods., Inc. v. Sinclair, 92 Ga. App. 95, 88 S.E.2d 43 (1955).

Resident defendant must have substantial equitable interest.

The Superior Court of Murray County did not have jurisdiction to entertain a case for a declaratory judgment where all of the parties defendant except one defendant, against whom no substantial equitable relief was prayed, were nonresidents of Murray County, the equitable feature of the case is removed, leaving the action solely one at law under Ga. L. 1945, p. 137, § 13 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9). The venue of such an action is in the county where the defendant resides, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI). The nonresident defendants not being of the class of persons who may be sued in counties other than the counties of their residence as permitted by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983,Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV), and this paragraph, the court was without jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment as to their rights. Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466, 111 S.E.2d 85 (1959) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. V). Cited in Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970); Register v. Stone’s Indep. Oil Distribs., 122 Ga. App. 335, 177 S.E.2d 92 (1970).

Am. Jur. 2d.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 26, 33.

C.J.S.

92A C.J.S., Venue, §§ 111 et seq., 121 et seq.

ALR.

Different or same venue or place of trial of proceeding or issue, and effect thereof, in respect of main action and ancillary garnishment or attachment, 139 ALR 1478. Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 ALR2d 693. Waiver by national bank of statutory right to be sued in district where established or in which it is located, 1 ALR3d 904. Right of accused in misdemeanor prosecution to change of venue on grounds of inability to secure fair trial and the like, 34 ALR3d 804. Liability of surety on infant’s contract or obligation, where contract is disaffirmed by infant, 44 ALR3d 1417.