In the Matter of D. Duston Tapley, Jr

D. Duston Tapley, Jr., a Georgia lawyer since 1977, told a Richmond County judge in 2018 that he was no longer physically and mentally able to represent clients adequately, citing dizziness, hearing loss, and fading stamina. After other judges also raised concerns, Tapley agreed to withdraw from cases in two circuits, but later got a psychological evaluation suggesting his general cognitive ability was normal for his age, and he then denied having any competency problems. The State Bar sought to have him removed from practice under a rule allowing removal for cognitive impairment, and also claimed he violated rules requiring competent, diligent representation. A special master agreed with the Bar and granted summary judgment against Tapley without a trial, reasoning that the psychologist's report did not specifically address his ability to practice law. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that the psychologist's evaluation was relevant evidence and enough to create a genuine dispute of fact. It rejected the special master's recommendation and sent the case back for an evidentiary hearing.

A general psychological evaluation of an attorney's cognitive functioning is relevant evidence on the question of competency to practice law even if it does not specifically assess legal competency, and here it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment against the attorney on both the Bar Rule 4-104 incompetency claim and the related rule violations.

The decision protects attorneys facing incompetency claims from being removed from practice without a hearing based solely on their own prior statements, and clarifies that general psychological evaluations can count as relevant evidence even if they don't directly address legal competency, affecting how future bar discipline cases are litigated.

Recommendation rejected; case remanded for an evidentiary hearing

1. The court applied the summary judgment standard, which requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the person opposing the motion (here, Tapley) and asks whether there is any genuine factual dispute left for a hearing.
2. The special master had ruled that a psychologist's evaluation of Tapley's general cognitive abilities was irrelevant because it did not specifically address his capacity to practice law, relying on a prior case, In the Matter of Moore, involving a different attorney's reinstatement conditions.
3. The court explained that Moore only addressed whether that attorney satisfied a specific court-ordered condition, not a general rule that psychological evaluations are irrelevant unless they directly assess legal competency, and clarified that relevance and probative value are distinct legal concepts.
4. Applying that distinction, the court found the psychologist's evaluation of Tapley's general cognitive functioning was relevant to his legal competency and, even if less persuasive than a targeted evaluation would be, was enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact.
5. Because that factual dispute undercut the finding of incompetency, and the alleged violations of the competent-representation and diligence rules were based on that same incompetency finding, the court rejected the special master's recommendations on all those points and sent the case back for a full hearing.

• attorney discipline
• cognitive impairment
• State Bar of Georgia
• summary judgment
• competency to practice law