Davis v. State

In 1997, Detrik Lamon Davis pleaded guilty in Lincoln County to felony murder, aggravated assault, and attempted feticide after setting his pregnant stepsister on fire, and he received a plea deal of life plus ten years. He did not appeal at the time. In 2019, more than two decades later, Davis filed a motion asking the superior court to let him file a late (out-of-time) appeal, arguing his lawyer's failure to discuss his appeal rights amounted to ineffective assistance. The superior court held a hearing, heard testimony from Davis and his former lawyer, and denied the motion. Davis appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, also arguing he should have had a lawyer appointed to help him file the motion. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both arguments and affirmed the denial, concluding Davis never showed a real interest in appealing and got the exact plea deal he wanted.

A defendant is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal unless he shows his lawyer's deficient performance deprived him of an appeal he otherwise would have pursued; because Davis got the plea deal he sought, expressed no dissatisfaction, and showed no interest in appealing for 22 years, he failed to meet that standard, and he also had no right to appointed counsel for the motion itself.

The ruling confirms that Georgia defendants who plead guilty are not automatically entitled to appointed counsel when seeking a late appeal years later, and that courts can deny such requests when the record shows the defendant was satisfied with the plea and showed no interest in appealing.

Affirmed

1. The court applied the rule that a motion for an out-of-time appeal is not part of a defendant's first appeal of right, so a defendant seeking one has no constitutional right to appointed counsel to help prepare it.
2. The court applied the Strickland standard (a two-part test asking whether a lawyer's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency caused harm) to evaluate whether Davis's lawyer's failure to discuss appeal rights after the guilty plea was constitutionally deficient.
3. Using the framework from Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the court asked whether a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal or whether Davis had shown his lawyer he was interested in appealing, noting that a guilty plea narrows the appealable issues and can signal a desire to end the case.
4. Applying that framework to the facts, the court found Davis received the exact plea bargain he sought, expressed no dissatisfaction with it, reserved no appeal rights, and showed no interest in appealing for 22 years, so no rational defendant would have wanted to appeal and Davis did not show interest to counsel.
5. Because Davis could not show his appeal of right was lost due to his lawyer's deficient performance, the court concluded he failed to establish grounds for an out-of-time appeal, and the trial court's denial was not an abuse of discretion, meaning it was a reasonable exercise of the judge's authority.

• out-of-time appeal
• guilty plea
• ineffective assistance of counsel
• right to counsel
• felony murder