Wright v. State

Shakur Wright pleaded guilty to malice murder and related charges in Fulton County after fatally shooting Benjamin Thompson during a fight at a house where drugs were being sold. Ten days after sentencing, Wright tried to withdraw his plea, arguing his plea lawyer never warned him that withdrawing after sentencing would require proving a 'manifest injustice,' a tougher standard than withdrawing before sentencing. At a hearing, only Wright's plea lawyer testified, saying he told Wright he could withdraw automatically during the plea hearing itself but that afterward it would take a motion decided at the judge's discretion, and that he even mentioned the manifest injustice standard. The trial court found this advice was accurate and denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed, holding that Wright failed to show his lawyer's performance was deficient or that he would have gone to trial otherwise, and it affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.

The court held that a plea lawyer is not required in every case to specifically inform a defendant about the heightened 'manifest injustice' standard for withdrawing a guilty plea after sentencing, so long as the lawyer accurately explains the defendant's absolute right to withdraw before sentencing; because Wright's lawyer did so, there was no deficient performance and no abuse of discretion in denying withdrawal.

The ruling clarifies for Georgia defense lawyers and defendants that a lawyer need not always spell out the exact 'manifest injustice' standard, so long as the defendant is accurately told about the right to withdraw a plea before sentencing and the more limited options afterward.

Affirmed

1. To win his ineffective-assistance claim, Wright had to satisfy the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: show his plea lawyer's performance fell below a reasonable standard, and show that but for the lawyer's errors he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty.
2. The trial court found, based on the lawyer's testimony, that Wright was accurately told he had an absolute right to withdraw his plea during the plea hearing itself, and that afterward any withdrawal would require a motion decided at the judge's discretion; the appellate court accepted these factual findings because they were not clearly erroneous.
3. The court distinguished this case from its earlier decision in Nelson v. Wilkey, where the defendant's lawyer never told him he could withdraw his plea before sentencing at all, causing him to lose that absolute right and face the tougher manifest injustice burden without warning.
4. Because Nelson only required that a lawyer accurately advise a defendant about the pre-sentencing right to withdraw a plea, and did not create a blanket rule requiring lawyers to always explain the manifest injustice standard, Wright's lawyer's advice here was not deficient.
5. Since Wright failed to prove deficient performance or that he would have chosen trial otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the standard under which a plea-withdrawal ruling is only overturned for a clear misuse of the judge's authority, in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.

• guilty plea withdrawal
• ineffective assistance of counsel
• malice murder conviction
• manifest injustice standard
• Fulton County