The LAMAR COMPANY, LLC v. NORTH FULTON OUTDOOR, LLC

A local zoning board ordered The Lamar Company to remove LED displays from a billboard it was building. Lamar challenged that order in the Superior Court of Fulton County, which upheld the board's decision but left some of Lamar's other claims unresolved. Lamar then tried to appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia using a discretionary application, but that court dismissed the appeal, saying it only had power to review final rulings under the zoning appeals statute and that the superior court's ruling was not final. Lamar asked the Supreme Court of Georgia to review that dismissal, arguing the Court of Appeals never actually decided whether the ruling was really an interlocutory injunction, a type of order that can be appealed right away under a different statute. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed, explaining that the two appeal statutes are not competing options but can both apply to the same order, and sent the case back for the Court of Appeals to sort out which one governs here.

The court held that Georgia's two appeal statutes, one requiring a discretionary application for review of administrative decisions and one allowing immediate appeal of injunctions, are not conflicting alternatives but can both apply to the same order, so the Court of Appeals must first determine whether the superior court's ruling was an interlocutory injunction before deciding it lacked jurisdiction.

The ruling clarifies how Georgia businesses and property owners must navigate overlapping appeal rules when challenging local zoning and administrative decisions in superior court, and prevents appellate courts from dismissing appeals without first pinning down what kind of order is actually being appealed.

Vacated and remanded with direction

1. The court explained that Georgia's appeal statute for administrative rulings, OCGA § 5-6-35, requires a discretionary application (asking permission to appeal) for certain rulings, including superior court review of zoning and other agency decisions.
2. It explained that a separate statute, OCGA § 5-6-34(a), lists rulings, including orders granting or denying interlocutory injunctions (temporary court orders blocking or allowing action while a case is pending), that can be appealed immediately without needing prior court permission.
3. The court clarified that these two statutes are not competing, conflicting appeal routes; a single order can fall under both, meaning a nonfinal injunction in a case that also involves review of an administrative agency's decision must still be appealed by discretionary application even though it is otherwise immediately appealable.
4. Because the Court of Appeals treated the statutes as conflicting and never decided whether the superior court's ruling actually qualified as an interlocutory injunction, it wrongly concluded it lacked jurisdiction without resolving that threshold question.
5. The court therefore vacated the dismissal and sent the case back so the Court of Appeals can first determine whether the superior court's order is an interlocutory injunction and, if so, whether it has jurisdiction over Lamar's discretionary appeal.

• billboard dispute
• zoning appeal
• discretionary appeal
• interlocutory injunction
• appellate jurisdiction