Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. IV. Jurisdiction over questions of law from state appellate or federal district or appellate courts.

The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 2003, p. 404, § 1) which revised Paragraph IV was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election held on November 2, 2004.

Certification of questions from federal courts as to Georgia law, Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, Rule 46.

For article, ‘‘Georgia’s Constitutional Scheme for State Appellate Jurisdiction,’’ see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 24 (2001).

1976 Constitution.

Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VII.

questions seeking advisory or anticipatory answers.

Because a federal district court certified questions regarding potential issues in a litigation and the certified questions addressed matters that either were previously decided in a prior certified opinion, were advisory or anticipatory in nature, or appeared to involve determinations properly made under federal practice and procedure, the court declined to answer the certified questions. CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 279 Ga. 655, 619 S.E.2d 597 (2005).

Habeas corpus.

Defendant’s ‘‘Motion to Set Aside Sentences’’ was not an appropriate remedy and should have been considered as a petition for habeas corpus. State v. McCrary, 193 Ga. App. 11, 387 S.E.2d 10 (1989), aff’d, 259 Ga. 830, 388 S.E.2d 682 (1990).

No certification for moot questions.

— While federal district courts could certify open questions of law under the Georgia state constitution and relevant state statutes to the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. IV, O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9, and Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 46-48, because the direct actions by plaintiff insureds against defendant insurer were barred by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 for failure to have first obtained a judgment against their uninsured motorists, the insureds’ request for certification of a question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia, to determine whether Georgia precedent prohibited the insurer from asserting set-offs in the payment of uninsured motorist personal injury claims was not warranted. Harden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08-15008, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16095 (11th Cir. July 22, 2009). Cited in Varner v. Century Fin. Co., 720 F.2d 1228 (11th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 732 F.2d 129 (11th Cir. 1984); Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985); Abney v. Cox Enters., 777 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1985); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Celotex Corp., 854 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1988); Kitchen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 19 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1994); Hardin v. NBC Universal, Inc., 283 Ga. 477, 660 S.E.2d 374 (2008); Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10 (2009); Harden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08-15008, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16095 (11th Cir. July 22, 2009) (Unpublished).